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This thesis seeks to find greater understanding in how to understand the concept of
‘effectiveness’ in a regime such as that to control biological weapons which has at its core
an international treaty, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.  Previous work in this
field has been highly theoretical and this thesis identifies: limitations in existing theories
as applied to this regime; gaps between theory and practice; and limits to common
perceptions of issues within the regime.
In order to create a new conceptualization of effectiveness, definitions for four
dimensions — Threat Ambition, Coherence/Engagement, Availability/Opportunity, and
Resilience — were developed to sit within a new framework of assessment for evaluating
effectiveness within the regime to control biological weapons.  
Limitations were also identified in policy analysis techniques focused on influences
towards particular outcomes as these bring with them a severe analytical limitation as
correlation does not equate with causation.  However, an analysis of hindrances/obstacles
to particular outcomes brings with it a means of analysis that allows for a separation of
influences and identification in which circumstances certain influences may have been
critical to a particular outcome.  This is the inspiration for a new analysis tool — a
conjectured generic idealized policy decision — which is then tested for the first time.
Triangulation between the two analytical techniques, the framework of analysis to
understand effectiveness within the regime to control biological weapons [the top-down
approach] and the conjectured generic idealized policy decision to see how the regime
impacts upon national policy processes [the bottom-up approach], indicates both have




AHG Ad Hoc Group — the BWC States Parties agreed at a Special Conference in 1994
to establish the ‘Ad Hoc Group’ to negotiate a legally binding protocol to the
Convention that would have included certain measures to strengthen it, including
verification measures.  The negotiations were brought to a standstill in the middle of
2001 when the United States announced that they would not be able to accept any
product that would result from the negotiations.
BINGO business interest non-governmental organization [see also NGO and PINGO]
BTWC see BWC
BWC The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction
is commonly known by two names: the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).  The Convention was opened
for signature on 10 April 1972 and it entered into force on 26 March 1975.
CBM Confidence-Building Measure
CBW Chemical and biological warfare
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy [EU]
CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies
CoW Committee of the Whole
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, is commonly known as the
Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC   The Convention was opened for signature
on 13 January 1993 and it entered into force on 29 April 1997.
ENDC Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FTR Free Text Retrieval
HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, commonly known as ‘bird flu’
HSP Harvard Sussex Program
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAP Inter Academy Panel for International Issues
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ISU Implementation Support Unit — established by the Sixth BWC Review Conference
JACKSNNZ An informal grouping within the BWC (pronounced ‘jacksons’ and
sometimes referred to as the Jackson-7) that first appeared in this form at the Sixth
Review Conference in 2006 comprising Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea,
Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand.
LRTAP Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution [Convention]
MERS Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
MSP Meeting of States Parties
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MX Meeting of Experts
NACD non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NGO non-governmental organization [see also BINGO and PINGO]
NPT The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is commonly known as
the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT.  The treaty was opened for signature on 1 July
1968 and it entered into force on 5 March 1970
OIE World Organization for Animal Health (original title Office Internationale des
Épizooties)
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [a body established by the
Chemical Weapons Convention]
PINGO public interest non-governmental organization [see also BINGO and NGO]
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
VEREX Group of Verification Experts [BWC]
VERTIC Verification Research, Training and Information Centre [previously the
Verification Technology Information Centre until 1998]
WHO World Health Organization
WMD Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction
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1. Introduction
There are international efforts to control biological weapons at a variety of levels,
including sub-national, national and international.  The characteristics of these efforts
have to be identified.  There has been considerable literature on the regime to control
biological weapons and this needs analysing to discover whether there has been single or
multiple approaches to analysis.  If there are multiple approaches, are there particular
lessons that might be drawn for analysis of effectiveness?
Biological weapons have been subject to prohibitions since before the basic
mechanisms of disease were understood.  For example, the taboo against the use of poison
weapons is longstanding, such as the Manu code in Hindu law and the Saracen code of
warfare in Islamic law which predate by centuries the earliest of the post-industrial
revolution efforts at prohibition such as the 1874 Brussels declaration; all of which were
enunciated before the germ theory of disease had been understood.1  In parallel with these
prohibitions, many of which have been simply declaratory in nature, there had been
practical efforts to counter the acquisition or use of these weapons.
A major turning point was the signing of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC)2 which now lies at the core of the regime to control biological weapons; although,
as will be illustrated later, the regime is far broader than the Convention.  Since the
resumed Fifth BWC Review Conference in 2002 there have been inter-sessional meetings
which allow for engagement between the States Parties and others at expert and at
political levels.
In the absence of a unified conceptualization of effectiveness across the regime to
control biological weapons across governments or within academia, the inputs into these
Chapter 1
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1. For an exploration of the taboo, see Catherine Jefferson, ‘The Taboo of Chemical and Biological
Weapons: Nature, Norms and International Law’, DPhil thesis, University of Sussex, 2009.
2. The text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction was negotiated over a three-year period in
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) [renamed the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament in August 1969] which concluded an agreed text in 1971.  On 16 December of that
year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution commending the Convention to all
states.  The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and it entered into force on 26
March 1975.  The Convention is commonly known by two names: the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
inter-sessional meetings provide a means to generate new understandings of what is
desired as effectiveness by regime participants.
The basic thrust of this thesis is to identify what is understood already; identify the
puzzle to be solved; ascertain the questions required to solve the puzzle; seek the
information needed to provide an answer to the questions; and, having done all of these,
reach some conclusions.
Chapter outline
The substantive part of this Chapter begins with an initial examination of what
effectiveness actually means, leading into identification of the research problem to be
tackled and some basic assumptions that underpin the research.  This is followed by an
outline of methodology used and description of the types of data available and how that
data is handled; this section includes some background information on the author’s
involvement with relevant international processes.  The overall structure of the thesis is
outlined and the Chapter concludes with an exploration of the Research Problem and
Research Questions
What is meant by effectiveness?
The Oxford English Dictionary does not include a separate definition of effectiveness but
includes an entry for effective that contains the following two definitions:
Concerned with, or having the function of, carrying into effect, executing, or
accomplishing
That is attended with result or has an effect3
Clearly, if an activity has identifiable objectives, the question of whether those
objectives have been achieved is key to understanding whether that activity has been
effective.  However, if the activity has objectives that cannot be clearly defined — or has
a clearly defined ultimate objective but difficult to define sub-objectives or other
intermediate steps needed to reach the ultimate objective — a simple measure of
effectiveness may be impossible.
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3. As cited under the entry ‘effective’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), vol V (Dvandva-Follis), p 80.
In the case of the subject matter of this thesis, there are some commonly understood
objectives, such as non-use and non-acquisition of biological weapons.  However, these
objectives are not simply achieved (or not) in isolation, but they can be heavily dependent
on other activities within the regime, such as whether restrictions are placed on the
possible use of certain materials and technologies for hostile purposes.  In this regard,
effectiveness could be seen as dependent on implementation of regime obligations.
If the overall policy objective of the regime to control biological weapons that is
simplest to define is to reduce any potential threat presented by biological weapons then
does any progress in this direction count as effectiveness within the regime?  For example,
if this progress results from behaviour that would have taken place notwithstanding the
existence of the regime, could the regime (in terms of international relations theory) be
considered effective?  In such circumstances the regime itself would have contributed
nothing from the perspective of the study of international relations and so could not be
considered to have been effective in those terms, notwithstanding that from the
perspective of those wanting to control biological weapons, the measures taken had
effectively controlled acquisition of biological weapons.
The work within this thesis is focused on issues of implementation effectiveness rather
than theoretical issues of regime cooperation effectiveness.
Within any activity, there may be unstated or implicit functions that may be seen as
contributions of effectiveness, such as the creation of a community dealing with a
particular issue area or the use of one activity to solve other problems.4
The research problem outlined
As will be elaborated in more detail later, in an ideal world, there would be a relatively
basic research problem to tackle within a thesis such as this, i.e., ‘is there a single, easily
understandable and explainable, measure of effectiveness in relation to the regime to
Chapter 1
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4. During the 1990s, during an entirely separate project, the current author was able to interview John
Edmonds who had been UK ambassador to the trilateral (UK-USA-USSR) negotiations on a nuclear
test ban which had been taking place when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.  He explained that the
negotiations continued, notwithstanding there was no hope of reaching a conclusion on the stated
subject matter, as the regular meetings were found to be extremely useful for the participating
governments to promote communication at a time of tension as it was the only forum at which the
three governments were represented at a senior level without other delegations being present.
control biological weapons’.  The answer to this question is itself very simple: it is ‘no’.
The regime to control biological weapons covers a broad spread of activities and therefore
it is not possible to define a single measure for effectiveness.
The lack of a simple measure of effectiveness means that the Research Problem that
this thesis seeks to resolve can be defined in the following terms:
How should success or failure, and therefore ‘effectiveness’, in a regime such as
that to control biological weapons be categorised and assessed?
This research problem will be tackled through two research questions.  The first of these
is:
How can the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in relation to the regime to control
biological weapons be broken down into separate dimensions in order to create a
more rigorous framework of assessment?
Such dimensions would need to be defined so as to encompass all activities that might
enhance the effectiveness of the regime.  It might be that some possible activities might be
regarded differently by different participants in the regime, so some might regard an
activity as enhancing effectiveness while others believe that it does not.  Any individual
axis or dimension will include positive as well as negative developments.  These are
sometimes best expressed as successes or failures in such an axis or dimension.
This Research Question can be summarised as looking at regime effectiveness from a
top-down perspective.  A particular difficulty with this approach is that it doesn’t allow
for an analysis of the policy structures within governments.  In order to have confidence
in the top-down analysis it is necessary to examine similar issues from a bottom-up
perspective which then allows triangulation of the results.
Therefore the second Research Question tackled in this thesis is:
Can analysis of policy processes within governmental structures identify whether
activities within the regime to control biological weapons impinge upon such
policy processes?
Triangulation of the results of the two research questions will allow for the drawing of
conclusions as to how effectiveness of the regime is understood by the participants in the
Chapter 1
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regime to control biological weapons and provide an evidence base to substantiate these
findings.
The Research Problem and Research Questions are discussed further later in this
Chapter.
Basic assumptions underpinning this thesis
All research starts from a set of assumptions that frame the work of the researcher.
Sometimes these assumptions are implicit, but there may be benefits in being explicit
about them in this case.  The assumptions outlined below are designed to frame the logic
of the argument provided in this thesis.  The assumptions outlined here are not designed
to be formal research hypotheses and they do not have a one-to-one relationship to the
research questions that are identified later.  They are instead intended to guide thinking
and to bring any underlying assumptions into the open.  Indeed, it is important to do this
to identify where assumptions may or may not be contested.
The initial assumption underpinning the issues relating to this thesis can be
summarized as:
the potential use of biological weapons is something to be avoided if possible and
the potential for use can be reduced by making acquisition of such weapons more
difficult.
While this might be a perspective held by many, if not the majority, of people of the world
in the early years of the twenty-first century, it is clearly not a universal view.  Indeed, it
can clearly be argued that anyone trying to acquire biological weapons does not hold this
view.
As will be elaborated later, the events of 2001 created a significant juncture in the
history of the regime.  The main working assumption relating to this thesis follows on
from this and can be elaborated as:
in the first decade of the twenty-first century many governments aimed to
strengthen the regime to control biological weapons despite US efforts to
downplay the treaty-based elements of the regime.
Chapter 1
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While this might appear at first sight to be a simple assumption, there are complicated
aspects.  While there was substantial activity by many governments on issues relating to
biological threats, there is also implicit within this assumption a further assumption that
there could be other reasons for these activities in some cases.
A third assumption relates to the nature of biological weapons themselves:
biological weapons have distinct characteristics in relation to their potentials for
use, their acquisition and their political context; meaning that the policy responses
to the threat of biological weapons should have distinct characteristics.
Biological weapons and activities to counter them have clear dissimilarities from many
other areas of international policy.  Potential threats posed by biological weapons are
aggregated by many into a collection of potential threats identified as so-called ‘weapons
of mass destruction’, for which there are a number of policy responses (see Chapter 2).
However, biological weapons have distinct characteristics in relation to their potentials
for use, their acquisition and their political context; this means that the policy responses to
the threat of biological weapons should have distinct characteristics (see Chapter 4).
However many within governments and within the external analytical communities
conflate the WMD issues in considering policy responses.  Moreover, as biological
weapons are essentially tools for deliberate disease, the counters to them require the
involvement of activities not usually involved in international policy organs (see Chapter
8).
The fourth assumption is one that is contradictory with traditional international
relations theory:
governments may not act as unified actors in this policy area.
As will be illustrated later, many of the activities within the regime to control biological
weapons are carried out by actors not normally involved with inter-governmental
activities.  It will be illustrated during this thesis that separate actors within governments
have different influences on their actions and different expectations of possible outcomes
(see Chapter 7).  To put it another way, activities to control materials and technologies
relevant to the control of biological weapons involves many more government
departments than is usual in inter-governmental issues.  It is quite reasonable to assume
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that the influences on and perspectives of officials from ministries of foreign affairs may
be different from those from ministries of health.
To strengthen the regime means the regime must in some way become more effective,
but what does ‘effective’ mean?  Indeed, what is understood by ‘the regime to control
biological weapons’?  If an understanding can be reached, in one form or another, on what
is meant by the regime and by effectiveness, this then leads to a further assumption:
An assessment of effectiveness of the regime to control biological weapons can
be made in one form or another
If no such assessment can be made, what are the guiding influences to policy and how can
policy itself be evaluated?  In working through this assumption, it would have to be
established whether there was a single measure of effectiveness or whether any such
assessment would have to be made in more than one dimension.  Does an increase in
effectiveness mean increasing intensity of existing measures or does it require additional
activities to be carried out?
There is a final assumption relating to the passage of time:
The events of 2001 were a watershed for the efforts to control biological weapons.
The rejection by the US of the draft protocol to strengthen the BWC followed by
the use of the US postal service as a delivery system for powdered Bacillus
anthracis forced governments around the world to consider how materials and
technologies that could be used to make biological weapons should be controlled.
These assumptions will be revisited in the chapters and the conclusions section of this
thesis.
The genesis of this thesis
This thesis is an examination of regime effectiveness, yet it started as an examination of
how the European Union’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy had evolved and how
the EU was learning to face new challenges in this sphere.  To fulfil this original purpose,
a case study of the regime to control biological weapons in the period starting 2001 was
selected.  This case study would be evaluated against the body of literature known as
‘Regime Theory’.  However, it became apparent as the work progressed that there were
few existing practical tools to evaluate effectiveness in such a regime, all of which had
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significant limitations or flaws in their application (see Chapter 6).  The lack of a means
to evaluate effectiveness created significant methodological limitations as to how the
activities of the EU, its institutions and its member states could be analysed.
As time progressed, the work for the thesis ended up being dominated by the process
of creating a framework of assessment to evaluate effectiveness to the extent that it
became logical to make this methodology the primary focus of the thesis.
Methodology — How to grasp the concept of effectiveness?
As noted in the introduction to the Research Problem, in an idealized world, there would
be a simple unified conceptualization of effectiveness.  Yet, when official meetings of the
states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention take place in Geneva, there can be
over 100 States Parties in the room — in such circumstances, could there be a realistic
expectation of a consensus understanding of what effectiveness is?  Indeed, this lack of
consensus goes to the heart of the difficulties of policy analysis in this field.  The classic
precepts of policy analysis start with coming to a single agreed definition of the problem;
something that would be difficult for a BWC meeting to arrive at a conclusion on.
While this limitation applies to many areas of international policy that are subject to
academic study, the regime to control biological weapons brings with it additional layers
of complexity.  While governments which attend meetings of the Biological Weapons
Convention will intend to have a unified position on matters under discussion, it is clear
that an official from a foreign affairs ministry will have a different perspective on some
issues from an official in a health ministry or one from an education ministry.  All of these
ministries have been represented at different times at the meetings the Biological
Weapons Convention.  For example, during the period relevant to the thesis, the UK has
included on its delegation officials from the Department for Environment Food and Rural
Affairs, Department of Transport, Food and Environment Research Agency, Food
Standards Agency, Health and Safety Executive, Health Protection Agency, Home Office,
Office of Science and Technology, Veterinary Laboratories Agency [later Animal Health
and Veterinary Laboratories Agency] in addition to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
Ministry of Defence and the Department of Trade & Industry [later Department for
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (from 2007), then Department Energy and
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Climate Change (from 2009)] that would usually be expected to attend.  (See Chapter 8,
page 204 for a tabulation of this data.)  Countries that have included ministry of education
representatives on their delegations have included the Netherlands, Romania and
Ukraine.5
It therefore follows that while an understanding of effectiveness could be obtained
through usual literature research, this would have significant limitations as this is often
focused on traditional international relations aspects.  A more productive option would be
to take advantage of an underused resource that would allow for a more comprehensive
understanding of the conceptualization of effectiveness within governments and that is the
wide variety of inputs that have been made to the inter-sessional meetings of the
Biological Weapons Convention.  However, these inputs need to be utilised within
suitable frameworks of analysis.
The author’s involvement with BWC and related processes
A further reason for utilizing the inputs into the inter-sessional meetings has been the
extensive familiarity of the present author with the inter-sessional process, other BWC
meetings and other related processes.
The author attended most days of the inter-sessional meetings in the period 2003-2005
as the Project Leader, Chemical and Biological Warfare Project, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute.  The exceptions were the 2003 Meeting of Experts, the second
week of the 2005 Meeting of Experts and two days of the 2005 Meeting of States Parties.
The 2004 MX and MSP coincided with a project the author was carrying out on EU policy
regarding control of biological weapons that was sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Affairs during the Dutch EU Presidency.  The author’s perspectives on the
meetings were written up in the relevant SIPRI Yearbook chapters.6
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5. This data has been compiled from the ‘List of Participants’ circulated at each meeting by the
secretariat.
6. Richard Guthrie, John Hart, Frida Kuhlau and Jacqueline Simon, ‘Chemical and biological warfare
developments and arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2004, (Stockholm/Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford
University Press, 2004), pp 659–96; Richard Guthrie, John Hart and Frida Kuhlau, ‘Chemical and
biological warfare developments and arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005, (Stockholm/Oxford:
SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 2005), pp 603–28; and Richard Guthrie, John Hart and Frida
Kuhlau, ‘Chemical and biological warfare developments and arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006,
(Stockholm/Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 2006), pp 707–31.
The author attended every day of the Sixth Review Conference (2006), the Seventh
Review Conference (2011), and the inter-sessional meetings between them as well as the
inter-sessional meetings in the period 2012-20157 on behalf of the BioWeapons
Prevention Project (BWPP) — a network of non-governmental bodies — for whom he
wrote daily reports.8  The writing of the daily reports has allowed for unique insights into
the process as most delegates who are active in any way with the BWC processes are keen
to have their interventions and other activities recorded in the reports.  This has allowed
for a level of interaction and engagement with members of delegations unparalleled
within the non-governmental community.  Indeed, the instant feedback of interacting with
delegates about what has been written regarding the events of the previous day proved
extremely useful in trying to understand the various perspectives of delegations.  The
freshness of interactions on the day or within days that proposals were made was
extremely useful.  In an ongoing process like that around the BWC, there is always a
danger of fading memories on particular details.
The author also produced Briefing Books, in association with former colleagues at the
Harvard Sussex Program, for the 2006 and 2011 Review Conferences.9  As these were
financed by governments active in the BWC processes — the Netherlands in the case of
the 2006 edition and the United Kingdom for 2011 — this gave additional credibility to
the author’s activities in the eyes of many delegations.
It should be noted that the meetings at the focus of this thesis — the annual BWC
Meetings of Experts — do not take decisions nor do they agree any form of consensus text
other than an uncontroversial procedural report.  The meetings are designed to be
primarily exchanges of views, perspectives and experiences.  The other types of BWC
meetings held during the period under consideration do take decisions (Review
Conferences) or agree consensus substantive reports (Meetings of States Parties); in
neither case was the current author directly involved in any formal decisions or
agreements.  There would have been limits to what would be appropriate for a doctoral
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7. Although these later meetings fall outside the direct scope of this thesis, the experience informed the
writing of it.
8. The daily reports from the BWC meetings can be found at <http://www.bwpp.org/reports.html> and
<http://www.cbw-events.org.uk/bwc-rep.html>.
9. The 2011 Briefing Book can be found at <http://www.bwc2011.info>.
thesis to be written on a decision-making process by somebody intimately involved in
decisions within it.
In addition to BWC meetings, the author has attended numerous meetings connected
with the Chemical Weapons Convention.  These have included the Second and Third
CWC Review Conferences in 2008 and 2013 respectively for which daily reports were
produced.10  For the Third CWC Review Conference, the author was a member of the
President of the Review Conference’s informal advisory panel.  A number of the annual
CWC Conferences of the States Parties were also attended.  As a number of personnel
dealing with BWC issues also deal with CWC issues, this allowed for further useful
interaction.  As with the BWC, briefing books, known for the CWC as ‘Resource Guides’
for historical reasons too boring to outline here, were prepared by the author in association
with former colleagues at the Harvard Sussex Program for the 2008 and 2013 Review
Conferences.11  As with the BWC books, these were financed by governments active in
the CWC processes — the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK in the case of the 2008
edition and the UK for 2013.
During this period, the author attended a number of conferences, including many at
Wilton Park and the February 2006 Tokyo seminar convened by the government of Japan
to explore possibilities for the Sixth BWC Review Conference.  The author was one of
three experts engaged in 2009 by the European Commission to evaluate European Union
expenditure to support effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
There are inherent difficulties in ensuring there is sufficient academic detachment
from processes in which a researcher is so familiar; a lack of detachment could lead to
inadvertent bias.  This is a similar risk to that which occurs in ethnographic studies.  The
analytical tools selected for the work within this thesis were specifically chosen to
enhance objectivity.  For example, the use of the compilations of suggestions at the
Meeting of Experts reduces the risk of sub-conscious bias towards any particular political
perspective within the meetings.
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10. The daily reports from the CWC meetings can be found at
<http://www.cbw-events.org.uk/cwc-rep.html>.
11. The 2013 Resource Guide can be found at <http://www.cwc2013.info>.
The frameworks of analysis
This thesis uses two frameworks of analysis through two approaches; the first top-down
and the second bottom-up.  Both use the inputs from the BWC inter-sessional meetings as
the major data source.
One of the reasons for having two frameworks of analysis is due to the traditional
boundaries between academic disciplines.
The tradition with studies of International Relations has been to treat states as ‘black
boxes’ (or ‘billiard balls’) and to carry out studies at the level of analysis of international
interactions.  This simplification of the role of the state is legitimate in many studies in
order to be able to achieve usable results in a required timeframe.  However, the
consideration of regime effectiveness, with its associated interaction between political
entities and regimes, requires that this boundary between levels of analysis be breached,
at least in part.
To take a hypothetical example, suppose a phenomenon or activity ‘A’ is to be
examined in order to see how it influences ‘B’. In a straightforward case, any academic
discipline that uses aspects of A as a unit or level of analysis can be used as a conceptual
framework and B can be considered a black box. If, on the other hand, B has influence on
A at the same time as A influences B, then considering B as a black box is likely to lead
to misleading results. This may not be an issue if the chosen academic discipline uses
aspects of B as a unit or level of analysis as well as aspects of A; but if A and B are not
shared as a unit or level of analysis in the same academic discipline then this should be
considered as a boundary condition and the starting point should be to examine the
interaction from both sides and then compare the results.
If, for the purposes of analysis, this boundary between the national and the
international is held as sacrosanct, a key point is missed as individuals involved in
national policy formulation are also key players within regime processes. This crossover
of individual participants is important in interactions between governments and regimes.
In intergovernmental meetings, for example, members of national delegations take on key
roles such as chairing plenary meetings and chairing committees. In regimes which
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include an international organization, staff of that organization are often drawn from
national delegations.
It therefore follows that a balanced consideration of influences that lead to policy and
practical outcomes has to include investigation at both the national and the international
level of analysis.
The top-down framework
The top-down framework of analysis derives from the elaboration of dimensions against
which activities or proposals can be compared.  As there is no unified conceptualization
of effectiveness, such dimensions would need to be able to encapsulate any and all
expressed observations of what might contribute to effectiveness within the regime.
The process of defining the dimensions was iterative with the proposed dimensions
being refined as the task of comparing them with the inputs from the inter-sessional
meetings and other literature.
Chapter 8 includes an attempt to develop understandings of aspects of the regime to
control biological weapons which might enhance or diminish regime effectiveness.  These
aspects can be presented as dimensions for analysing regime effectiveness.  For some of
these dimensions it is possible to identify potential benchmarks or criteria for assessment
of regime effectiveness.  These dimensions, benchmarks and criteria are then tested
against real policy suggestions put forward during inter-governmental meetings and
assessed in relation to earlier writings on principles, norms and rules (i.e., obligations)
identified in literature examining the regime.
The bottom-up framework
The bottom-up framework of analysis derives from the identification of obstacles to
relevant national policy implementation.
As with the top-down framework, the process of defining the obstacles was iterative
with the proposed obstacles being refined as the task of comparing them with the inputs
from the inter-sessional meetings and other literature.
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Chapters 7 and 9 propose and test a new method of examining obstacles to policy
outcomes through the introduction of a conjectured idealised generic policy decision.
This idealised generic policy decision may have policy analysis applications beyond
examining national interactions with international regimes.
The inputs into the BWC meetings
The background to the Convention and the creation of the inter-sessional processes are
given in Chapter 3.
As part of the BWC inter-sessional processes there were seven pairs of annual
meetings in the period 2003-10 with each year discussing an allocated topic.  For example
the topic in 2004 was ‘enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating
and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or
suspicious outbreaks of disease’ and in 2008 was ‘national, regional and international
measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of
pathogens and toxins’.
The Meeting of Experts in each year includes opportunities for BWC states parties to
discuss the allocated topic(s) in a frank manner.  The meeting secretariat prepares a
collation of suggestions arising from the discussions which is published and this collation
is then summarized in a Synthesis Paper that is presented to the Meeting of States Parties
later that year.  While the suggestions embodied in these documents will inevitably be
biased towards the topics discussed in each meeting, collectively they represent the best
compilation of indications of what BWC States Parties would consider to be policies or
activities that  could strengthen or enhance the regime — in other words, they are directly
related to understandings of effectiveness.
The meetings in the periods 2003-05 and 2007-10 are known as the first and second
inter-sessional processes, respectively as they are convened between the BWC Review
Conferences, the sixth of which met in 2006 and the seventh in 2011.12  Other than at the
2003 Meeting of Experts, the meeting secretariat has collated ‘considerations, lessons,
perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals put forward in presentations,
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12. The Fifth Review Conference was convened in late 2001 but was unable to reach a conclusion so
was suspended.  When it was reconvened in 2002, it agreed the first inter-sessional process.
statements, working papers and interventions during the meeting’.  This collation of
suggestions was appended to the formal Report of the Meeting and later summarized into
a Synthesis Paper presented to the Meeting of States Parties later that year.  In 2003, the
secretariat instead produced a 172-page compilation of statements and interventions in the
Meeting of Experts.
Table 1.1 Dates of the inter-sessional meetings
Year Meeting of Experts Meeting of States Parties 
2003 18-29 August 10-14 November
2004 19-30 July 6-10 December
2005 13-24 June 5-9 December
2007 20-24 August 10-14 December
2008 18-22 August 1-5 December
2009 24-28 August 7-11 December
2010 23-27 August 6-10 December
The reports of the Meetings of Experts 13 are not only made available to participants
in the meetings and to other officials of states parties, but are also made available online
together with formal Working Papers submitted.
While the suggestions embodied in these documents are focused on the topics
discussed in each meeting (listed below), collectively they represent the most
comprehensive compilation available of indications of what it is that BWC states parties
would consider to be policies or activities that could strengthen or enhance the regime —
in other words, they are directly related to understandings of effectiveness.  Although the




13. The reports are: Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I), dated 18
September 2003, 10 pp; Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part II)
[Statements, Presentations and Contributions Made Available to the Chairman], dated 18 September
2003, 172 pp; Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/3, dated 11 August 2004, 56
pp; Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2005/MX/3, dated 5 August 2005, 50 pp; Report
of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2007/MX/3, dated 3 September 2007, 30 pp; Report of the
Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2008/MX/3, dated 8 September 2008, 51 pp; Report of the Meeting
of Experts, BWC/MSP/2009/MX/3, dated 16 October 2009, 42 pp; and Report of the Meeting of
Experts, BWC/MSP/2010/MX/3, dated 8 September 2010, 38 pp.  These documents are available
via the UN online document server at <http://documents.un.org> as well as from the BWC
Implementation Support Unit website at <http://www.unog.ch/bwc>.
The topics of the annual meetings
The topics under consideration in the various annual meetings have been as follows: 
the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set
forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation [2003]
national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of
pathogenic microorganisms and toxins [2003]
enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or
suspicious outbreaks of disease [2004]
strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and
existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of
infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants [2004] 
the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists [2005]
ways and means to enhance national implementation, including enforcement of
national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among
national law enforcement institutions [2007]
regional and sub regional cooperation on BWC implementation [2007]
national, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and
biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins
[2008]
oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of
codes of conduct with the aim to prevent misuse in the context of advances in bio
science and bio technology research with the potential of use for purposes
prohibited by the Convention [2008]
with a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in
biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity
building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and
containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance,
identifying requirements and requests for capacity enhancement, and (2) from
States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, opportunities
for providing assistance related to these fields [2009]
provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request
by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons,
including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and




The compilations of the suggestions made in each meeting are substantial documents
which are repetitive as some suggestions are made by more than one State Party; some
others are no more than rhetorical debating points.  In some cases the political nature of
international diplomacy makes this inevitable.  For example, if ‘Anywhere’ makes a
statement, a member of that delegation may request that they would like to see a particular
paragraph reflected in the suggestions compilation — notwithstanding that this paragraph
boils down to a general statement — the meeting secretariat has essentially no choice but
to accede to this.
With over a thousand suggestions being made, and therefore captured in the
tabulation, it is beyond the scope of this tabulation to detail how every individual policy,
activity or other suggestion enhances effectiveness in each particular dimension, merely
to note that it does.  However, sample entries from the tabulation are included in the
relevant substantive chapters in order to illustrate the assessment under the dimensions
and obstacles.  A key point here is that the test being carried out for the top-down analysis
is to evaluate the comprehensiveness of the proposed dimensions.
As noted earlier, as it took considerable time to collate and annotate these
compilations of suggestions, there were ample opportunities to interact with practitioners
to discuss possible subtleties of meanings of individual suggestions.
Additional sources
Aside from the contents of the official secretariat compilations of suggestions, there are
other materials available during inter-sessional meetings.
At each of the meetings there is a chance (usually on the opening day) for delegations
to make plenary statements.  There is also a chance for non-governmental organizations
to address an informal plenary session.  In each case these statements can be
wider-ranging than the topics allocated to the meeting and any points made that do not




On the margins of each of the inter-sessional meetings there are side events organized
by non-governmental bodies, national governments and inter-governmental bodies.
These do not have to follow the strict agenda relating to topics under discussion in the
plenary meeting room.  Suggestions made within side events do not make it into the
official compilations.  However, as the author has been present at the vast majority of side
events during the period, this thesis has been informed by them.
The Convention’s five-yearly Review Conferences also have speeches made to them,
working papers and background information documents submitted to them, and side
events held on the margins.  No official compilations of suggestions are made at Review
Conferences.  The author attended all days of the Review Conferences in 2006 and
2011.14
A number of countries have published policy papers on issues pertinent to the regime
to control biological weapons.  Examples include the UK’s Green Paper on the BWC,
published in 2002,15 and the US Presidential Action on strengthening biodefence
measures signed in 2004.16  These have been used to inform the thesis.
In each case the information available has been used to ensure that the dimensions are
comprehensive by checking that none of it falls outwith the dimensions collectively.
Document handling
Introduction
Documents from the BWC meetings, together with other relevant material, is held in a
PDF library put together by the author.  Documents within this library include:




14. The author’s Daily Reports from the 2006 and 2011 Review Conferences as well as from each of the
Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties since 2007 can be found at
<http://www.bwpp.org/reports.html>.  He also co-edited a Briefing Book for each of these Review
Conferences.  The 2011 edition can be found at <http://www.bwc2011.info>.
15. United Kingdom, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the
Threat from Biological Weapons, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, 29 April 2002, Cm 5484.
16. United States of America, Biodefense for the 21st Century, signed by the President, 28 April 2004.
• speeches and presentations published by those that have given them;
• press releases by participants;
• other relevant materials circulated within BWC meeting rooms and side events;
and
• any other relevant materials identified such as official policy papers issued to
national policy processes.
Finding documents
The two main ways of retrieving material in the Library is through using the search
functions of the Adobe Acrobat Catalog index and Lucerne search software; each allows
searches for any terms, or combination of terms, in any of the documents and their
metadata.
Searching within files
The PDF library has a tremendous flexibility in allowing searches across any word in any
document.  This form of searching is known as ‘free text retrieval’ (FTR).  FTR is
extremely useful for words that do not crop up often, such as names of people and places.
The great disadvantage of FTR is that it sometimes is not specific enough as searches will
bring up results that are less useful as well as the sought after documents. 
There are two systems of information that are added to documents in the Library to
enhance searching that utilise the PDF standard metadata fields.  The first is the creation
of a consistent filenaming protocol which allows immediate identification of the date and
source of a document.  The data in the filename is copied into the PDF document ‘title’
field.  The second is a system of ‘topic codes’ added in the ‘keywords’ field of the PDF
documents.  However, any system of markers must be easy to use, both for initial
indexing and for later retrieval.
Advantages and limitations from the methodological approach used in this thesis
There are both advantages and limitations to the approaches used within this thesis.
The key advantage is the breadth of coverage of input material. The annual Meetings
of Experts allows for many chances for governments to raise issues.  Moreover, as
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governments are rarely unifed actors (as in the third basic assumption identified earlier),
the MXs allow entities within governments to highlight particular perspectives.  This
means that an aspect, such as an issue focused upon by a health ministry has a greater
chance of being raised in an MX by an expert from that ministry than if that issue had to
compete with others for space in a unified statement offered on behalf of a government as
a whole.  It is a reasonable assumption that issues related to implementation of the regime
to control biological weapons identified within national policy processes would find an
outlet at an inter-sessional meeting.
A further particular advantage is that the selection for the list of suggestions compiled
by the secretariat is made with the agreement of the delegates in the room and therefore
there is no risk of selection bias from the researcher.
A significant limitation is that the topics of the annual meetings were relatively
specific, particularly during the first inter-sessional process; impact of this can be reduced
by examining speeches — there were no restrictions on topics that could be raised in
general debate speeches either in the Meetings of States Parties or at the Review
Conferences.  However, no formal compilations of suggestions were made during the
MSPs or Review Conferences.
A further limitation is that there was some insertion of political or rhetorical
statements within the selection of the suggestions at the request of the delegates that made
them.  This has been countered by identifying such statements and removing them from
the analysis.
The structure of this thesis
Thesis structure issues
A conventional Social Sciences thesis follows a fairly predictable structure: Introduction
— Review of the Literature — Methodology and Research Design — Data Analysis,
Report Results — Discussion — Conclusion.  There is some variation in where chapters
relating to theory are positioned.  For most topics that are entirely within the social
sciences, such a structure is considered appropriate.
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Within the Humanities thesis structures are more flexible, especially where studies are
of an historical, philosophical or theoretical nature.
Perhaps the author that has explored structures of theses in greatest detail is John
Swales.17  He identifies the conventional Social Sciences thesis structure as a ‘traditional’
PhD format.  Swales highlights other thesis structures which he describes as being
appropriate for relevant topics.  For example, he describes an ‘article-compilation
structure’ which assumes each of the substantive chapters has a certain level of
self-containment along the Introduction, Methodology, Research, Discussion (IMRD)
order within research articles and which follows the sequence: Introduction (definitions,
justification, aims) — Literature Review (sometimes included in the introduction) —
(General Methods) (optional) — IMRD — IMRD ... IMRD — Conclusions.
A further thesis structure he describes as a ‘topic-based structure’ which follows the
sequence: Introduction — Literature Review — (Theoretical Framework) — Topic:
Analysis-Discussion — Topic: Analysis-Discussion ... Topic: Analysis-Discussion —
Conclusions.  The advantage of this structure is that it is more able to accommodate
subjects under consideration that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries.
In the end, a slightly hybrid form of the traditional thesis format has been adopted in
order to best handle some of the material arising during research.
Disciplinary boundary issues
Traditional disciplinary boundaries can hinder a thesis such as this one.
Science tells us what we can know but what we can know is little and if we forget
how much we cannot know we become insensitive of many things of very great
importance.  Theology, on the other hand induces a dogmatic belief that we have
knowledge where in fact we have ignorance and by doing so generates a kind of
impertinent insolence towards the universe.  Uncertainty in the presence of vivid
hopes and fears is painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the
support of comforting fairy tales.18
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17. John M Swales, Research Genres: Explorations and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp 314 + xii.
18. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1946), p 2.
Bertrand Russell was writing specifically about the contradictions between learned
examination of the world through the application of scientific methods and the dogmatic
belief represented by theology in all its forms.  Theology is not the only realm in which
dogmatic beliefs exist.
Dogmatic beliefs regarding boundaries between areas of academic research can hinder
the development of new understandings.  Rather than following dogmatic distinctions on
areas of study, a thesis should be based on intelligent analysis drawing on data relevant to
the Research Questions irrespective of the academic disciplines that the data arises from.
The logic within this thesis
The logic of the presentation of the issues and argument contained within this thesis is as
follows.
The general sequence of argument outlined in the beginning of this chapter results in
the organization of this thesis in the following chapters.
Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’ — this chapter is intended to fulfil a number of functions.
First, to provide a description of the context and background of the subject matter of the
thesis in order to illustrate why this area of study is of particular interest.  The second
purpose is to outline some assumptions that underpin the research that is to be done.  This
chapter also provides an opportunity to elaborate what this work seeks to achieve and
where this work is intended to add value to existing understandings.  Finally, the chapter
includes an outline of the research problem and related research questions.
Chapter 2 ‘Context and background of the problem of biological weapons’ is intended
to outline the context and background of the problems posed by biological weapons,
including identifying why biological weapons have particular characteristics that make
them distinct within the field of so-called weapons of mass destruction — a class of
weapons itself distinct from other weapons.  A starting point for this is to understand
weapons of mass destruction as a whole, together with political understandings relating to
them.  From there it is possible to distinguish the particular context and background of the
problems posed by biological weapons.
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Chapter 3 ‘Efforts to control biological weapons’ examines how efforts have been
taken to control biological weapons and outlines the regime to control them, including a
review of how this regime has been understood in the academic literature and in other
documents in relation to the developments within the regime to control biological
weapons.  The chapter examines components of the regime as well as implementation of
the regime.  Obligations within the regime to control biological weapons are identified
and discussed.  Having established that earlier literature regarding the regime to control
biological weapons does not contain within itself the answers to the challenges posed by
the research problem, there is therefore a need to examine what other sources might be
used to provide such answers.
Chapter 4 ‘Use of the concept of effectiveness within the regime to control biological
weapons’ examines interactions about effectiveness within the regime to control
biological weapons, primarily within texts from international meetings relevant to the
regime and within the text of the Biological Weapons Convention itself.  The Chapter also
illustrates why 2001 was a watershed; not simply for general international interactions
relating to the regime to control biological weapons but in particular interactions relating
to effectiveness.  A further aim of this Chapter is to provide some basic quantitative
results on the use of ‘effectiveness’ and related terms in documents from meetings of the
Biological Weapons Convention.
Chapter 5 ‘Conceptual Framework’ presents background to theory relevant to
investigating the research problem and related research questions.  This chapter indicates
the relevance of particular disciplines to the subject matter of this thesis and illustrates
why it is not possible to carry out this study within a single discipline.  This chapter and
the following two chapters were originally one large chapter but were separated to
enhance the flow of the argument within this thesis.
Chapter 6 ‘Theories regarding international regimes’ presents a review of literature in
relation to Regime Theory as well as other theories of international relations and
international governance.  The concept of regime effectiveness and the different
theoretical understandings that have been developed in this area are explored.  The




Chapter 7 ‘Theories regarding national policy processes’ outlines previous
approaches to understanding national policy processes.  The limitations of approaches
examining influences in favour of particular policy outcomes are explored.  A new
method of examining obstacles to policy outcomes is proposed through the introduction
of a conjectured idealised generic policy decision.  This chapter includes some overall
conclusions relating to theories.
Chapter 8 ‘Creation of a new framework for analysing ‘‘effectiveness’’ in the context
of this thesis’ proposes dimensions along which aspects of success or failure within the
regime might contribute to or diminish regime effectiveness.  The analysis leading to the
creation of this framework includes an examination of how many dimensions of
success/failure should be considered.  These dimensions have associated variables that
can be used as the basis for further analysis.  The identified dimensions are examined in
comparison with suggestions for strengthening the regime made during meetings of the
BWC inter-sessional processes.  The identified dimensions are also contrasted with
identified principles, norms and rules (i.e., obligations) within the regime to control
biological weapons.  While this chapter is a system-level examination of regime
effectiveness, an understanding of interactions between regimes and other governance
systems allows for a more informed understanding of how regimes may be considered to
be effective.  Tabulations of the testing of the dimensions against policy proposals are
provided in Volume II.
Chapter 9 ‘Analysing obstacles/hindrances to ‘‘effectiveness’’ within policy
processes and regime contributions to diminishing or reinforcing them’ takes the
conjectured idealised generic policy decision proposed in Chapter 7 and uses it to examine
the context of the regime to control biological weapons.  Using selected materials from
the BWC meetings and elsewhere to analyse obstacles to regime effectiveness and how
the regime might contribute to overcoming them becomes a tool to connect aspects of the
two elements of the frameworks of assessment used withine this thesis.
Chapter 10 ‘Conclusions’ draws together the themes developed within the thesis and
includes sections on what novel aspects the research has brought forward, limitations
within the research and possibilities of future research.
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Volume II contains the tables of comparison of the proposed dimensions with
suggestions made at the BWC Meetings of Experts for strengthening the regime to control
biological weapons.
What is hoped to be achieved in this thesis
There are a number of aims of this thesis, which will be dealt with here from the general
to the specific.  The broad, general contextual aim of this thesis is to contribute to an
improved understanding of the control of dual-use materials and technologies that might
contribute to a biological weapons programme.  Many of the conceptual and
implementation issues that relate to the control of dual-use biological materials and
technologies have some applicability in other areas of dual-use control.  As relevant
materials and technologies are widely spread across a number of industries in a
considerable number of countries, many of which are both major producers and major
consumers of dual-use materials and technologies.  There is, therefore, a large number of
relevant actors who may benefit from a better comprehension of what effectiveness of
controls in this area means.  As ‘Regime Theory’ is the framework within which
arrangements to control dual-use risks and threats are often discussed, this body of theory
was a logical starting point for this thesis.  However, the limitations inherent in this body
of thinking, once identified and elaborated, meant a new framework of assessment for
effectiveness needed to be developed.
Inevitably, given the nature of a PhD project, the contribution of this thesis toward
these general aims is likely to be modest.
Value added in specific areas
There are specific areas in which it is hoped that this thesis will bring particular added
value.
The existing literature is weak on understanding regime effectiveness in general terms
and on success or failure in a regime like that to control biological weapons in particular.
Much focuses on how ‘robust’ a regime is, rather than its effectiveness.  Much of the
assessment of effectiveness relates to whether a regime enhances cooperation between
states, rather than whether the regime is effective at achieving its objectives.  Much
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literature is focused on individual legal instruments rather than the broader regimes.
Some analysis relies on highly contested techniques such as the use of counterfactual
scenarios.  Other analysis looks at regime effects in individual states involved in a regime.
Taken with the new frame of reference resulting from the dual-use nature of the biological
weapons problem, new measures for assessing effectiveness will need to be developed.
This thesis contains some suggestions for new measures that may help future analyses of
this and similar regimes.
The Research Problem and Research Questions
As noted earlier in this Chapter, the Research Problem that this thesis seeks to resolve can
be defined in the following terms:
How should success or failure, and therefore ‘effectiveness’, in a regime such as
that to control biological weapons be categorised and assessed?
This thesis will propose dimensions through which effectiveness can be assessed.
This thesis is based on the assumption that there is a real world out there and that
human actions contribute to it, but that these actions are always within a context of
arrangements and processes that are themselves human constructs.
This thesis is a multidisciplinary project and therefore it is not possible to draw from
a single strand of literature.  Issues of governance, law and norms — on international as
well as domestic scales — as well as of scientific and technological developments enter
any analysis of effectiveness of a regime such as that to control biological weapons.
Tackling the research problem
This research problem will be tackled through two research questions.  The first of these
is:
How can the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in relation to the regime to control
biological weapons be broken down into separate dimensions in order to create a
more rigorous framework of assessment?
The dimensions identified in Chapter 8 of this thesis are: threat ambition (the carrying out
of activities or policies that run counter to the regime); engagement/coherence within the
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regime; technology availability/opportunity; and resilience of the regime to adverse
events.
It is possible to refine and test these dimensions by comparing them with two
particular external bodies of text: proposals for strengthening and enhancing the regime
that have been raised through the BWC inter-sessional processes; and analytical writings
on the principles, norms and rules of the regime to control biological weapons.
The selected case study of the regime to control biological weapons thus becomes a
‘disciplined configurative’ study, as defined by Eckstein.  As George and Bennett note: 
A disciplined configurative case can contribute to theory testing because it can
‘impugn established theories if the theories ought to fit it but do not’, and it can
serve heuristic purposes by highlighting the ‘need for new theory in neglected
areas’.
19
This Research Question has two sub-questions:
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria suggested for use within this assessment
of regime effectiveness be related to the considerations, lessons, perspectives,
recommendations, conclusions and proposals put forward in presentations,
statements, working papers and interventions during meetings of the BWC
inter-sessional processes?
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria suggested for use within this assessment
of regime effectiveness be related to principles, norms and rules (i.e., obligations)
within the regime?
The comparison with proposals for strengthening and enhancing the regime that have
been raised through the BWC inter-sessional processes will be of particular significance.
The proposed dimensions for evaluating effectiveness can be set against these suggestions
to establish whether the dimensions capture all of the suggestions — if they do not, then
modification to the existing dimensions or an additional dimension might have to be




19. Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International Security, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 331 + xv pp
at p 74, citing Harry Eckstein, ‘Case Studies and Theory in Political Science’, in Fred Greenstein
and Nelson Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7, (Reading, MA: Addision Wessley,
1975), pp 79-138 at p 99.
The second Research Question tackled in this thesis is:
Can analysis of policy processes within governmental structures identify whether
activities within the regime to control biological weapons impinge upon such
policy processes?
This Research Question has a specific sub-question:
Can the selected policy analysis methods indicate how obstacles to policy
development be overcome using the considerations, lessons, perspectives,
recommendations, conclusions and proposals put forward in presentations,
statements, working papers and interventions during meetings of the BWC
inter-sessional processes?
The proposals for strengthening and enhancing the regime that have been raised through
the BWC inter-sessional processes as used for the first Research Question collectively
represent the best compilation of indications of what BWC States Parties would consider
to be policies or activities that could strengthen or enhance the regime.  Using these in a
second manner to examine domestic policy processes allows for a better understanding of
whether they contribute to regime effectiveness.
The initial intention was to examine in some detail the policy processes within a
selection of states which might be considered useful examples to verify whether the
regime was truly having an impact on decision making.  However, the generic policy
decision analytical technique appears to be sufficient, when compared with the author’s
previous experience in national policy processes, to render an accurate illustration of the
relevant issues.
Triangulation of the results of the two research questions will allow for the drawing of
conclusions as to how effectiveness of the regime is understood by the participants in the




2. Context and background of the problem of biological weapons
The regime to control biological weapons does not exist in isolation.  Biological weapons
form one category of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) and understandings of the
issues surrounding biological weapons are influenced by more general WMD issues.
Moreover, as the study of WMD issues is dominated by the study of issues related to
nuclear weapons, application of general WMD understandings to the field of biological
weapons can lead to misleading results.  The primary responses to WMD issues on an
international scale has been through non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament
(NACD) measures which contribute to the relevant regimes.  It is only once these issues
have been examined that it is possible to present existing understandings of the regime to
control biological weapons in a proper context.
This chapter is intended to outline the context and background of the problems posed
by biological weapons, including identifying why biological weapons have particular
characteristics that make them distinct within the field of so-called weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) — weapons that are themselves distinct from other weapons.
A starting point for this is to understand weapons of mass destruction as a whole,
together with political understandings relating to them.  From there it will be possible to
distinguish the particular context and background of the problems posed by biological
weapons in the following chapter.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is commonly understood to encompass
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.  In some contexts, including the context of this
thesis, the term is also used in its broadest sense to include possible delivery systems for
these weapons such as ballistic missiles.  However, there are a number of distinctions
between the types that should be elaborated in order to better understand them.  In
particular, an understanding of the distinctive nature of biological weapons will help
reinforce this choice of case study.
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History and context of the term WMD
Examining the history of the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is a worthwhile activity
as it is an illustration of how ‘conventional wisdom’1 can impede understanding of events
as few researchers go back to the source materials.2  However, it must be noted the use of
the term has not been consistent.3
On 5 September 1947 the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments
debated definitions of ‘weapons of mass destruction’.  This debate arose in the third
meeting of the Working Committee of the Commission which found it needed to clarify
its terms of reference which were essentially to consider all armaments that were not
weapons of mass destruction.  The majority of the working committee was of the opinion
that the best way to arrive at a definition of conventional armaments would be to start by
defining weapons of mass destruction.4  Four days later, a resolution was adopted which
read:
The Working Committee resolves to advise the Security Council ... that weapons
of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radio
active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any
weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in
destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.5
This resolution was not published as a formal UN document until July 1948, and it was
formally adopted by the Commission a month later, hence this definition is often referred
to as the ‘1948 definition’.
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1. There is so much mythology surrounding WMD issues that is taken by some analysts as literal truth
that such research takes on an almost euhemeristic character.  The statement, reportedly by
Napoleon Bonaparte, that ‘History is a set of lies that people have agreed upon’ is apt in dealing
with some of these issues.
2. Another classic item of misleading conventional wisdom is that the United Nations was founded in
1945.  While the Charter was indeed signed that year, the UN itself dates from 1 January 1942 and is
based on the eight principles elaborated in the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941.
3. One account of the history of the term WMD, particularly in the context of US Government
activities, can be found in: W Seth Carus, ‘Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”’, Occasional
Paper 4, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University
[Washington, D.C.], pp 49 + xii.
4. Working committee of the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments, Summary
record of the third meeting held at Lake Success, New York, 5 September 1947, UN doc.
S/C.3/SC.3/SR.3, dated 6 September 1947.
5. Letter from the Chairman of the Working Committee of the Commission on Conventional
Armaments addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on Conventional Armaments and
enclosed resolution, [letter dated 9 September 1947], UN doc. S/C.3/24, dated 28 July 1948.
Distinctive characteristics of biological weapons / deliberate disease
A biological weapon is one that works through the disease-causing or ‘pathogenic’ effects
of organisms.  Disease might be caused by the actions of a micro-organism itself or by the
effects of substances produced by living things.  Such substances are known as ‘toxins’.6
Toxins, being toxic chemicals, may also be counted as chemical weapons.7  Sometimes
the production of a toxin happens within the host, for example in a disease such as
anthrax.8 
Biological warfare — whether by a state, a non-state group or as a criminal act —
stems from any attempt to induce disease in an enemy.  It has a history that goes back even
before the discovery of micro-organisms or the development of germ theory, when
diseased carcasses of animals would be catapulted into beseiged cities and castles with the
hope of spreading the affliction.  In other words, biological warfare is the deliberate
inducement of disease for hostile purposes — ‘deliberate disease’ in short.
For a number of decades the term ‘bacteriological warfare’ was used as bacteria were
the only clearly identified class of microbes.  When the science had become clearer, the
usage ‘bacteriological (biological) warfare’ became common to ensure that there was no
ambiguity that this included other microbes such as viruses and fungi.  This term was
adopted for use in texts such as UN General Assembly resolutions.9  Over time, this has
simply become ‘biological warfare’.
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6. Some commentators make specific distinctions between biological weapons and toxin weapons.
See, for example, Erhard Geissler (ed.), Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, (Stockholm/Oxford:
SIPRI/OUP, 1986), pp 4-7.
7. Some definitions have referred specifically to diseases caused by micro-organisms and toxins
derived from them which would therefore exclude ricin (derived from castor beans) or other toxins
such as snake venom.  Use of this tighter definition has fallen out of favour.
8. The disease anthrax arises from the production of two toxins by Bacillus anthracis in a mammalian
host.  However, these toxins are not suitable as weapons in themselves as they can only enter cells to
produce their pathogenic effect if they are in combination with a particular protective antigen also
secreted by B anthracis.
9. It should be noted, however, that the adoption of this term was the focus of much argument on the
sidelines of the General Assembly, with disagreements between the UK, USA and USSR.  See, for
example, Airgram from the US Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State (Drafted
by Alan F. Neidle, David L. Aaron, and Richard L. McCormack on 21 December, and cleared by
Peter S. Thacher, Committee I Executive Officer), 24 December 1968, Department of State, Central
Files, DEF 18-6, marked ‘Confidential’ in the original text.
There has been a variety of additional terms used to describe biological warfare over
the years, for example, ‘microbial warfare’, ‘microbiological warfare’ and ‘germ
warfare’.  These terms are essentially synonymous.
Pathogenic microbes used as biological agents have particular characteristics, not least
because they are living organisms.  This means that they can reproduce.  For infectious
diseases, anyone who is infected becomes a host within which more of the pathogen is
produced.  It also means that, compared with nuclear or chemical weapons, only a small
quantity of active biological agent is required.  For diseases such as smallpox, each host
can infect more people, but for others such as anthrax, the possibilities for
human-to-human infection is extremely limited.
It must be stressed that there is a great deal of difference between a biological agent
and a biological weapon.  For an agent to be used as a weapon it has to be distributed in
such a way as to cause disease in the intended victims.  Therefore a biological warfare
programme is not limited to production of agents, but also to their methods of delivery.
While effective dispersal of biological agents is not simple, it would be within the reach
of the majority of states which have the technical capability to produce biological agents.
In addition there are doctrinal considerations to be taken into account — is it worth
producing a biological warfare capability without training forces in how to use it and
without putting into place a decision-making process regarding the circumstances it might
be used in?
In summary, the use of biological weapons — whether in warfare or as a terrorist or
criminal act — is nothing more than the deliberate inducement of disease, possibly using
materials and technologies that may also be obtainable for peaceful purposes.  Countering
this therefore includes questions of public health and reduction in the threat of all disease.
There is much common ground in responses to outbreaks of disease, whether they stem
from natural, deliberate or accidental (such as a laboratory incident) causes.
Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (NACD) Regimes
Regimes to control weaponry, together with associated materials and technologies, fall
within three overlapping types — non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.  As
the overlaps between these three types can be significant, they are often referred to
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collectively.  There is no consensus on the precise definitions of these terms and policy
implications.  It should be noted that there are times when one or other of the terms is
used, perhaps inadvertently, as a shorthand for all three types of regime.
The distinctions between non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament become
significant when questions of effectiveness are evaluated.  As will be noted in Chapter 6,
in any system of assessment there is a requirement to have a benchmark of what could
have been achieved in order to measure real progress against it (see page 164).  It is
therefore important to understand what the limits are in each of these types of regimes.
This section briefly examines the distinctions between these types of agreements and
then examines some common elements such as verification and decisions on
non-compliance.
To put the distinctions in the broadest context, it is a common simplification to
consider that the concept underpinning disarmament is that the weapons are the problem
and so must be eliminated, that underpinning arms control is that weapons are a problem
to be managed, and that underpinning non-proliferation is one of concerns of the wrong
weapons being in the wrong hands.  However, as will be illustrated below, each of these
descriptions oversimplifies the concepts such that important nuances are lost.
It is also worth noting that there are particular contexts within which these terms carry
overtones.  For example, the term disarmament has been very closely associated with the
United Nations.  Another example is the connection of the term non-proliferation with the
NPT and its nuclear haves and have-nots, leading to an association with concepts of
discrimination.  This is further illustrated by the difference of opinion in the negotiations
for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) over the role of the treaty as either a
disarmament or non-proliferation measure.  The holdout states (India, Israel and Pakistan)
saw the treaty as a step towards nuclear disarmament, while the nuclear-weapon states
(China, France, Russia, UK, and USA) saw the treaty as a means to bring the holdout
states into the non-proliferation regime.10  This was the focal point of the disagreement
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10. Richard Guthrie, ‘Significant Multilateral NACD Agreements: the scope and challenge of
implementation’, in J. Marshall Beier and Steven Mataija, Cyberspace and Outer Space:
Transitional Challenges for Multilateral Verification in the 21st Century, York Centre for
International and Security Studies, 1997, pp. 41–52.  The author was in attendance for the
over provisions in the negotiated text which remains a key issue in preventing that treaty’s
entry into force.11
Non-Proliferation
The basic concept of the term proliferation is that of spread or development and therefore
the concept of non-proliferation is to reduce the possibility of such spread or
development.  The concept derives from the biological sciences and was later applied to
issues relating to the spread of weapons.
The Oxford English Dictionary provides the following example of usage from the
Daily Chronicle of 2 December 1905:
The theory of the Imperial Cancer Research Committee that cancer is entirely due
to the proliferation of cancer cells, and that to stop this proliferation would be to
cure cancer.
12
In its biological sense, the term proliferation embodies an implicit understanding that the
proliferation spreads from something that exists.  When the term was first achieving
prominence in its use in relation to nuclear weapons, the proliferation was indeed also
spreading from something that existed, whether ‘horizontal proliferation’ — the spread of
nuclear capabilities to new countries — or ‘vertical proliferation’ — the development of
more advanced capabilities within a country that already had nuclear weapons.
When used in relation to biological weapons the situation is slightly more complicated
as there are no declared biological weapons programmes being carried out by any
government in the world,13 although Syria did acknowledge that as part of its chemical
weapons programme it had researched the properties of ricin, a toxin which falls within
the definitions of both biological and chemical weapons.14  The concept of proliferation
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penultimate week of the CTBT negotiations.
11. Indeed, India did not join the consensus for the adoption of the CTBT text in the Conference on
Disarmament in 1996.
12. As cited under the entry ‘proliferation’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), vol XII (Poise-Quelt), p 606.
13. This does not rule out the possibility of undeclared biological warfare programmes.  The number of
possible or potential undeclared programmes has been reduced by at least two in the last decade
with the cessation of the Libyan research efforts and the removal of Saddam Hussein.
14. ‘On 14 July 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted a further amendment to its initial declaration
submitted on 23 October 2013.  In the amendment, the Syrian Arab Republic declared as a CWPF
[chemical weapons production facility] a facility for the production of ricin.  The newly declared
in this circumstance relates more to new countries acquiring a capability for biological
weapons rather than the materials and technologies spreading from one country to
another.
Some forty years ago, Robert Neild highlighted the differences between
non-proliferation and disarmament with reference to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
which was about to be opened for signature:
[the NPT] is not a disarmament measure. ... What it does is to invite non-nuclear
countries, most of whom do not want to go nuclear anyway, to abstain from doing
so, and to propose a system of restraints on the supply of fissile material which
will make it harder than before for most non-nuclear powers to go nuclear.  The
main point, however, is that non-proliferation ... seems unlikely to be effective for
long if the great powers do not do something to stop their arms race.  Otherwise it
will simply be a measure that confirms the nuclear dominance of the existing
nuclear powers.15
Arms control
An arms control agreement is premised on the assumption that some of the participating
countries possess, or have possessed in the past, the weapons or objects that are the subject
of control.  Arms control thus involves a slightly different approach to that of
non-proliferation, notwithstanding that for a country that did not possess any items
prohibited under a treaty, there would be little distinction between the effects of an arms
control or a non-proliferation treaty on the internal activities of that country.16
The concept of arms control became highly theorised during the Cold War period,
although this analysis often neglected or dismissed arms control efforts in the inter-war
years.  Most published work, much of which originated in the United States, was heavily
focused on nuclear weapons and the Cold War superpower rivalry.
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facility is subject to verification and destruction, although it is located in an area that is not under
Syrian Government control.  According to the amendment, the entire quantity of ricin produced was
disposed of prior to the entry into force of the [Chemical Weapons] Convention for the Syrian Arab
Republic.’  Director-General, ‘Progress in the elimination of the Syrian CW programme’ [10th
report], OPCW, EC-M-44/DG.1, 25 July 2014, para 4(b).  The report is also reproduced as an annex
to the UN Secretary-General’s report contained in document S/2014/533, dated 25 July 2014.
15. Robert Neild, What Has Happened to Disarmament?, David Davies Memorial Institute of
International Studies Annual Memorial Lecture, April 1968.
16. There may, however, be significant implications for the external activities or foreign policy of a
country in this situation as there may be greater domestic political support for a treaty that treated all
states equally rather than one that allowed some states to retain types of weapons or objects that are
prohibited to others.
Two American analysts, Halperin and Schelling, established three critical criteria for
successful arms control that are often cited: increased stability; reduced potential for
destruction; and decreasing the cost of defence policies and postures.  These authors
noted:
We believe that arms control is a promising, but still only dimly perceived,
enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the
recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure
conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the
avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the
arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it
occurs.
17
Arms control can lead to a reduction in weapons, and therefore to partial disarmament.
However, arms control measures can also include numerical ceilings on treaty-limited
items that do not require any party to remove such an item from service or destroy it.  This
situation is more accurately referred to as ‘arms limitation’. 
Disarmament
Disarmament can best be summarized as a case of arms control leading to zero for a
particular class of weapon or other controlled item.
The concept of disarmament evolved during the twentieth century.18  In particular, in
the decades immediately following the Second World War, the concept of ‘general and
complete disarmament’ was predominant in international diplomacy.  For example, UN
General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), adopted on 20 November 1959, referred to an
aim of ‘general and complete disarmament under effective international control’.
However, this ambitious target proved impossible to achieve.  The final efforts towards
general and complete disarmament through the adoption of one international arrangement
came with the agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics of the the McCloy-Zorin Principles19 which noted that ‘disarmament is general
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17. Thomas C Schelling and Morton H Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1961), 148 pp at p 1.
18. See, for example, Victor Lefebure, Scientific Disarmament: A Treatment Based on the Facts of
Armament, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1931), 320 pp; and Dick Richardson, The Evolution of British
Disarmament Policy in the 1920s, (London: Pinter, 1989), 265 + vi pp.
19. The McCloy-Zorin Principles were a set of criteria for disarmament agreed by the USA and USSR
and published on 20 September 1961.  The Principles specifically included ‘elimination of all
stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction, and the
and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems’ and
called for phased reductions of weapons and an ‘International Disarmament Organization’
with wide inspection powers to carry out verification.  Notwithstanding the agreement of
principles, no treaty resulted from these proposals.
The move away from ‘general and complete disarmament’
In the early 1960s, emphasis was moving away from general and complete disarmament
to means by which parts of this problem could be solved.  These means became known as
‘collateral measures’, the most famous of which is the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.20  Other collateral measures included proposals for a fissile material cut-off,
prohibitions on nuclear testing, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (including
outer space and the sea bed), and a non-aggression pact between the two power blocs.
Bans on biological and chemical weapons were also put in this group.  Over twenty
proposals for collateral measures were put to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee (ENDC) in the early 1960s.  Nonetheless, resolutions were still being passed
by the UN General Assembly on general and complete disarmament, such as resolution
2602E (XXIV), adopted on 16 December 1969 which also added the phrase ‘strict and’
thus referring to an aim of ‘general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control’.
Of the still relevant collateral measures listed above, only the fissile material cut-off
has not been achieved.21  Moreover, much of the early work on such a cut-off was




cessation of the production of such weapons’.
20. While many commentators date the genesis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with the adoption by the
United Nations General Assembly of resolution 1665 (XVI) [the ‘Irish resolution’] on 5 December
1961, this resolution was borne by a frustration that negotiations on disarmament measures were
taking too long and that delays in disarmament could lead to widespread proliferation of nuclear
weapons.  It may be argued that the adoption of the Irish resolution was a milestone on the passage
from ‘general and complete’ measures to ‘partial’ or ‘collateral’ ones.
21. The requirement for a non-aggression pact between the two power blocs could be said to have
become irrelevant since the end of the Cold War.  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened
for signature in September 1996, but is not yet in force.  While prospects for CTBT entry into force
do appear to be hampered it is worth noting that this sort of statement has been regularly made about
several treaties.  For example, ‘It is by no means certain that the Non-Proliferation Treaty will ever
enter into force’ — Mason Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Arms Control, The
Michie Company, 1969; the author was a former Assistant General Counsel in the US Arms Control
And Disarmament Agency.
[This paper] assumes that an international agreement would have been reached
that no country should manufacture or retain nuclear weapons, and that the Control
Organization’s duty would be to ensure that such an agreement was demonstrably
being adhered to.22
Common threads and particular issues
Systems of verification under NACD regimes
Most NACD regimes include some form of verification system or a means of raising
compliance issues within them.  As will be seen later, verification has been a controversial
issue in the regime to control biological weapons.  All successful systems of verification
for international regimes share certain characteristics:
• they contain a coherent system of measures that complement one another;
• they gather relevant information on activities related to the instrument(s) being
verified; and
• they are each contained within a framework that allows information gathered to
be used as required, in a timely manner, to promote confidence and compliance
with the instrument(s) being verified, or to indicate that non-compliance has
taken place.
It is only when all of these are fulfilled that any verification system can satisfy the political
and security concerns of its participants.
Historically, verification systems have been regarded in a similar way:
A system of safeguards cannot be adequate unless it possesses the following
characteristics:
(a) It is technically feasible and practicable;
(b) It is capable of detecting promptly the occurrence of violations;
(c) It causes the minimum interference with, and imposes the minimum burdens
on, any aspect of the life of the individual nations.23
The Chemical Weapons Convention contains its own verification arrangements
through its Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).  The NPT
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22. United Kingdom, The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production,
ENDC/60, 31 August 1962.
23. United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments, August 1948.  Note: in this period the
uses of the terms ‘verification’ and ‘safeguards’ are almost indistinguishable; almost all verification
proposals are based on calculating material balances and inspection.  However, as organisms can
reproduce and die, material balance as a technique has limitations in the biological field.
requires States Parties to have safeguards arrangements with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).  Neither the BWC nor the Geneva Protocol has any formal
verification and compliance mechanisms or institutions associated with it.  
Breakout issues
The elimination of an entire class of weapon brings with it particular problems.  The
potential for one state to be able to possess a prohibited weapon after all other similar
weapons have been destroyed is of greatest concern with regard to any form of
disarmament.  Breakout could take one of two forms: (i) the concealment of existing
weapons during the disarmament process; and (ii) the manufacture of new weapons.24
This is of particular concern where possession of prohibited weapons could lead to a
strategic imbalance, such as in processes of nuclear disarmament.25  It is worth noting
that, as the nuclear-weapon states (as defined within the NPT) have all foresworn the
possession of the other forms of weapons of mass destruction, these states would have a
greater concern that a regime for nuclear disarmament is complied with.26
A second decision for a state wishing to breach its treaty obligations and implement a
breakout capability would be to choose whether to carry out prohibited activities at an




24. As there has been no formal case of biological disarmament under the BWC the concealment of
existing weapons might be thought of as less likely.  However, two countries, Iraq and Russia (and
prior to that the USSR), have made formal acknowledgement in one form or another to having
carried out activities that are considered by most analysts to be contrary to Article I of the BWC at
one time or another.
25. For a discussion of the implications of breakout see Robert Neild, ‘Cheating in a Disarmed World’,
Disarmament and Arms Control: An International Quarterly Journal, vol I, no 2, Autumn 1963.
26. It has been clear that there has been considerable interplay between weapon of mass destruction
types in the policy formulations of the nuclear-weapon states.  For example, it is not just
coincidence that the UK renounced chemical weapons at the same time as its nuclear weapon
programme reached a certain level of maturity.  This form of reasoning may also have been a factor
in the renunciation of chemical weapons by India in 1997.  It was certainly a factor in the UK’s
termination of its offensive chemical programme in 1956.
27. For a discussion on how this choice might be made by a non-compliant state and how verification
regimes can make either form of breakout far more difficult, see Douglas J MacEachin, ‘Routine
and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification’, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, 39, March 1998, pp
1-3.
Verification is a key element of disarmament arrangements and normally has an
enhanced role in any such arrangement compared with non-proliferation and arms control
arrangements:
major states will not disarm and remain disarmed without adequate verification
that other states are doing the same.  Any government therefore which is sincere
in seeking an honest and lasting agreement on disarmament will accept as well as
require adequate international verification that obligations are being loyally
observed.  Since this cannot be one-sided, willingness to accept adequate
international verification is the real test of the sincerity of any government about
disarmament.28
The above words were written as the last global discussions on a WMD-free world were
coming to an end.  At the time, the major states of the world were looking at the issue of
‘general and complete disarmament’, of which a world free of WMD was a major
component.  The issues relating to disarmament were similar as the world moved on to
controls relating to specific types of weapons.
The increased verification efforts required for increased disarmament (and therefore
the smaller number of weapons of a particular type) is illustrated by the ‘Wiesner curve’:
The level of intensity of inspection to monitor a disarmament agreement is in some
way proportional to the degree of disarmament.  In other words, the more
completely weapons of all kinds are eliminated the greater will be the necessity
for an inspection system sufficiently sensitive to discover small discrepancies in
the size of remaining forces.29
Decisions on non-compliance
All major post-war multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaties
have mechanisms to use the United Nations Security Council as final arbiter as to whether
any case of non-compliance with treaty obligations has occurred.  However, without a
clear understanding of what should be done in the case of non-compliance, any NACD
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28. Sir Michael Wright GCMG, Disarm and Verify: An Explanation of the Central Difficulties and of
National Positions, Chatto & Windus, 1964, p x.  The author was British Delegate to the Test Ban
and Disarmament Conferences 1958–63.
29. Jerome B. Wiesner, ‘Inspection for disarmament’, in Louis Henkin (ed.), Arms Control, Issues for
the Public, Columbia University/Prentice Hall, 1961, pp 112–40.  See also his article
‘Comprehensive arms-limitation systems’ in Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament,
and National Security, George Braziller, 1961, pp 198–233.  For a more recent interpretation of
Wiesner’s work, see Allan S. Krass, ‘Nuclear verification in the post-Cold War era’, in John B.
Poole & Richard Guthrie (eds.), Verification 1993, VERTIC/Brassey’s, 1993, pp. 69–76.
regime is fundamentally weakened.30  An unanswered question is what should happen if
key states in an alleged treaty violation are permanent members of the Security Council
with a power of veto.31
In the case of the BWC, complaints of non-compliance with the Convention can be
made to the Security Council under Article VI and assistance provided under Article VII
if the Council decides there has been a violation of the Convention.
NACD regime conclusions
It is clear that NACD regimes have long been seen by political authorities as having to be
effective in order to have support — hence the resolutions on ‘effective’ or ‘strict and
effective’ international control.  Yet there is rarely any detailed description of how these
authorities understand effectiveness.
As noted in the introduction to this section, the distinctions between the concepts of
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament become significant when questions of
effectiveness are under evaluation as in any system of assessment there is a requirement
to have a benchmark of what could have been achieved in order to measure real progress
against it (see also page 164).  It is therefore important to understand what the limits are
in each of these types of regimes.
Where a regime to control a type of weapon falls within more than one of these
categories, the balance of activities in each of these areas must be reached.  A particular
example of how such a balance can change is provided by the Chemical Weapons
Convention as the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons approaches its
treaty-mandated deadlines.  One CWC state party presented its view of this in 2008:
The relative importance of an effective industry verification regime and
strengthened non-proliferation measures will grow as the chemical weapons




30. The classic description of this is contained within: Fred Charles Iklé, ‘After Detection — What?’,
Foreign Affairs, January 1961, pp 208–20.
31. Ironically, Iklé’s work dates from a time that most NACD efforts were bilateral rather than
multilateral, with both sides being permanent members of the UN Security Council.
32. Republic of Korea, Proposal for enhancing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of Other Chemical
Production Facilities inspections, OPCW document RC-2/NAT.7, dated 8 April 2008.
There are significant limits to traditional thinking about success or failure in NACD
regimes.  For example, each of the three criteria identified by Halperin & Schelling for
successful arms control (see page 50) — increased stability, reduced destructive power
and cutting the financial burden — has some relevance to the modern regime to control
biological weapons, but even collectively they are a poor measure of effectiveness of this
particular regime in its current context.  For example, how should this set of criteria place
a value on capabilities to stop sensitive materials and technologies falling into the
possession of non-state actors?
Efforts to control Weapons of mass destruction
So-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD), and the materials and technologies that
contribute to them, have long been the subject of control efforts, many of which take the
form of (or contribute to) international regimes.33  The term ‘weapons of mass
destruction’ is commonly understood to encompass biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons.  In some contexts, including the context of this thesis, the term is also used in its
broadest sense to include possible delivery systems for these weapons such as ballistic
missiles.34
While the different types of WMD were dealt with separately for the bulk of the 20th
century, they were brought together for a number of policy purposes at the end of the
century.  William Walker notes that following the end of the Cold War:
inhibiting the diffusion and preventing the use of all of the weapons of mass
destruction would henceforth be deemed essential to international order. This
conclusion came from both realist and idealist directions: realist in that power
balances were now considered threatened by the acquisition of any of these
weapons since each potentially attained deterrent value; idealist in that the goal of
complete nuclear disarmament was now contingent upon chemical and biological




33. For example, a national export control effort is a contribution to a regime, but is not a regime in
itself.  It is, however, a non-proliferation effort.  The need for a distinction between these terms will
become more apparent later in this thesis.
34. The derivation of the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is discussed earlier in this chapter.  While
this inclusion of delivery systems within the use of the term WMD is not universally supported, in
the context of this thesis it does allow for the use of ‘WMD’ rather than ‘WMD and their possible
delivery systems’ in many instances within the text.
35. William Walker, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order’, Adelphi Paper 370,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, (2004), 90 pp, at pp 41-42.
An EU policy document in 2003 noted that WMD are different from other weapons
‘not only because of their capacity to cause death on a large scale but also because they
could destabilise the international system’ and that:
acquisition of WMD or related materials by terrorists would represent an
additional threat to the international system with potentially uncontrollable
consequences.  Armed with weapons or materials of mass destruction terrorists
could inflict damage that in the past only states with large armies could achieve.36
The control of WMD — and the materials and technologies that contribute to them —
provides an interesting example of the development of governmental policies on human
security as well as those more obviously in national security.  WMD are, by their very
nature, political weapons rather than military ones.37  In the case of biological and
chemical weapons, the utility on the modern battlefield is limited against protected
military forces, while the potential for harm against unprotected civilian populations is
severe.  In understanding how governments interact with regimes, the control of the
proliferation of WMD also forms an interesting case study to help understand how
policies in this field have developed from declarative policies to practical action.  In
selecting practical actions, how do governments decide which actions would be effective
and by what means could such effectiveness be assessed?
The dual-use nature of the WMD problem
Many of the materials and technologies that might contribute to development of WMD
programmes also have peaceful uses.  This ‘dual-use’ nature can refer to both tangible and
intangible features of materials and technologies which enable them to be applied to both
hostile and peaceful purposes.
An example of a dual-use material is thiodiglycol — a chemical in widespread use in
industry, but also a close precursor to sulphur mustard (mustard gas).38  Dual-use
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36. European Union, ‘Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction’, EU Council document 10352/03, dated 10 June 2003, available via the EU Council
website.
37. The weapons are political rather than military not only because they have their greatest effects
against centres of population rather than on military formations but, more significantly, in most
cases their use or threat of use is designed to influence policy by the opposing side in a conflict
rather than win an individual battle.
38. Johan Lundin (ed.), ‘Verification of Dual-use Chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention:
The Case of Thiodiglycol’, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies [Scorpion Papers], no 13,
technologies include fermenters and aerosolizers.  An example of something intangible is
the laboratory skill set a postgraduate microbiology student might acquire.  On the nuclear
side, this dual-use nature is easier to control as the types of locations that would have
peaceful uses of relevant materials is relatively limited.
The difficulties of implementing controls in relation to dual-use biological sciences is
highlighted in national papers, for example:
The dual-use nature of virtually all the know-how, materials and equipment used
in biology means that identifying and agreeing workable and acceptable
verification and compliance measures for biological arms control is fraught with
formidable intellectual, scientific and political problems.39
When the potential to manufacture biological or chemical weapons was limited to
military programmes run by governments, international controls had to focus on the
activities of governments.  Once peaceful civilian activities had advanced — both in scale
and in technological development — to the extent that non-state actors could utilize them
for hostile purposes, the nature of the problem changed fundamentally.  This dual-use
nature creates a new frame of reference to the security problems of WMD — and in
particular of biological and chemical weapons — the issue is no longer just about
weapons controlled by states, but also about the regulation of technologies outside of the
ownership of governments that have not only peaceful uses, but also economically
significant purposes.40
The legitimate global trade in dual-use materials and technologies means that controls
cannot be implemented on an ad hoc basis.  Without basic agreement on what should be
controlled, there is no chance of harmonization of controls — either on a global basis or
for a trading bloc like the EU.  This is a fundamental lesson from the activities of Iraq in
the 1980s, when that country was able to procure a range of significant inputs into its
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (1991), 160 pp.
39. United Kingdom, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the
Threat from Biological Weapons, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, 29 April 2002, Cm 5484, para 24.
40. This should not be understood, of itself, as increasing the threat from non-state actors as threat
requires intent.  However, it may be argued that the risk that a non-state actor might pursue this
route has increased.  Moreover, there are further repercussions.  As certain technologies become
more widely available, it becomes much easier for a state, if it were to decide to do so, to co-opt the
technologies for a hostile programme.
chemical weapons programmes by selecting exporting countries which had not
implemented comprehensive controls.  Concerns that dual-use materials may be used for
hostile purposes by non-state actors have highlighted needs for controls within as well as
between states.
It is worth noting that dual-use concerns also exist in non-WMD areas.  These include:
the control of narcotic and psychotropic substances; financial transfers; publications; and
small arms.41
Global WMD controls
There is a long history of international legal measures to control WMD.  The key
multilateral instruments are:
• the 1925 Geneva Protocol;
• the 1968 [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
• the 1972 Biological [and Toxin] Weapons Convention (BWC); and
• the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
In addition, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 2004.  The resolution mandates that all states establish
domestic controls to ‘prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their
means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes’.
As will be explored further in Chapter 3 (see page 68), these measures only form parts
of the relevant overall regimes.  However, much of the academic literature is focused on
these specific legal instruments rather than the broader regimes that surround them.
The NPT, BWC and CWC have a number of common themes. Each of these
conventions contain a bargain – the renunciation of hostile uses of the relevant materials
and technologies in return for freedom to gain the benefits of the peaceful uses of them.
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41. The control of drugs has many parallels with the control of CBW as both rely on the control of
materials that have a legitimate as well as a non-legitimate use.  Much of the international efforts
against money laundering involves identifying transactions that have a legitimate basis and those
which result from the proceeds of crime.  Obscene publications have been the subject of
international conventions for over a century.  Proposed controls on small arms have, since the 1930s,
had been hindered by the desires by some countries to preserve what they consider to be a legitimate
international trade in such weapons for personal use.
Security, economic and geographical considerations influence how individual countries
see the balance between the two sides of the bargain.42  While most western states have
consistently put emphasis on the security aspects of the bargain, they have also had a
long-term recognition that the other considerations have to be taken into account in order
to encourage universal membership, national implementation and on-going active
engagement with the treaties.
The early 21st century debate
The early 21st century policy debate on WMD threats and dual-use issues have been
characterized by certain predominant themes:
• fears of terrorist or criminal use of biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological
materials, substantially enhanced by the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US
and the anthrax letters posted later that year;
• concerns that illicit trade in WMD-related materials and technologies could
assist state or non-state actors in acquiring new capabilities;
• concerns regarding the harm that could result from natural outbreaks of disease,
such as the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory System (SARS) in 2003 and the
possibilities of a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) epidemic43 — this
also brought onto sharp focus the dangers from deliberate disease; and
• the inability to use traditional methods of arms control following the rise of the
Bush Administration in the United States, notably with its announcement it
could not accept any result that might have come out of the on-going
negotiations for a compliance protocol for the BWC.
Each of these themes created pressures for novel thinking, policies and activities.44
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42. For non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT, this bargain is no different in the biological and
chemical fields than for nuclear.  There is a greater focus in the politics of nuclear issues on this
bargain as a number of high-profile peaceful activities, such as uranium enrichment, can be both
peaceful and create technological capacities within a state that would make future acquisition of
weapons easier.  However, the same could be said of a thiodiglycol production plant or
establishment of a P4 laboratory.  This is the basis of much of the debate about BWC Article X
43. In more recent years there have been additional sources of potential harm with outbreaks of disease
from a novel coronavirus causing what is now referred to as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) and from H7N9 influenza.
44. The term ‘activities’ rather than ‘policies’ is deliberately chosen in this context as many policies
have been simply declaratory.  There is a distinction, that will become important later, between
actions and words.
There was also a difference in transatlantic perspectives on levels of threat, with much
of the debate in the US focusing on a perception of increasing overall threats.  For
example, the covering letter from President Bush to the US National Security Strategy
included:
Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to
endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos
and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists
are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern
technologies against us.45
Furthermore, the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism released in early 2003,
opened with the words:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, D.C., New York City,
and Pennsylvania were acts of war against the United States of America and its
allies, and against the very idea of civilized society. No cause justifies terrorism.
The world must respond and fight this evil that is intent on threatening and
destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life. Freedom and fear are at war.46
By contrast, the European Security Strategy opened with the words:
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the
first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability
unprecedented in European history.47
Robert Kagan summarized the difference in transatlantic perspectives in the following
terms:
It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view
of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important
question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability
of power – American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning
away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a
self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and
cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative
prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”.  The United States,
meanwhile remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian
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45. George W Bush, President of United States of America, covering letter on publication of the
National Security Strategy, dated 17 September 2002.
46. United States of America, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, published by the White
House on 14 February 2003.
47. European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, adopted by the
European Council on 12 December 2003.
world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security
and the defence and promotion of liberal order still depend on the possession and
use of military might.48
The difference in transatlantic perspective has to be noted as much of the English
language literature on international security issues originates from the US.
Identified challenges
Particular challenges for the international community in relation to the control of WMD
are identifiable within the early 21st century debate, such as universality, national
implementation and capacity building within countries.
Universal membership has been seen as key to promoting success under the WMD
treaties.49  The NPT has 191 states parties, with the main states outside of the treaty being
declared ‘hold-outs’, such as India, Israel and Pakistan, and North Korea which had
withdrawn from the treaty in 2003.  In 2003, the BWC had 151 states parties and the CWC
had 154; by the end of 2008, this had risen to 163 and 184, respectively; and by the end of
2015, had risen further to 173 and 192, respectively.
The WMD treaties oblige their states parties to carry out some form of national
implementation to ensure the treaties are not only being complied with by official bodies
but also those natural or legal persons within their jurisdiction or control.50  The number
of states parties that have enacted full implementation is seen as far from satisfactory.  For
example, in 2003, only 51 CWC States Parties out of 154 (33 per cent) were able to report
that they had implemented legislation that covered all of the key areas of the Convention
obligations.  By September 2008, this had risen to 82 out of 184 States Parties (45 per
cent)51, to 86 out of 188 (46 per cent) by August 2009,52 and to 88 out of 187 (47 per cent)
by July 2012.53 Later reporting has not been placed on the OPCW website.
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48. Robert Kagan, ‘Power and Weakness’, Policy Review, no 113, (June 2002),
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7107> 
49. For a brief discussion of the ‘universality problem’ see: Richard Guthrie, ‘Could a New Security
Assurance Enhance WMD Norms?’, in Richard Guthrie (ed.), Verification 1997: the VERTIC
Yearbook, (London/Boulder: VERTIC/Westview Press), 1997, pp 11-22.
50. Technically, this obligation under the NPT falls within the obligation to implement a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
51. OPCW Director-General, Report to the Conference of the States Parties at its Thirteenth Session on
the Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 15 September
2008, OPCW Document C-13/DG.6, dated 11 November 2008
One of the lessons of the revelations of the AQ Khan network which created a black
market in nuclear-weapon-related materials and technologies was that countries can be
host to companies that are contributing to proliferation activities without the relevant
governmental authorities being aware.54  Effective national implementation therefore
includes much more than simply the enactment of legislation but extends into areas such
as licencing and customs controls.
Development of dual-use issues in the 21st Century
Even as the 20th century drew to a close, there was a growing recognition that most, if not
all, peaceful technologies had been adapted at some point for hostile purposes.  For
example, Matthew Meselson of Harvard University summarizes this in the following
terms:
Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation,
electronics, nuclear energy — has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful
purposes but also for hostile ones.  Must this also happen with biotechnology,
certain to be a dominant technology of the twenty-first century?55
Traditional security concerns, and therefore responses such as export controls, had
focused on objects – weapons and their components or high technology goods.  Most of
these objects have had only military purposes or were part of leading edge technological
advances.
With the changing frame of reference (see page 58), objects with both military and
civilian uses (‘dual-use’) were now seen in many circumstances as posing a greater threat.
Moreover, it is not just the physical objects that now need to be controlled, but the
methods that produce them.
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52. OPCW Director-General, Report to the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourteenth Session on
the Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 19 August
2009, OPCW Document C-14/DG.9, dated 21 October 2009
53. OPCW Director-General, Report to the Conference of the States Parties at its Seventeenth Session
on the Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 27 July
2012: Article VII(1)(A) to (C) and Other Obligations, OPCW Document C-17/DG.6, dated 28
August 2012.
54. See, for example, the Buhary Syed Abu Tahir case.  Shannon Kile, ‘Nuclear arms control and
non-proliferation’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005, (Stockholm/Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford University Press,
2005), pp 551–77 at p 552.
55. Matthew Meselson, ‘Averting the hostile exploitation of biotechnology’, The CBW Conventions
Bulletin, no 48, June 2000, pp 16-19 at p 16.
There are four broad contributory factors for this.  The first is that military
technologies started to lag civil technologies in many fields.  As recently as two decades
earlier the drivers for technological innovation were primarily governmental – military
and civil research and development.  Information technology and biomedical innovation
were now primarily commercially driven, but these technologies have both peaceful and
hostile uses.
The second is that the capabilities of countries and organizations to take up new
technologies and innovations and to be able to use them (‘absorptive capacity’)
increased.56  This has happened, in part, through the greater codification of ‘knowledge’
(through books, articles, digital media — to become ‘information’)57 leading to easier
transfer across jurisdictional borders.
The third is developments within the life sciences (not simply genetics) which have
led to new understandings of the processes that underpin life.  Improved quality control
enables the use of extremely tiny quantities of materials in certain experimental
procedures, such as combinatorial techniques.  This rapidly increases the rate in which
substances of interest can be identified in any particular context.
The fourth is the increasing computational developments which have enabled, for
example, more accurate modelling of biological substances and the creation of ever more
sophisticated machine tools that allow manufacture of components in more complex
shapes to finer tolerances.  Software developments are often readily transferable.
Each of these four areas provides peaceful benefits as well as hostile potential.
Developing economies require technological development to help drive economic
development.  Restrictions that are too tight can hinder this.  In situations where countries
with developing economies perceive themselves deprived of technology imports they can
be left wondering whether the measures imposed by the exporters are designed to prevent
economic development (or protect trade) rather than to prevent proliferation.  In such
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56. The classic text on absorptive capacity is: Wesley M Cohen and Daniel A Levinthal, ‘Absorptive
capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation’, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol 35,
no 1, [Special Issue: Technology, Organizations, and Innovation], (March 1990), pp 128-52.
57. Robin Cowan and Dominique Foray, ‘The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of
Knowledge’, Industrial & Corporate Change, vol 6, no 3, (September 1997), pp 595-622.
circumstances, will developing countries be as keen to support the NACD aspects of the
regime to control biological weapons?  Hence the importance of the debate on Article X
of the BWC.
Intangible technologies
Intangible technologies are those things that are difficult to codify – those things that are
carried in people’s heads.  This is also known as tacit knowledge.  The only controls that
could be effective against the transfer of tacit knowledge is to prevent the movement of
people and the training of overseas students.  Trained students vastly increase a country’s
absorptive capacity.  However, the problems of the ‘dual-use’ of technologies is
magnified with tacit knowledge.  For example, a microbiology student from a developing
country in which anthrax is endemic studying overseas may return with benefits that
would be worth a substantial equivalent in economic aid.  However, that student would
also take back valuable knowledge that could contribute to a biological weapons
programme.  Where should the balance lie?
Intangible technologies are occasionally confused with intangible transfers of
technology.  Intangible transfers of technology are means by which technologies, or
information relating to technologies, can be transferred without a tangible object being
transferred — in other words through an internet or e-mail transfer, for example.
Responding to scientific and technological changes
Having identified the dual-use potential of the life sciences (see page 63), Meselson noted
that there were broader dangers that needed to be taken onto account:
During the century ahead, as our ability to modify fundamental life processes
continues its rapid advance, we will be able not only to devise additional ways to
destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it — including the processes
of cognition, development, reproduction, and inheritance.  A world in which these
capabilities are widely employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which
the very nature of conflict had radically changed.  There in could lie
unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression, or subjugation.
Movement towards such a world would distort the accelerating revolution in
biotechnology in ways that would vitiate its vast potential for beneficial
application and could have inimical consequences for the course of civilization.58
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58. Matthew Meselson, ‘Averting the hostile exploitation of biotechnology’, The CBW Conventions
Bulletin, no 48, June 2000, pp 16-19 at p 16.
Meselson identified that these scientific and technological developments had important
policy implications that not only needed to be elaborated but also to be actively addressed:
At present, we appear to be approaching a crossroads — a time that will test
whether biotechnology, like all major predecessor technologies, will come to be
intensively exploited for hostile purposes or whether instead our species will find
the collective wisdom to take a different course.59
The combination of political and scientific and technological developments at the turn
of the century led to many attempts to find new ways of tackling biological threats such
as proposals for an Accountability Framework,60 the adoption of modular measures61 and
a Framework Convention on Biochemical Controls.62
In the background, behind much of the innovative thinking of the period, was a
simple, but rarely explicitly raised, question with a complicated answer — what should
effectiveness mean in the context of the regime to control biological weapons?
In order to explore what might be an answer to this deceptively simple question it is
necessary to explore the regime to control biological weapons (Chapter 3) and how the
context of effectiveness has been used within that regime before the 2001 watershed
(Chapter 4).  This then sets the context for the new analysis of how effectiveness might be
understood within the new inter-sessional processes.
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59. Matthew Meselson, ‘Averting the hostile exploitation of biotechnology’, The CBW Conventions
Bulletin, no 48, June 2000, pp 16-19 at p 18.
60. Canada, Towards the Sixth BTWC Review Conference: An Accountability Framework,
BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1, dated 10 April 2006, 3 pp.
61. VERTIC, ‘A new strategy: strengthening the biological weapons regime through modular
mechanisms’, VERTIC Research Reports, no 6, (October 2006), 88 pp.
62. Alexander Kelle, Kathryn Nixdorff and Malcolm Dando, Controlling Biochemical Weapons:
Adapting Multilateral Arms Control for the 21st Century, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006),
208 + vii pp.
3. The regime to control biological weapons and earlier analysis
As illustrated in the preceding Chapter, the regime to control biological weapons does not
exist in isolation — biological weapons form one category of ‘weapons of mass
destruction’ (WMD) and understandings of the issues surrounding biological weapons are
influenced by more general WMD issues.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the regime to control biological weapons, discuss
how it is perceived and illustrate why biological weapons, and the responses to the
challenges they offer, differ from the other types of weapons.  From this starting point, it
is then possible to examine issues relating to the effectiveness of the regime.
Biological weapons have been subject to prohibitions since before the basic
mechanisms of disease have been understood.  For example, the taboo against the use of
poison weapons is longstanding, such as the Manu code in Hindu law and the Saracen
code of warfare in Islamic law which predate by centuries the earliest of the
post-industrial revolution efforts at prohibition such as the 1874 Brussels declaration; all
of which were enunciated before the germ theory of disease had been understood.  In
parallel with these prohibitions, many of which have been simply declaratory in nature,
there had been practical efforts to counter the acquisition or use of these weapons.
This chapter starts by examining the breadth of the regime to control biological
weapons and some of the significant elements that contribute to the regime.  Relevant
developments in the regime during the period of the case study are elaborated.  The
second section of this chapter examines earlier analysis and understandings that have been
reached regarding the regime to control biological weapons.  The third section examines
how obligations under the regime to control biological weapons have been
conceptualized.  The chapter is rounded off with conclusions and judgements regarding
which previous understandings are built upon or contribute to the work undertaken within
this thesis, notably that while there is much analysis of the regime, there is little that
relates to real world effectiveness.
Chapter 3
67
The breadth of the regime to control biological weapons
As noted in Chapter 2 (see page 59), the regime to control biological weapons is much
broader than the BWC.  Even as the BWC was being negotiated, it was recognised that the
Convention was but one component in the overall regime:
The fact of the matter is that the BWC was never supposed to be a stand-alone
countermeasure against BW.  Nor was it seen that way by the countries that had
studied the weapons closely.  The function of the BWC was instead to serve as a
consolidating influence within a diverse array of countermeasures.  This initially
comprised the development and maintenance of the anti-BW protective posture
expressly permitted through the General Purpose Criterion, and national
intelligence machinery that had at least some capacity for monitoring foreign BW
capability. It expanded as national penal codes began to criminalise misuse of
pathogenic microbes and toxins, law that could also be directed against terrorists
seeking access to such agents.  Later, national export control measures would be
added to the array as an anti-proliferation measure, with efforts to harmonise the
controls subsequently being pursued through the Australia Group.  Later still,
interest would arise in mobilising the resources of international criminal law to
that same end.
Within all this, the primordial function of the BWC was to assert a norm of
abstention from BW armament, to reassert the taboo against resorting to the use
of BW, and to provide a nucleus around which international action against
transgressors could crystallise.1
As the limits of the Convention are easier to define, some authors have deliberately
selected the Convention as the focus of their analysis rather than the broader regime as this
makes analysis much simpler, notwithstanding that this loses key features of the broader
regime.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the breadth of regime activities is to provide
examples of the types of elements that contribute to the regime.  Understanding of the
contributions of different elements to the regime is important in order to be able to judge
whether the regime is effective at achieving its objectives.  What is provided within this
chapter is simply an outline of some of the elements.
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1. George Poste and Julian Perry Robinson, ‘International Control Measures: The Biological Weapons
Convention and its Projected Protocol’, in: Measures for Controlling the Threat from Biological
Weapons, Royal Society, (2000), pp 9-14.  The section from which this quote was taken ends with –
‘Incorporating compliance-verification measures was not at that time, unlike now, seen as a
cost-effective addition to the array, especially since the technical component of such measures was
relatively undeveloped.’
It is also worth noting that, drawing on the discussion of NACD regimes in the
preceding chapter (see page 46), the regime to control biological weapons contains
elements that are characteristic of each of these types of regime.  On the disarmament
aspect, biological weapons are seen as the problem and so are banned.  On the arms
control aspect, while the weapons aren’t needing to be managed, the materials and
technologies certainly are.  On the non-proliferation side, there is a clear desire to ensure
these weapons capabilities do not spread.  As there are no declared possessor states for
these weapons to spread from, the issue is less one of non-proliferation as non-acquisition.
Global treaty-based regime elements
The treaty-based elements listed below are described as global to distinguish them from
relevant regional treaties.2  It should be noted that not all countries have become parties to
them.
The Geneva Protocol
The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.
It enters into force for each state on ratification.  The 1925 Geneva Protocol contains a
prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, using a formulation appearing in earlier
measures
3
 — ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids,
materials or devices’ — but adding a specific phrasing ‘to extend this prohibition to the
use of bacteriological methods of warfare’.4
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2. The Antarctic Treaty requires that Antarctica should only be used for peaceful purposes, the Seabed
Treaty prohibits stationing of WMD on the seabed, and the Outer Space Treaty prohibits stationing
of WMD in outer space.  Each of these is classed as a regional treaty.
3. There were two specific precedents.  Article 5 of the Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and
Noxious Gases in Warfare, signed 6 February 1922 [but which never entered into force] reads: ‘The
use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices,
having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of
such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties’.
Article 5 of the Convention on the Limitation of Armaments of Central American States, signed 7
February 1923, reads: ‘The Contracting Parties consider that the use in warfare of asphyxiating
gases, poisons, or similar substances as well as analogous liquids, materials or devices, is contrary to
humanitarian principles and to international law, and obligate themselves by the present Convention
not to use said substances in time of war.’
4. As the scientific understanding of diseases and their causes have developed, the term
‘bacteriological’ in this context has customarily been taken to include all biological methods of
disease.
Although the Geneva Protocol contains no provisions for verification or compliance
monitoring measures, it is cited within resolutions from both the General Assembly and
the Security Council of the United Nations which empower the Secretary-General to
investigate possible breaches of ‘the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of
customary international law’.  Such investigations were carried out in the 1980s and early
1990s.  This was also the mechanism used for the investigation of alleged uses of
chemical weapons in Syria in 2013.5  While most of the investigations related to chemical
warfare, the first and last investigations before those carried out in Syria — carried out in
south-east Asia and Azerbaijan, respectively — involved toxins that fall within the remit
of the BWC.6  Now commonly referred to as the ‘UN Secretary-General’s mechanism’ or
‘UN Secretary-General’s investigative mechanism’, this power to investigate is being
reinvigorated.7  The mechanism’s appropriateness for investigation of alleged use of
weapons prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention has been contested.8
Notwithstanding this simple prohibition on the use of bacteriological weapons, a
number of states, on becoming parties, stated reservations along the lines that they
considered the Protocol binding only in conflict with other parties and reserving the right
to use bacteriological weapons in response to an attack with such weapons against them.
As time has gone by, many of these reservations have been withdrawn.  There are periodic
efforts to encourage states to withdraw remaining reservations.9
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5. Investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons within Syria that had been made after that
country had joined the Chemical Weapons Convention were made under the provisions of the CWC
and UN Security Council resolution 2118.
6. Richard Guthrie, ‘The United Nations Secretary-General’s mechanism to investigate alleged use of
biological and chemical warfare’, briefing paper prepared by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) for the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2006 [submitted by the
Swedish Government to the United Nations study Verification in All Its Aspects].   This paper
includes information on the relevant UN resolutions together with a list of investigations undertaken
and resulting official documentation.
7. United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/288, adopted 8 September 2006, encourages
‘the Secretary-General to update the roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical
guidelines and procedures, available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of alleged use’.
This is being acted upon with training activities and exercises being held by Germany, Sweden and
the United Kingdom, for example.  The mechanism is the legal basis for the investigation into the
alleged uses of chemical weapons on the territory of Syria that predate that country’s accession to
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
8. See, for example, Iran, ‘Investigation’, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.68, 28 July 2004, para 5.
9. See, for example, France, ‘90 ans de la signature du Protocole concernant la prohibition de l’emploi
a la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques’ [90th
anniversary of the signature of the Protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare], BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.11, 26 April 2016.
The Protocol was the result of an intergovernmental conference on control of
international trade in ‘arms, munitions and implements of war’ held in Geneva during 4
May–17 June 1925.  Of the instruments in preparation at this conference, only the
protocol on chemical and biological weapons remains relevant.10
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is commonly
known by two names: the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).  The Convention was opened for signature on 10
April 1972 and it entered into force on 26 March 1975.  The BWC took control of
biological weapons much further than the Geneva Protocol which had simply banned the
use of biological methods of warfare, but did not prohibit states from manufacturing them.
Under Article I the BWC States Parties undertake:
never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or
retain ... microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
Also known as the ‘general purpose criterion’, this criterion relating to types and
quantities means that all biological materials fall within the remit of the Convention and
that everything is prohibited unless it can be justified.11
Under Article IV, BWC States Parties undertake to implement the prohibitions
contained in the Convention within their own jurisdictions.
Like the Geneva Protocol, the BWC has no formal compliance and verification
provisions, although it does include a complaints procedure; for some states, this lowers
confidence in the compliance of parties to it.  The BWC States Parties agreed at a Special
Conference in 1994 to establish the ‘Ad Hoc Group’ to negotiate a legally binding
protocol to the Convention that would have included certain measures to strengthen it,
Chapter 3
71
10. It is worth noting, to help avoid confusion, that another measure of the period was also referred to as
the ‘Geneva Protocol’ — the 1924 ‘Protocol for Pacific Settlements of International Disputes’ —
which was superceded by the 1929 General Act and then by instruments adopted under the auspices
of the United Nations after the Second World War.
11. But note the comments on research by Nicholas Sims later in this chapter.
including verification measures.  The negotiations were brought to a standstill in the
middle of 2001 when the United States announced that they would not be able to accept
any product that would result from the negotiations.
BWC review process
Article XII of the BWC provides for conferences ‘to review the operation of the
Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions
of the Convention ... are being realized’ and such Review Conferences have been held in
1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001–02, 2006 and 2011.  Article XII also states that: ‘Such
review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant
to the Convention’.
BWC negotiations
During the 1950s and 1960s the focus had been on ‘general and complete disarmament’,
which would have included a global prohibition on biological warfare.  During the early
1960s, as negotiations on general and complete disarmament faltered, the focus shifted to
means by which parts of this problem could be solved.  These means became known as
‘collateral measures’.  The collateral measures included proposals such as a nuclear
non-proliferation treaty, a fissile material cut-off, prohibitions on nuclear testing,
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (including outer space and the sea bed), a
non-aggression pact between the two power blocs and bans on biological and chemical
weapons.  Over twenty proposals for collateral measures were put to the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in the early 1960s.
In the late 1960s proposals were put forward to separate the issues of biological and
chemical warfare for negotiating purposes.  Although these proposals were initially
resisted from some quarters, once agreement on this separation was reached the
negotiations proceeded swiftly with a text being concluded in 1971.12  On 16 December
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12. Details of the negotiations are included in: Nicholas A Sims, The Diplomacy of Biological
Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force, 1975-85, (London: Macmillan; New York: St
Martin’s Press, 1988), 356 + xv pp.  A brief summary of the stages of negotiation can be found in:
Nicholas A Sims, ‘The Evolution of Biological Disarmament’, SIPRI Chemical & Biological
Warfare Studies [Scorpion Papers] no 19, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2002),
200 + xi pp at pp 3-5.
of that year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution commending the
Convention to all states.
Some states have noted that there is no explicit reference to a prohibition on use of
biological agents within the text of the BWC.13  In response, some other states have
expressed the view that a prohibition on use is implicit within the prohibition on
possession.  In order to make the situation clearer, the final document of the Fourth
Review Conference of the BWC contained a consensus view that the use of biological
weapons ‘is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention’.14  A more detailed
statement was made at the Sixth BWC Review Conference in 2006: ‘The Conference
reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I’.15
BWC institution, or lack of
A change that took place following the Sixth BWC Review Conference in 2006 is that the
BWC has a three-person ‘Implementation Support Unit’ based in Geneva to assist BWC
states parties carrying out certain functions.  Previously, the BWC had lacked any form of
secretariat.
Other significant treaty-based regime elements
A number of international treaties provide contributions toward the regime to control
biological weapons alongside the Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva
Protocol, although there is no widely accepted or agreed list of what these additional
treaties provide.  The other significant treaty-based regime elements highlighted here are
the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the Cluster Munitions Treaty.
However, this list is by no means exhaustive.
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13. There were interventions during the BWC negotiations raising concerns that inclusion of use in the
text would be seen as weakening the Geneva Protocol.  Iran, at the Fourth BWC Review Conference
in 1996, proposed an amendment to the text of the Convention to make the prohibition of use
explicit; the proposed amendment is contained in: Iran, ‘A Proposal’, BWC/CONF.IV/COW/WP.2,
28 November 1996.
14. The relevant sentence is included in paragraph 3 of the section reviewing Article I within the Final
Declaration, as reproduced in: BWC/CONF.IV/9, Part II, December 1996.
15. The statement is included in paragraph 3 of the section reviewing Article I within the Final
Declaration, as reproduced in: BWC/CONF.VI/6, Part II, December 2006.
A useful guide to treaties that have contributed to NACD regimes is contained in a
series of books by Jozef Goldblat.16
It is also worth noting where proposals had been made for treaty measures that would
contribute to the regime but that did not appear in the final agreed treaty.  The key
example here would be the negotiations for an International Criminal Court (see below).
The 1948 Genocide Convention prohibits acts intended to carry out genocide which is
the destruction, in whole or in part, of any distinct national, ethnic, racial or religious
group.  One act that could be carried out to promote genocide would be the spread of
disease.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions each include prohibitions on ‘biological
experiments’ on protected persons as a grave breach.  In 1977, two Additional Protocols
were added to these Conventions.  Amongst the new provisions introduced were
arrangements for an International Fact-Finding Commission to investigate allegations of
grave breaches, application of the Conventions to conflicts within states and a prohibition
on attacks on foodstuffs.
A prohibition on cluster munitions may not seem at first glance to have much
relevance to the control of biological weapons.  However, many designs of munitions for
dispersal of biological agents have relied upon cluster munitions technologies and the
creation of bomblets.17  Restrictions in the 2009 Cluster Munitions Treaty will reduce the
availability of these technologies.
During the negotiations for the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court
there were proposals for the inclusion of  use of biological weapons within the definition
of war crimes.  However, in the final days of negotiation in July 1998, all of these options
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16. Each of these books has borne the title Arms Control or Arms Control Agreements.  The most recent
edition is: Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control, (London: Sage, 2002) [published in association with the
Peace Research Institute Oslo and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute], 396 + xliii
pp.
17. For example, anthrax tests on Gruinard Island in 1942 and 1943 involved testing cluster bomb
sub-munitions.  See the plates in Peter M Hammond and Gradon B Carter, From Biological Warfare
to Healthcare, Porton Down, 1940-2000, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 280 pp.
fell, primarily owing to the issue of whether use of nuclear weapons should be considered
a crime.18
Non-treaty measures with global legal effect
UN Security Council resolution 1540
The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004 as a
binding measure under Chapter VII of the Charter to counter the threat of terrorist
acquisition of unconventional weapons, including biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons.  The resolution calls on UN member states to present national reports on steps
they have taken or intend to take to control materials and technologies that could be used
to develop or otherwise acquire such weapons.  It is clear that the process of compiling the
reports, together with assistance to states provided by the 1540 Committee, has led to the
identification of gaps in implementation of the key international instruments, particularly
as regards issues related to biological weapons.19 Resolution 1540 was initially intended
to be in operation for two years but this duration was extended by a number of other
resolutions.  Under resolution 1977 it remains in operation until 2021.
International Organizations
A number of international organizations have roles and responsibilities that contribute to,
or overlap with, the regime to control biological weapons.  These include the World
Health Organization (WHO), the World Organization for Animal Health20 (OIE, original
title Office Internationale des Épizooties) and the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO).  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is also included in this
category, although its status varies depending on the circumstances.21
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18. Philippe Kirsch and John T Holmes, ‘The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court:
The Negotiating Process’, American Journal of International Law, vol 93, no 2, January 1999, pp
2-12.
19. Richard Guthrie, John Hart and Frida Kuhlau, ‘Chemical and biological warfare developments and
arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005, (Stockholm/Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 2005), p
604.
20. Biological Weapons Convention Secretariat, The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), doc
no BWC/MSP/2004/INF.1, dated 1 November 2004, 5 pp.
21. For example, for BWC meetings, the ICRC is considered an international organization, but for some
CWC/OPCW meetings has been considered a non-governmental organization.  There is a subtlety
often missed in status: the WHO, OIE and FAO are all inter-governmental organizations, which the
ICRC is not, although it is an international organization.
Of particular note are the new International Health Regulations comprising legally
binding provisions for member states of the WHO on sharing epidemiological
information about potential transboundary spread of infectious diseases in order to
manage public health emergencies of international concern which were agreed in 200522
and entered into force in 2007.  The new rules will ‘prevent, protect against, control and
provide a public health response to the international spread of disease’.  The new
regulations allow for the WHO Director-General to form a ‘determination of a public
health emergency of international concern’, even if the government of the territory is in
disagreement with this conclusion.
All of these organizations have in common that they have interests in the prevention
of disease — and suffering or other implications that follow from disease — in humans,
animals and plants.  As the use of biological weapons is nothing more than the deliberate
use of disease (as noted above, see page 45), the general roles of each of these
organizations in the regime to control biological weapons is apparent.
The organizations, and implications such as the ‘second diagnosis’ problem, are
discussed in more detail later in this Chapter.
Non-treaty-based group arrangements
The non-treaty-based group arrangements described here are essentially understandings
between groups of like-minded states.  These arrangements contribute to the regime  to
control biological weapons in a variety of ways.
The Australia Group is a multilateral forum for the co-ordination of export controls
amongst a group of supplier states.  This group was originally formed in the mid 1980s to
harmonise export control policies in relation to materials that might be used in a chemical
weapons programme.  Around 1989 its remit was expanded by its participating states to
include materials that may be relevant to biological weapons programmes.  The Australia
Group has no formal legal basis.23  Its role in relation to biological materials is
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22. The International Health Regulations were formally adopted by the World Health Assembly on 23
May 2005.
23. For background to the Australia Group, see: Robert J Mathews, ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons
Export Controls and the ‘‘Web of Prevention’’: A Practitioner’s Perspective’, in: Brian Rappert and
Caitríona McLeish (eds.), A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the
comparable with the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in controlling the trade in
nuclear technologies.
Proponents of export control regimes argue that such arrangements are a key feature
in stopping the spread of technologies and can thus make programmes to develop
biological weapons much more difficult and costly.24
Opponents of export control regimes argue that such controls are implemented in a
discriminatory way with a brisk trade between states that have already reached a certain
level of technological capabilities, while states that haven’t reached that level are subject
to restrictions.  Opponents argue that the Biological Weapons Convention itself should be
the sole basis of controls.25
A new form of supply control appeared in 2003 with the creation of the ‘Proliferation
Security Initiative’ (PSI) by the US.  PSI is intended to prevent transfers of
proliferation-sensitive materials to state and non-state actors who might use them for
hostile purposes.  Unlike simple export controls, PSI envisages the interdiction of supplies
in transit.
Other measures
In the context of the broader regime, there are a number of additional measures that make
valuable contributions towards preventing the hostile misuse of the life sciences.   These
include good laboratory practice standards including biosafety and biosecurity provisions,
many of which are developed through professional associations at both national and
international levels.  Many professional associations also include codes of conduct to help
reduce potentials for misuse.




Governance of Research, (London: Earthscan, 2007), pp 163-71.
24. See, for example: China, ‘The Issue of Export Control’, Working Paper, BWC/AD HOC
GROUP/WP.453, 8 May 2001, 3 pp.
25. See, for example: Iran, ‘International Cooperation-Transfer Denials’, Working Paper,
BWC/MSP/2009/MX/WP.22, 21 August 2009, 2 pp. [Note: The title of this paper was corrected in
the notice of correction in document BWC/MSP/2009/MX/WP.22/Corr.1, 24 August 2009, 1 p.  The
title as corrected is given here.]
Previous analysis and understandings of the regime to control biological weapons
Analysis of the regime to control biological weapons can be carried out from a number of
approaches, many of which have backgrounds distinct from the traditional international
relations literature.
The regime to control biological weapons is a response to the perceived threats from
biological weapons and the materials and technologies that can be used to create them.  It
therefore follows that in order to understand analysis of this regime, there is a need to
understand how the threats of biological weapons have been perceived in the literature.
However, this is not the only way to approach the regime for the purposes of analysis.
The lists of approaches outlined here are not exhaustive, but intended to draw out
approaches of the most relevance and significance to the subject matter of the thesis.
Within the problem-oriented approaches there are specialized areas such as the study
of the implications of scientific developments, the examination of the threats from
terrorism and implications for public health. 
There are a number of more methodological approaches examined here, such as the
chronological approach breaking down developments into discrete events, the narrative
focus on particular critical periods and a sectoral approach.
Some of the more methodological approaches outlined here have roots in some of the
traditions of International Relations in particular and Political Studies in general.  As has
been noted elsewhere in this thesis, the study of the regime to control biological weapons
can only be carried out in a multi-disciplinary basis, thus the problem-oriented approaches
draw on understandings from other fields of study.
Problem-oriented approaches
Some authors analyse the regime to control biological weapons in the context of the
problems it is intended to counter; this is the approach taken by study groups such as the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Harvard Sussex
Program (HSP).26  Conceptually, much of the work falling within this approach assumes
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26. Full disclosure: the author of this thesis has worked for both of these organizations.
that issues around biological weapons lead to problems that require management rather
than problems that can be solved. 
The six-volume series, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, published
by SIPRI in the early 1970s remains the most comprehensive documentation on the
subject, notwithstanding its age.27  Indeed, in 2001, the US Department of Defense paid
for the series to be scanned as there were few copies of the original books left available.28
The six-volume series was published as the BWC was being negotiated, with draft copies
of some of the volumes being circulated to negotiators.
With regard to evaluation of regime effectiveness, the fifth volume of the six-volume
series, The Prevention of CBW, is of greatest significance.  Within this volume, the study
identifies 26 stages in the development of an offensive chemical or biological warfare
capability.29  While not all apply in all circumstances, these identified steps form a useful
guide for analytical purposes.  This tabulation was the first published attempt to elaborate
activities involved in a chemical or biological weapons programme.
In 1969 and 1970, two reports were issued that influenced international debate, and
the negotiations on the BWC.  Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and
the Effects of their Possible Use was prepared by a group of experts and was endorsed and
published in the name of the UN Secretary-General in July 1969.  The study had been
requested in UN General Assembly resolution 2454A (XXIII) adopted on 20 December
1968.  The second, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, was published
by the World Health Organization in 1970.  This report had initially been prepared as a
contribution to the work of the UN Secretary-General’s group of experts and an earlier
version had been circulated in 1969, hence this is sometimes referred to as being
published in the earlier year.
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27. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological
Warfare, [six volume series], (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1971-73).  The six volumes are: I The Rise of CB
Weapons [1971]; II CB Weapons Today [1973]; III CBW and the Law of War [1973]; IV CB
Disarmament Negotiations, 1920-1970 [1971]; V The Prevention of CBW [1971]; and VI Technical
Aspects of Early Warning and Verification [1973].
28. The scans are available on CD-ROM from SIPRI.
29. Summarized in Table 2A.1, SIPRI V, p 142.
There are similarities in the conclusions about problems that are presented by the
potential for biological warfare in the reports by the Secretary-General, the WHO and the
SIPRI six-volume series.  These various publications provide an indication that there was
a broad consensus on the issues during this period.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that
while there were many contributors to these three studies, they shared the same lead
drafter, Julian Perry Robinson.
There have also been more traditional problem-oriented approaches that take a
longer-term historical perspective.  Two detailed histories of past biological warfare
programmes and policies have been published.  The first, dealing with the period up to the
end of the Second World War was published in 1999.30  The second, involving many of
the contributing authors to the first volume, covering the post-war period was published
in 2006.31
Scientific developments approach
One of the themes within the problem-oriented approaches is the study of the implications
of scientific and technological developments related to the life sciences.  As the life
sciences develop, new challenges to the regime may result.  Some of these were noted in
Chapter 2 (see page 65).  Some of the work in this area is focused on the potential of new
activities, while some has examined misuse of current otherwise peaceful activities.  An
additional focus has been biosecurity issues.  In most cases, work covers more than one of
these aspects.
The scientific community, through learned societies and national academies, such as
the Royal Society (UK),32 the National Academies (US)33 and the Koninklijke
Nederlandse Academie van Wetenschappen (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences)34 has carried out detailed work on these issues.  The Inter Academy Panel for
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30. Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, (eds.), ‘Biological and Toxin Weapons:
Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945’, SIPRI Chemical & Biological
Warfare Studies [Scorpion Papers], no 18, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (1999),
276 + 15 pp.
31. Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rózsa and Malcolm Dando (eds.), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since
1945, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) 479 pp.
32. See, for example, Royal Society, New approaches to biological risk assessment, RS policy
document 08/09, July 2009, 17 pp.
33. See, for example, National Academy of Science, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the
Life Sciences, February 2006, 300 pp.
International Issues (IAP), of which all these societies are members, has performed a
coordinating role.  For example, the IAP appointed a working group on biosecurity in
200435 to develop a statement of principles to be used by member academies or other
scientific bodies in developing their own biosecurity policies.
In terms of academic analysis, much of what has been published in the English
language derives from work undertaken at the Bradford University School of Peace
Studies and others associated with this research group.36  Malcolm Dando of Bradford
University presents his perspective in the following terms:
the historical process of misusing current biological and medical capabilities in
offensive biological warfare program[me]s continues.  The genetic engineering
techniques discovered in the early 1970s were misused in the former Soviet Union
during the 1980s. But we are only in the initial stages of the revolution in
biotechnology.  The Human Genome Project — designed to uncover the full
details of our genetic make-up by the early years of the twenty-first century —
signifies how much further this scientific revolution and its applications have to
run.  There are undoubtedly dangers that the new knowledge might be misused,
for example, to develop new biological weapons that could be targeted at specific
genetic characteristics of different ethnic groups.37
Another Bradford scholar, Jim Whitman cautions:
There is a danger that the speed of scientific and technological advances will
outpace our deliberative systems.38
While scientific and technological developments have not been fully examined within
BWC processes in recent years, issues relating to biosecurity have been on the agenda in
both the 2003-05 and 2007-10 inter-sessional processes.  The WHO produced new or
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34. See, for example, Koninklijke Nederlandse Academie van Wetenschappen (Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences), A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity: Report by the Biosecurity
Working Group, Amsterdam, August 2007, 43 pp.
35. The decision to appoint the working group was taken at the IAP General Assembly which met in
Mexico City in December 2003.
36. These others include Alexander Kelle, Kathryn Nixdorff and Brian Rappert.
37. Malcolm Dando, The New Biological Weapons: Threat, Proliferation, and Control, (London: Lynne
Reiner, 2001), 181 + ix pp at p 11.  See also: Malcolm R Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare:
The Failure of American Leadership, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 231 + xiv pp, and in particular
chapter 4 of that volume ‘Genomics and the New Biotechnology’, pp 62-74.
38. Jim Whitman, ‘Global Governance and Twenty-first Century Technology’, in: Brian Rappert (ed.),
Technology and Security: Governing Threats in the New Millennium, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007),
pp 89-110.
updated guidance on both biosafety39 and biosecurity.40  There has been some academic
analysis of this crossover between biosecurity and NACD activities.41
One scientific and technological development that is receiving particular attention in
the literature is synthetic biology, which was described in an official US submission to
one of the BWC Meetings of Experts in the following terms:
Synthetic biology refers to the design and construction of biological components
and systems that do not already exist in the natural world, as well as the re-design
of existing ones imparting novel biological functions. As an interdisciplinary
domain that includes biologists, engineers, chemists, and computer modelers, and
as an emerging field extending beyond the traditional genetic engineering,
synthetic biology is poised to become the next significant transforming technology
for the life sciences and beyond.42
The implications of synthetic biology have been the subject of academic study,43
proposals in the specialized scientific media,44 and Parliamentary inquiries,45 yet there is
not, thus far, an emerging consensus on what the impact of these developments will be in
anything other than a short timeframe.
Assumptions that wholly technological answers are needed to respond to




39. World Health Organization, Laboratory Biosafety Manual [third edition], document no
WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2004.11, November 2004, 178 + viii pp.
40. World Health Organization, Biorisk management: Laboratory biosecurity guidance, document no
WHO/CDS/EPR/2006.6, September 2006, 33 pp.
41. See, for example, James Revill and Malcolm Dando, ‘The Rise of Biosecurity in International Arms
Control’, in: Brian Rappert and Chandré Gould (eds.), Biosecurity: Origins, Transformations and
Practices, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), pp 41-59.
42. United States of America, Synthetic Biology: A Transforming Technology,
BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.4, dated 30 July 2008, 4 pp at p 1.
43. See, for example, Alexander Kelle, ‘Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness In Europe’,
Bradford Science and Technology Report [University of Bradford], no 9, (November 2007), 23 pp;
and Jonathan B Tucker and Raymond A Zilinskas, ‘The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology’,
The New Atlantis, (Spring 2006), pp 25-45.
44. See, for example, Hans Bügl, John P Danner, Robert J Molinari, John T Mulligan, Han-Oh Park,
Bas Reichert, David A Roth, Ralf Wagner, Bruce Budowle, Robert M Scripp, Jenifer A L Smith,
Scott J Steele, George Church & Drew Endy, ‘DNA synthesis and biological security’, Nature
Biotechnology, vol 25, no 6, (June 2007), pp 627-29.
45. See, for example, UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Bioengineering
[Seventh Report of Session 2009–10], HC 220, published 25 March 2010, 52 + 182 pp.
There is no technical solution to the problem of biological weapons. It needs an
ethical, human and moral solution if it’s going to happen at all. There is no other
solution.46
Indeed, a recent volume has attempted to bring together many of the scientific and
technological development issues and examine them in a international security context,
including some of the human aspects.47
Terrorism approach
A notable theme within the problem-oriented approach has been prompted by the
possibility of the use of biological weapons, or other WMD, as a terrorist or criminal act.
Literature on possible terrorist use of WMD, or the materials and technologies that
contribute to them, is often a study of perception of threat rather than an absolute
assessment of threat.  This is particularly applicable in relation to biological and chemical
weapons.  Press reporting has followed the issues of the potential of WMD terrorism,
often taking a shrill tone.
When terrorists or criminals innovate and find new methods of carrying out attacks,
perhaps it is not surprising that there may be subsequent assumptions that more deadly
methods may be used next.  The hypothesis that new forms of attack by those identified
as terrorists — whether assassination in the 1930s,48 multiple casualty events in the
1970s49 or suicide bombings of buildings in the 1980s50 — produce a peak in fears of use
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46. As quoted in: Richard Preston, ‘Annals of Warfare: The Bioweaponeers’, New Yorker, 9 March
1998, pp 52-65 at p 65.
47. Brian Rappert and Caitríona McLeish (eds.), A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life
Sciences and the Governance of Research, (London: Earthscan, 2007), 218 + xi pp.
48. The 1935 session of the International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, held in
Copenhagen, included the following as terrorist acts: ‘ignition of asphyxiating or noxious
substances’, ‘pollution, fouling, or deliberate poisoning of drinking water or staple foods’ and
‘causing or propagating contagious or epidemic diseases’ – Thomas M Franck and Bert B
Lockwood jr, ‘Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism’, American
Journal of International Law, vol 68, no 1 (January 1974), pp 69-90.
49. Take, for example, the following quote from a debate initiated in the UK House of Lords: ‘One only
has to think of the appalling [recent attacks] to realise that nowadays international terrorists will stop
virtually at nothing.  The chemical weapon is easily portable, cheaply made and easily used ... [We
must] think seriously about the appalling danger that would be presented to international order and
stability if international terrorists of the kind that carried out the shocking [attacks] were to decide to
use, instead of the weapons that they used there, this kind of weapon of indiscriminate destruction’ –
Lord Chalfont, 7 June 1972, Hansard (Lords), vol 331, c 311-62.  The attacks he refers to were at
Lod Airport, Tel Aviv, on 30 May that year in which 3 Japanese Red Army terrorists, operating in
conjunction with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-GC), killed 24 people and
injured over 70 more.  Chalfont was a former Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth
of biological or chemical weapons is outside the focus of this thesis, however the
historical precedents should be borne in mind when considering the events of recent years.
Nevertheless, fears of terrorist or criminal use of biological, chemical or nuclear materials
were substantially enhanced by the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US and the anthrax
letters posted later that year.  One effect of these and other events51 was a growing
realisation of the vulnerabilities of modern societies to disruption.  These fears had direct
influence on policy making.
In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo dispersed the nerve gas Sarin on the Tokyo underground and
subsequent investigation indicated that the group was certainly involved with research
into biological agents, although its efforts to use any of these did not appear to lead to any
casualties.  This prompted much literature on the possibilities of use of biological
weapons.  The period 1995 through 2000 is characterised by Milton Leitenberg as being
driven by spurious statistics (for example, hoaxes being counted as biological events),
unknowable predictions, gross exaggeration of the feasibility of acquisition of usable
weapons, apparent absence of a thorough threat assessment, and extravagant rhetoric.52
RAND analyst Brian Jenkins was concerned about the prevalence of ‘fact-free
analysis’:
While no one can predict the future course of terrorism with confidence, the
history of terrorism counsels us to think broadly but at the same time to exercise
caution. The analysis of ‘dream threats’ is filled with pitfalls. It is easy to begin by
identifying vulnerabilities — they are infinite, positing theoretical adversaries —
they are legion, then reifying the threat — a subtle shift of verbs from could to may
happen.  ‘Could’ means theoretically possible while ‘may’ suggests more. So long
as the reader and the policymakers understand the utility of what necessarily must
be speculative, there is no problem. The danger arises when speculation becomes
the basis for launching costly efforts to prevent ‘what ifs’, or worse, when
policymakers believe that highly publicized preventive or mitigation efforts will
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Office and would have had access to earlier government assessments on these issues.
50. For example, one press article quoted an ‘expert’ as stating ‘I believe there’s certainly a will (on the
part of terrorist groups) to use chemical weapons’.  The article then went on to say: ‘Frank
Stunnenberg of the University of Amsterdam agreed, adding, ‘‘All that’s needed is the knowledge,
and I don’t doubt that they can get it together.’’  Dr. Stunnenberg said that it would take nothing
more than ‘a basic knowledge of chemistry and $240’ to make 60 pounds of mustard gas - enough to
threaten the population of a medium-size city.’ – Gary Yerkey, ‘Experts study threat of chemical
weapons in terrorists’ hands’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 August 1986, p 9.
51. For example, the fuel protests in the UK in 2000 which caused significant disruption.
52. Milton Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, (December 2005), 115 pp at p 45.
deter such adversaries.  This is not to say the threat is not real. I believe that major
assaults on information systems are a real possibility.  Terrorist use of chemical or
biological weapons is a legitimate concern, although the evidence here is
sketchier.  My intention is rather to point to the risks of fact-free analysis.53 
However there were some more analytically based pieces in this period.54  Jonathan
Tucker noted that ‘information on past incidents of CBW terrorism is anecdotal and often
factually incorrect’.55  A later chapter in the same book highlights one incident in more
detail:
During the hysteria preceding the RAF trial, the claim of a threatened terrorist
attack with chemical weapons was seized upon by the media.  Various anonymous
sources then built up the story by claiming that the stolen-material hypothesis was
correct.  Once the story was in the public domain, it became further distorted by
journalistic sensationalism.  Finally, although the alleged incident had been
debunked in the specialist literature on left-wing terrorism in Germany, none of
the U.S. terrorism experts who repeatedly cited it took the time to confirm its
veracity.  Once one author accepted the rumo[u]r as fact, others simply followed
suit, a case of ‘incestuous inter-quote.’  In conclusion, if one were to categorize
this case in the history of terrorism, it would be better placed under the heading
‘terrorism and the media’ than ‘terrorism and chemical and biological weapons.’56
Leitenberg later wrote that all of the trends he had earlier identified were continuing
beyond 2001 and concluded:
For the past decade the risk and imminence of the use of biological agents by
nonstate actors/terrorist organizations — ‘bioterrorism’ — has been
systematically and deliberately exaggerated.57
Other analysts identified that claims of the level of terrorism threat in other areas were
also exaggerated.58  Elsewhere, Leitenberg noted that exaggerated claims can be
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54. See, for example, Jonathan Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and
Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 303pp.
55. Jonathan B Tucker, ‘Introduction’, in: Jonathan Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use
of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp 1-14 at p 13.
56. David Claridge, ‘The Baader-Meinhof Gang (1975)’, in: Jonathan Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror:
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000),
pp 95-106 at p 106.
57. Milton Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, (December 2005), 115 pp at p 88.
58. John Mueller, ‘Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration’,
International Studies Perspectives, vol 6, no 2, (May 2005), pp 208–34.
counter-productive as they may end up stimulating interest in biological weapons in
people previously not considering development or use of biological weapons.59
Exaggerated claims continue to be published.
Whether exaggerated or not, threat perceptions were influential on elements of the
regime to control biological weapons.  In particular, the adoption of topics such as
national implementation and security of pathogens in the first BWC inter-sessional
process represented a refocusing of the regime onto the potential threats from non-state
actors.
That the perceptions of threat were changed for many people is beyond doubt, but
hard evidence for assessment of real threat levels was difficult to find.  Some attempts
were made at putting together a framework for threat assessment in relation to hostile uses
of dual-use materials by non-state actors60 and in identifying signs that might be observed
if a group attempted to acquire dual-use materials for hostile purposes.61
Evidence-based policy making was lacking in some countries.  Two key allegations
were made during the decade, that ricin had been produced in London and that al-Qaeda
cells working on biological terrorism had moved from Afghanistan to the Pankisi Gorge
in Georgia.  The Pankisi Gorge allegations were originally made by US Secretary of State
Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, during the now-infamous briefing
to the Council on Iraq’s alleged WMD, and repeated by French Interior Minister
Dominique de Villepin in 2005.  Neither the London ricin claim nor the Pankisi Gorge
allegations appear to be based on any substantive evidence.62
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60. See, for example, Lyle Makosky, Eric R Stephen, Development of a Threat Assessment Framework
Applicable to Dual Use Biotechnology, Defence R&D Canada Contract Report,
DRDC-CR-2007-003, April 2007, 58 pp.
61. T J Sullivan and W L Perry, ‘Identifying Indicators of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons Development Activity in Sub-National Terrorist Groups’, Journal of the
Operational Research Society, vol 55, no 4, [Special Issue: ‘OR in Defence’], (April 2004), pp
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A number of bioterrorism-related exercises were carried out, most notably Dark
Winter and Atlantic Storm.  Both contained scenarios that were considered implausible by
other experts.63 However, these and other exercises influenced policy and perceptions.
Analysis in a more measured tone was produced by some authors.64
With widespread concerns that a new enthusiasm for suicide bombings indicated that
terror groups would be unconcerned at the loss of life in an attack, and therefore such
groups might have a greater interest in mass casualty WMD attacks, a notable approach
was that of Adam Dolnik who examined neglected nuances of suicide terrorism.  Dolnik
noted:
the fact that some individuals are willing to sacrifice deliberately their lives for the
‘greater good’ does not necessarily translate into a self-destructive attitude among
the rest of the group.  Almost all suicide attacks to date have involved the death of
individuals, carefully planned to sacrifice the lowest number of people necessary
to carry out the operation.  Even the September 11 attacks involved only the
necessary minimum of personnel to overtake the airplanes and to complete the
mission successfully.65
Responding to suggestions that a greater danger is posed by religious cults, especially
those with apocalyptic ideology, Dolnik notes:
most suicide cults tend to direct their violence only inward, committing collective
suicide without attacking others ...  Apocalyptic cults that do kill non-members,
on the other hand, surprisingly tend to be oriented toward survival.  Even members
of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo ... demonstrated their desire to survive by
adopting extensive safety measures and by emphasizing survival of Armageddon
as the main benefit of being the group’s member.66
Public health approach
The understanding that the use of biological weapons – whether in warfare or as a terrorist
or criminal act – is nothing more than the deliberate use of disease makes it apparent that
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there is much common ground in responses to outbreaks of disease, whether they stem
from natural, deliberate or accidental (such as a laboratory incident) causes.
At the same time as the greater awareness was building of the vulnerability of modern
societies to disruptions caused by deliberate actions, such as the 2001 anthrax letters, there
were increased concerns regarding the harm that could result from natural outbreaks of
new diseases, such as the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory System (SARS) in 2003 or
the possibilities of a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI or ‘bird flu’) epidemic.
This led to a new realization of the connections between health security and economic
security, and the understanding that a significant impact on economic security that
resulted from health issues could have a major impact on national security.
The World Health Organization is the inter-governmental body tasked with issues
relating to public health.  The 1970 WHO publication, Health Aspects of Chemical and
Biological Weapons, was followed by a second edition in 2004, Public health response to
biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance.  While this illustrates the involvement
of the WHO within this subject area, there are particular issues that are of significance in
relation to the interaction between health and security issues.  This is probably best
summed up by a concept known as the ‘second diagnosis problem’.
The second diagnosis problem was first highlighted by Robin Coupland of the
International Committee of the Red Cross.  Coupland noted that the identification of a
disease in any particular circumstance might be known as the ‘first diagnosis’. However,
if there was an allegation that a disease had been deliberately induced, this would require
a ‘second diagnosis’ to resolve the situation — to identify how this deliberate act had been
carried out and who had perpetrated the act.  But who should make this second diagnosis
and how long might this take?  Coupland and colleagues recognized dangers of presuming
health or humanitarian organizations should make the second diagnosis.67
Individual authors have focused on particular aspects of these problems, such as
dual-use issues or the interaction of the regime and public health issues.  Some authors
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have suggested that one of the best ways to reduce the impact of any use of deliberate
disease is to reduce the general impact of natural disease.  One suggestion has been for a
‘vaccines for peace’ programme.68
Amongst the developed countries, there is a notable US–Europe divergence, based
mostly on different attitudes to health provision.  In most of Europe public health, and
healthcare in general, is seen as an activity for which it is correct that government should
be involved with.  In the USA, healthcare is seen as essentially a contract between a
patient and a provider and the ‘legitimate’ role of government in health issues is the
subject of much debate.
There is a particular overlap in the public health area with civil protection
considerations and with terrorism issues.  This has had great influence on the nature and
tenor of public debate on the subject.
An influence that needs noting is the sponsorship of events and of literature by those
that might benefit from decisions to follow particular policies.  A simple example of this
would be a meeting and report organized by the New Defence Agenda and the Chemical
and Biological Arms Control Institute entitled ‘Countering Bioterrorism: How can Europe
and the United States work together?’  The meeting was held in Brussels on 25 April 2005
and produced a series of recommendations.  One proposed recommendation related to
vaccine procurement.  The meeting and report were made possible with the support of
Acambis and Agilent Technologies, both of which are involved with vaccine
production.69
A further example was the presentation by a representative of Emergent BioSolutions
Inc. (an anthrax vaccine manufacturer) at a side event of the 2009 Meeting of Experts in
which it was stated that the casualty effects of a one megaton nuclear weapon can be
reproduced with only 6.5 kg of anthrax, without citing a specific source.70  However, this
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70. Richard Guthrie, ‘The Final Day: closure and reflections’, MX report no 6, BioWeapons Prevention
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figure derives from a 1995 paper71 that suggested this number as an minimum
requirement in near perfect conditions with high levels of technical expertise to achieve
100 per cent aerosolization in use against a totally unprotected population, noting that
urban populations would gain some protection from the buildings they were in, thus
requiring more material to be used.  Indeed, the paper illustrated that with basic protective
measures the quantity of anthrax required to have the same casualty effects as a one
megaton nuclear weapon would be raised ten-thousand fold to some 65,000 kg.  The irony
of the use of the minimum estimate from the 1995 paper is that these suggested basic
protective measures did not include vaccination.
Methodological approaches
In addition to the thematic, problem-oriented, approaches outlined above, there are a
number of methodological approaches that are of notable significance.
The events approach
One method for analysing a regime as complex as that to control biological weapons is to
break down developments into discrete but inter-related events and present them in a
chronological sequence.
This is one of the approaches used by HSP and quarterly chronologies are published
in its CBW Conventions Bulletin.72  Examples of events in the HSP dataset include:
• the presentation of official speeches, announcements, declarations or documents;
• the gathering of individuals at a particular location, including committees and
conferences;
• the movement of individuals, either singly or as a group;
• the publication of papers, articles and books; and 
• the births and deaths of individuals;
Clearly, the significance of any event, or what it might mean in relation to other events, is
subject to interpretation and this interpretation may vary according to the experiences,
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assumptions and prejudices, or indeed the theoretical perspective, being brought to bear
by the individual who is doing the interpreting.
A key characteristic of an event is that its validity can be determined, such that it can
be established that a particular policy document was released or an article was published.
It must be noted, however, that even if an event is considered to be valid, this does not
mean that all data embodied within the event is automatically assumed to be accurate.
However, the collation of events in a logical sequence with appropriate cross
referencing provides a particularly rich research resource.
A further publication that followed a not entirely dissimilar methodology was Arms
Control Reporter, published from 1982 to 2007.
The form of events analysis described here is distinct from the events analysis
developed by Charles McClelland in the 1960s which was a quantitative approach
involving the creation of a database of events for the purpose of statistical analysis.73
Critical period approach
A further approach is to examine a particular period in the lifetime of the regime and to
examine it in detail.  This approach combines elements of International Relations,
Political Studies and Contemporary History.  Two particular examples of this approach
have dealt with events within the past decade and a half in the regime to control biological
weapons.
The first of these, by Jez Littlewood,74 is a detailed examination of the negotiations of
the protocol for the BWC, their cessation in 2001 and the implications of this cessation.
The second, by Guy Roberts,75 also examines the events of 2001 and provides thoughts
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on how the international scene was leading to new forms of international effort to control
biological weapons.
Each of these authors base their writings on their own experiences within the regime
— Littlewood was a member of the Secretariat supporting the Ad Hoc Group and other
BWC meetings, while Roberts was a senior member of the US delegation at BWC
meetings.
Although other authors have written about the same period,76 the particular
experiences and background knowledge that these authors bring to the subject matter
provides a more rounded  and nuanced perspective. 
There have been other notable analyses of critical periods.  For example, Nicholas
Sims examined the first decade after the entry into force of the BWC.77  There have been
a number of articles and papers that focus on the state of the regime after particular
Review Conferences, for example.78
The sectoral approach
Nicholas Sims produced a book in 2001 that took a different perspective on the evolution
of the regime to control biological weapons.  Unlike his earlier book, noted above, which
took an essentially chronological approach to the developments, this later volume took a
sectoral approach.79  This latter book is focused on the BWC rather than the broader
regime.  The author notes ‘The treaty regime was defined and developed by a process of
cumulative diplomacy and accretion; each review conference built on its predecessor’.80
The three sectors, which Sims describes as ‘regimes’, identified by the author are a
regime of compliance; a regime of development; and a regime of permanence.  Sims
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described his regime of compliance as composed of the elements of the BWC, such as the
complaints procedure, ‘that served as functional substitutes for verification’ together with
confidence-building measures and negotiations for a protocol that were still continuing at
the time.  His regime of development is described as ‘a set of principles and norms that
lead to practical economic and social benefits’ and the regime of permanence as the ‘legal
and diplomatic elements which reinforce the permanent character of the BTWC and
render it more irreversible’.81
Sims concluded that, of the three, the regime of compliance had evolved the furthest,
notwithstanding that ‘Every element in the regime of compliance remains
underdeveloped, and each can be strengthened’.82
In bringing these three regimes together, Sims identifies two lacunae.  The first of
these is a regime relating to research as research is not a prohibited activity under the
BWC.  As research is not a prohibited activity then, Sims argues, it does not fall within the
general purpose criterion.  The second identified lacuna is the lack of an institutional core
to the Convention.
Sims concludes a need for ‘a balanced approach to the evolution of the BWC treaty
regime in each of its sectors’.83
In a later book, Sims continues to focus on countering institutional deficit, but focuses
on accountability framework issues rather than research issues.84
The sectors in the middle book in the Sims trilogy were drawn upon in a recent PhD
thesis85 in which James Revill analysed four dimensions — ‘Compliance Dimension’,
‘Development Dimension’, ‘Institutional Dimension’ and ‘Research Dimension’.
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Identification of regime obligations
As noted earlier (see Chapter 1, page 40), the second sub-question of the first Research
Question of this thesis is:
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria used within assessment of regime
effectiveness be related to principles, norms and rules (i.e., obligations) within the
regime?
The wording of this question derives from earlier literature regarding regimes, especially
that focused on Regime Theory.  This is discussed in Chapter 6. 
To tackle this question, the first task has to be the identification of the principles,
norms and rules within the regime to control biological weapons.  An initial working
premise underpinning this question is that to be as useful as possible, as many as possible
of the identified principles, norms and rules within the regime should be encompassed
within the dimensions.  Ideally, all of them should be taken into account within the
proposed dimensions.  Once principles, norms and rules within the regime have been
identified, these can then be compared in Chapter 8 with the proposed dimensions.
As will be explained in Chapter 6 (see page 144), the distinction between principles,
norms and rules is not always easy to make and therefore there is some utility in
understanding these obligations together.
Sims elaboration
Nicholas Sims identified a number of obligations under the Convention.86 He elaborated
them on an article-by-article basis and these are presented below.
Article I — Never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or
otherwise acquire or retain, biological or toxin weapons (defined as: (a) microbial
or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production,
of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,, protective or
other peaceful purposes; and (b) weapons, equipment or means of delivery
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict)
Article II — To destroy them, or divert them to peaceful purposes, not later than
9 months after the entry into force of the convention
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Article III — Not to transfer them to any recipient whatsoever, and not in any way
to assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire them
Article IV — To take any necessary measures to give domestic legal effect, within
each state party, to its international obligations under the convention
Article V — To consult and cooperate as necessary, bilaterally and multilaterally,
in solving any problems that may arise, including the use of ‘appropriate
international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in
accordance with its Charter’
Article VI — To cooperate with the UN Security Council in any investigation
which it may ‘initiate’ (English text) or ‘entreprendre’ (French text), should it
receive a complaint that one state party finds another state party to be acting in
breach of its obligations87
Article VII — To assist victims, again in cooperation with the Security Council,
if biological or toxin weapons are used against a state party88
Article IX — To continue negotiations in good faith ‘with a view to reaching early
agreement’ on a chemical disarmament treaty
Article X — To pursue international cooperation in the peaceful uses of
micro-biology,, through the ‘development and application of scientific
discoveries’ for the prevention of disease and for other peaceful purposes;; and to
implement the BTWC in such a way as ‘to avoid hampering the economic or
technological development of States Parties to the Convention’ or international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of microbiology
A comparison of these identified obligations with the proposed dimensions of
assessment of effectiveness of the regime is carried out in Chapter 8 (see page 231).
Kelle elaboration
In his analysis, Alexander Kelle, separately identified norms and principles in 2003.89  He
identified eight specific norms within the regime, together with a normative requirement
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to negotiate a convention on chemical weapons which has now been fulfilled.  These eight
identified norms are: ‘non-use’; ‘non-acquisition’; ‘disarmament’; ‘non-transfer’;
‘cooperation’; ‘assistance’; ‘consultation’; and ‘harmonization’.  Three principles of the
regime are also identified in this article: ‘use of [biological and toxin weapon] agents
constitutes an abhorrent act of warfare and is therefore prohibited’; ‘peaceful uses of the
biosciences are a legitimate undertaking’; and ‘assumption of states subscribing to the
regime that defenses [sic] against the threat or use of [biological and toxin weapons] are
permitted’.
While the first three of these identified norms are self-explanatory, some of the others
are worthy of elaboration.  In Kelle’s analysis, the ‘non-transfer’ norm derives from BWC
Article III and strengthened through national implementation measures adopted under
Article IV.  The ‘cooperation’ norm is based on BWC Article X with the ‘assistance’
norm deriving from BWC Article VII, and the ‘consultation’ norm deriving from BWC
Article V.  The ‘harmonization’ norm in this analysis is of a different character being
implicit in nature.  The example by Kelle of this norm in action is the harmonized
behaviour of states participating in the Australia Group.  Kelle also identifies the
possibility of an ‘investigation norm’ but suggests that this is ‘practically absent from the
existing BTW regime’.
A comparison of these identified norms and principles with the proposed dimensions
of assessment of effectiveness of the regime is carried out in Chapter 8 (see page 232
onwards).
Issues relating to norms
Any attempt to ascertain the characteristic of any norm or norms under the regime to
control biological weapons prompts certain questions.  How should the norms of the
regime be identified?  Is there any distinction between the norms within the more general
regime to control biological weapons and the more specific BWC.  Are these same norms
held by all of the participants within the regime and the States Parties to the Convention?
If there is more than one interpretation of these norms, are these truly norms?  Is there
simply one overarching norm – the acceptance of the taboo against inflicting disease?  Are
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the norms embedded in regime members or is participating in the regime in general or
joining the BWC in particular simply a gesture?
It is incontestable that norms develop over time — change over time cannot be done
universally as some states will have different rates of adoption or acceptance of new or
amended norms.  By definition, this highlights a weakness of Regime Theory as this
theory implies norms are shared by all participants in a regime.  A response to this point
would be that this might be accommodated if there is an over-arching norm binding the
regime together that has universal acceptance and it is what might be classed as
‘sub-norms’ that are the subject of development.
In addition to the development of norms, there are issues of membership of the group
that has collectively adopted any norm.  In the case of the BWC, the attitudes of a number
of states has varied through the years.  For example, France clearly indicated it could not
support the BWC before it was opened for signature in 1972 but acceded to the
Convention in September 1984.90
Single or multiple norms?
Nicholas Sims notes that in statements to the Second BWC Review Conference in 1986,
the preponderence was for suggesting that a single norm existed within the Convention,
although he also notes that this ‘assumes that the phraseology was carefully chosen in
each instance, which may not have been the case’.91  He also notes that language
regarding norms was almost completely absent from statements and proposals at the Third
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90. The French Representative to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly indicated on 29
November 1971 why France would not be signing the BWC: ‘What we fear is that on the
international level this would be the first step towards a policy of disarmament without control. Such
a policy would limit itself to prohibiting the manufacture of weapons, the use of which is unlikely in
any case.  It would have the serious shortcoming of giving credence to the idea that disarmament is
forging ahead, whilst the true dangers will not have been allayed, and in the field of verification it
will be based on the use of national means of observation and will therefore be discriminatory, since
not all states have sufficient means.  International control as a principle is the indispensable
corollary to any disarmament measure of a contractual nature, albeit partial.  If this element is
ignored, the draft convention on the prohibition of the manufacture of biological weapons is an
extremely dangerous precedent, the existence of which will weigh heavily upon all disarmament
work.  A State cannot merely have faith in the goodwill of other Powers in a field where its security
is at stake.’ [A/C.1/PV.1838, as cited in SIPRI II, p 187-88]
91. Nicholas A Sims, ‘The Evolution of Biological Disarmament’, SIPRI Chemical & Biological
Warfare Studies [Scorpion Papers] no 19, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2002),
200 pp at p 163.
BWC Review Conference five years later.92  Plenary statements made by States Parties at
meetings of the BWC’s inter-sessional process and at the Sixth Review Conference in
2006 contain a mix of singular and plural in relation to norm(s).93
Dynamic norms?
Clearly, norm(s) are not static.  It is not simply that norm(s) at the core of the regime have
evolved over time, the perception of the prohibition of biological warfare has also
changed over the years.  Rapid developments in the life sciences and the accompanying
spread of biological materials and technologies to numbers of facilities that are orders of
magnitude higher than the numbers when the BWC was negotiated.  The ownership of
facilities is also an issue as at the time of negotiation of the BWC, most facilities were
under the direct ownership or control of governments.  By the first decade of the 21st
century many relevant facilities were privately owned.  New forms of research in the life
sciences are being carried out.  There are fears that laboratories could be the source of new
dangers.  Should the expectation that there should be responsible conduct of research in
the life sciences, with appropriate biosafety and biosecurity arrangements, be considered
to be a new norm or sub-norm under the BWC or the wider regime?  Ensuring responsible
conduct of research requires engagement with many actors outside of government.
The bargain of the renunciation by States Parties of hostile uses of biological materials
and technologies in return for freedom to gain the benefits of the peaceful uses of them is
embodied in Article X of the Convention.  Although most Western states have
consistently put emphasis on the security aspects of the bargain, states seeking greater
economic development see access to peaceful uses as a key justification for using precious
governmental resources in their engagement with the Convention.  The human cost of
disease is widely recognised, but it is worth noting that there are many parts of the world
in which the economic costs of infectious disease have a significant impact, not only
through individuals being unable to be economically active when they are unwell, but also
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92. Sims, p 164-65
93. For example, the document dataset compiled for this thesis can identify 7 plenary statements by
States Parties and 4 by NGOs made in the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 that use the term
‘norm’; while 2 plenary statements by States Parties, 1 by an international organization and 1 by an
NGO used ‘norms’.
through the efforts of others to take care of them.  Might some states see Article X issues
as a norm or sub-norm of the Convention?
Conclusions relating to earlier analysis
There are a number of conclusions and judgements regarding previous understandings
that are relevant to the work of this thesis.  The most fundamental of which is that
understanding the problems presented by the issue of biological weapons and the possible
solutions there may be is a truly multidisciplinary effort that spans the natural and social
sciences.  This thesis therefore has to go beyond standard political sciences and
international relations literature.
There is a need to separate biological weapons from the other ‘weapons of mass
destruction’ for a number of types of analysis.  While there is significant common ground
between biological and chemical weapons there are also important differences.
Biological weapons should only be compared and contrasted with the other types of
WMD where appropriate.  The nuances of the differences between the NACD concepts
are important, notwithstanding that there are sufficient overlaps so that it is worth
considering all of these as one grouping for a number of purposes.
As might be expected, when viewing issues relating to the regime to control biological
weapons through different lenses, different emphases are brought forth.  In the approaches
outlined in this Chapter there are no inherently contradictory understandings.  However,
policy perspectives and the choices that follow from them have implications for each
other.  Perhaps the clearest example of this is the tension between a need for controls on
materials and technologies to prevent hostile uses of them while at the same time as there
is a need for these to be accessible for peaceful purposes.
The shrill tone of much that is written about the possibility of terrorist use of
biological weapons has had a dominant influence on much public debate and discourse.
While this has not drowned out the more analytical commentators on the subject matter, it
has meant that analysts reaching measured conclusions have had some difficulties having
their voice heard.  The ‘incestuous inter-quote’ problem has made the difficulties of
delineating between allegations and confirmed cases much more pronounced.
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It is apparent from the variety of problem-oriented approaches that each of these might
be used as background for an evaluation of success, failure and other measures of
effectiveness of the regime to control biological weapons, but it is clear that no one
measure would encompass all of these approaches.  Hence, in the work of this thesis,
more than one axis or dimension of assessment of effectiveness should be explored, as
anticipated in a sub-question of the first Research Question.
In a thesis, the convention after such a review of earlier understandings would be to
position the author in the context of the existing literature.  However, in this case, it is not
such a straightforward proposition.  In relation to the problem-oriented approaches
identified above, all of the main strands have to be taken into account.  The critical period
approach that has been outlined above is the foremost relevant approach to be used within
this thesis.  However, these methods on their own will not be sufficient.
The key element in attempting to understand what has taken place within the regime
to control biological weapons and to identify how certain perceptions, including those of
effectiveness, influenced choices is to recognise that are usually multiple causes in each
decision or critical juncture that is relevant to the narrative.
In concluding this Chapter, it is worth noting at this point that the key challenge that
arises within this thesis is the lack of a previously tested method for understanding
effectiveness of a regime such as that to control biological weapons.  While the existing
methods that have been used to understand effectiveness that have been identified within
the thesis provide lessons and some tools for application in the chosen area, none are
suitable in their entirety for the task required here.
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4. Use of the concept of ‘effectiveness’ within the context of the regime to control
biological weapons
Signposting
Chapter 2 concluded with the simple, but rarely explicitly raised, question with a
complicated answer — what should effectiveness mean in the context of the regime to
control biological weapons?  Having explored the regime to control biological weapons
in Chapter 3, there is a need to illustrate why 2001 was a watershed; not simply for general
international interactions relating to the regime to control biological weapons but in
particular interactions relating to effectiveness.  A second aim of this Chapter is to provide
some basic quantitative results on the use of ‘effectiveness’ and related terms in
documents from meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention.
One of the underlying assumptions within this thesis highlighted in Chapter 1 (see
page 21) related to this watershed:
The events of 2001 were a watershed for the efforts to control biological weapons.
The rejection by the US of the draft protocol to strengthen the BWC followed by
the use of the US postal service as a delivery system for powdered Bacillus
anthracis forced governments around the world to consider how materials and
technologies that could be used to make biological weapons should be controlled.
This assumption needs to be explored as part of the case to illustrate why a new approach
to understand effectiveness needs to start after this date.
Introduction
Amidst the official inter-governmental activities within the regime to control biological
weapons, there have rarely been specific interactions about the meaning of the concept of
effectiveness.  However, concepts of effectiveness have appeared within texts from
international meetings relevant to the regime and within the text of the Biological
Weapons Convention itself.
From the quotations provided below it can be seen that the attitudes expressed in
relation to effectiveness were very much focused on verification with the next most
common focus being on Article X issues.  This is most clearly elaborated in texts prior to
the 2001 suspension of the negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BWC — indeed,
the very process of ‘strengthening’ the Convention has an inherent element of improving
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effectiveness.  Post-2001, with no further negotiations on a protocol and the introduction
of the inter-sessional process, there are new elaborations of activities that might enhance
effectiveness.
In essence, the ‘shock’ of the events of 2001 prompted an examination, both explicit
and implicit, of what the regime to control biological weapons was for.  This does not
imply, however, that those carrying out this re-examination, either implicitly or explicitly,
would come to the same conclusions.
The selected quotations, provided below in chronological order, illustrate the
development (or lack of development) of the concept of effectiveness regarding WMD in
general (initially) and then control of biological weapons once that had become a separate
issue.
The United Nations General Assembly
From the beginnings of concerns about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), there were
expressed desires for ‘effective’ countermeasures to their spread.  The first ever resolution
adopted by the UN General Assembly includes the following text on the tasks allocated to
the new Atomic Energy Commission:
The Commission shall proceed with the utmost despatch and enquire into all
phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with
respect to them as it finds possible. In particular. the Commission shall make
specific proposals:
(a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information
for peaceful ends;
(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for
peaceful purposes;
(c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other
major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;
(d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect
complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.1 [emphasis
added]
There are two points about the text of this resolution worth highlighting in particular.
First, is that the reference is the elimination of weapons from national armaments and,
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1. United Nations General Assembly, Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems
Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy, resolution 1(I), adopted 24 January 1946, paragraph 5,
‘Terms of reference of the Commission’.
secondly, this resolution was adopted before the UN definition of WMD had been agreed
in 1947-48 (see page 44)
As noted earlier, UN General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) (see page 50), adopted
on 20 November 1959, referred to an aim of ‘general and complete disarmament under
effective international control’ and resolution 2602E (XXIV) (see page 51), adopted on 16
December 1969 which added the phrase ‘strict and’ thus referring to an aim of ‘general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’.
However, there seems to be very little on the public record as to what the term
‘effective’ is taken to mean other than in the broadest of terms.
The Biological Weapons Convention
There was some references to effectiveness as a concept in the BWC negotiations but this
was never elaborated in any detail.  Most references are general statements such as
‘effective elimination’ without specific attributes of how such effectiveness should be
achieved.  The UK proposals for drafts of the BWC as put forward on 10 July 19692 and
26 August 19693 only use the term ‘effective measures’ in relation to undertakings to
negotiate a chemical weapons convention.4
There are direct references to effectiveness within the text of the Convention as
opened for signature in 1972 itself.  For example, Preambular paragraph 1 reads:
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and
complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of
weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will
facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control, [emphasis added]
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2. Contained in document ENDC/255.
3. Contained in document ENDC/255/Rev.1.
4. Of the cables released in recent decades by the United States from the time of negotiation of the
BWC that have come to the attention of the author, the emphasis in relation to ‘effectiveness’ is also
in regard to any future potential chemical weapons convention.  Notably, a memo from Kissinger to
Nixon dated 28 April 1971 regarding the negotiations says on-site verification for biological
weapons ‘could not possibly be effective without also being extraordinarily intrusive’ .
The use of this terminology would seem to follow on from the evolution in the general and
complete disarmament debate (see page 50 onwards) and UNGA resolution 2602E
(XXIV).  This theme is continued in Preambular paragraphs 7 and 8:
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of
States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction
as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,
Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological)
and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of
agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue
negotiations to that end, [emphasis added]
There are also references to effectiveness in Article IX regarding calls for negotiations of
a Chemical Weapons Convention, but these are in very general terms.
As with many other international agreements, the Biological Weapons Convention
includes provisions for on-going review of its operation.  These are included in Article
XII:
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested
by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect
to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention
shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention,
with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of
the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical
weapons, are being realized.  Such review shall take into account any new
scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. [emphasis
added]
While the phrase ‘assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the
Convention ... are being realized’ is an embodiment of the concept of effectiveness by
another name, there is no guidance in the language of the Convention as to how
effectiveness should be considered.
The connection between assuring the provisions of the Convention are being realized
and effectiveness is made explicit in the Rules of Procedure adopted for the BWC Review
Conferences at the Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference:
The task of the Review Conference being to review the operation of the
Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the
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provisions of the Convention are being realized, and thus to strengthen its
effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive
matters by means of consensus.  There should be no voting on such matters until
all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted. [emphasis added]5
The text of paragraph 28 has remained unchanged and the identical text was used for the
Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011.6  These Rules of Procedure were themselves
based on the rules adopted for the Review Conferences of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the first of which had been held in 1975.
The First BWC Review Conference
The First BWC Review Conference, held in 1980, considered a number of issues.  The
Final Declaration, adopted by consensus, included the following as its first preambular
paragraph:
Reaffirming their determination to act with a view to achieving effective progress
towards general and complete disarmament including the prohibition and
elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction and convinced that the
prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective
measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control. [emphasis in italics added]7
The final preambular paragraph reads:
The States Parties to the Convention reaffirm their strong determination for the
sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons.  They reaffirm their strong
support for the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and
objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions. [emphasis
in italics added]8
The phrasing ‘general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control’ will have been recognized as consensus text taken from UNGA resolution 2602E
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5. Preparatory Committee for the First Review Conference, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Draft
Rules of Procedure for the Review Conference’, BWC/CONF.I/PC/2, dated 9 July 1979, paragraph
28.
6. The Rules of Procedure are included in the report of the Seventh Review Conference,
BWC/CONF.VII/7, dated 13 January 2012.
7. First Review Conference, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Final Document’, BWC/CONF.I/10,
dated 21 March 1980, p 6.
8. Ibid., p 6.
(XXIV) (see page 51), adopted on 16 December 1969 and subsequently used in the first
Preambular paragraph of the Convention itself.9 
The Committee of the Whole during the First Review Conference reported on
discussions in relation to Articles I–IV:
It was a widely held view that the scope of the Convention, as defined in the
respective articles, had not given rise to any problems or caused any ambiguities
in the process of its application by States Parties.  In this connexion some
participants also noted with satisfaction that no complaints had been lodged
regarding violations of the obligations as provided for in these articles.  On this
basis they concluded that the provisions of Articles I – IV had been effectively
implemented. [emphasis added]10
The use of the term ‘effectively implemented’ implies that an examination of the
effectiveness of the Convention had been carried out.  However, the only yardstick
referred to in the record of discussions is that of complaints, and that no complaints
equated with effectiveness.
The Committee of the Whole also reported on discussions in relation to Articles
V–VII:
With regard to these articles, it was widely noted that no State Party had found
cause to resort to the complaints procedure.  The opinion was shared by several
States Parties that, nevertheless, it would improve the effectiveness of the
Convention if the complaints procedure were strengthened in accordance with
principles of flexibility, objectivity and non-discrimination. [emphasis added]11
While there are no specifics about what measures might be adopted to strengthen the
complaints procedure, the agreement of this text indicates that delegations were
recognising there were areas in which improvements could be made to enhance
effectiveness of the Convention even if this was only couched in general terms.
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9. From direct observation of negotiations, the benefits for the negotiation process of the insertion of
text that has previously been agreed by consensus are clear as this technique allows for a focus on
issues that require agreement.
10. First Review Conference, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Report of the Committee of the
Whole’, BWC/CONF.I/7, dated 18 March 1980, para 7.
11. Ibid., para 14.  In the draft version of the CoW report circulated as an unpublished conference room
paper on 14 March 1980 the equivalent paragraph read: ‘With regard to these articles, it was
generally recognised that no situation had arisen to warrant resorting to the complaints procedure.
The opinion was expressed that, nevertheless, it would improve the effectiveness of the Convention
if the complaints procedure were strengthened and improved.’
The Final Declaration included the following in the section regarding Article V:
The Conference considers that the flexibility of the provisions concerning
consultations and co-operation on any problems which may arise in relation to the
objective, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention, enables
interested States Parties to use various international procedures which would make
it possible to ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the
Convention provisions taking into account the concern expressed by the
Conference participants to this effect.
These procedures include, inter alia, the right of any State Party subsequently to
request that a consultative meeting open to all States Parties be convened at expert
level.
The Conference, noting the concerns and differing views expressed on the
adequacy of Article V, believes that this question should be further considered at
an appropriate time. [emphasis in italics added]12
References were also made in the sections on Article IX in relation to effectiveness in
very general terms relating to possible future controls on chemical weapons.
The Second BWC Review Conference
The Second BWC Review Conference, held in 1986, followed many of the precedents set
by the First Review Conference.  Therefore, some general comments on effectiveness that
are repeats of language from the First Review Conference are not repeated here.
The section of the Final Declaration dealing with the Preamble to the Convention
included the following language:
Confirming the common interest in strengthening the authority and the
effectiveness of the Convention, to promote confidence and co-operation among
States Parties, [emphasis in italics added]13
and:
Declare their strong determination, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude
completely the possibility of microbial, or other biological agents, or toxins being
used as weapons and reaffirm their strong support for the Convention, their
continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their legal obligation
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12. First Review Conference, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Final Document’, BWC/CONF.I/10,
dated 21 March 1980, pp 7-8.
13. Second Review Conference, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Final Declaration’,
BWC/CONF.II/13, dated September 1986, part II, p 2.
under international law to implement and strictly comply with its provisions.
[emphasis in italics added]14
The phrase ‘implement and strictly comply with its provisions’ is another form of
expression indicating concepts of effectiveness.
In the section on Article V there was reference to a number of new measures for
information exchange and encouragement for contact between scientists across national
borders which were the first iteration of what became the current system of
Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs):
The Conference, mindful of the provisions of Article V and Article X, and
determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance
confidence in the implementation of its provisions, agrees that the States Parties
are to implement, on the basis of mutual co-operation, the following measures, in
order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions,
and in order to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful
bacteriological (biological) activities;15
The phraseology ‘to enhance confidence in the implementation of its provisions’ and ‘to
prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to
improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological)
activities’ are forms of expression indicating concepts of effectiveness.
In the section on Article X there were reference to new measures to encourage or
enable the fullest possible exchanges in relation to peaceful uses.  The section concludes
with the statement:
The Conference upholds that the above-mentioned measures would positively
strengthen the Convention [emphasis added].16
The review of Article XII (the Article that embodies the provisions for review of the
Convention) included the following language:
The Conference, noting the differing views with regard to verification, decides
that the Third Review Conference shall consider, inter alia:




14. Ibid., p 3.
15. Ibid., p 6.
16. Ibid., p 9.
- the relevance for effective implementation of the Convention of the results
achieved in the negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons,
- the effectiveness of the provisions in Article V for consultation and co-operation
and of the co-operative measures agreed in this Final Declaration, and
- in the light of these considerations and of the provisions of Article XI, whether
or not further actions are called for to create further co-operative measures in the
context of Article V, or legally binding improvements to the convention, or a
combination of both.17
This again illustrates that delegates were interested in effectiveness of the Convention,
although there were no detailed consensus conclusions on what effectiveness entailed.
The Third BWC Review Conference, VEREX and the Special Conference
The Third BWC Review Conference, held in 1991, followed many of the precedents set
by the First Review Conference.  Therefore, some general comments on effectiveness that
are repeats of language from the First and the Second Review Conference are not repeated
here.
Within the review of Article IV, the Final Declaration included that the ‘Conference
notes the importance of’ a number of issues including ‘Legislative, administrative and
other measures designed effectively to enhance domestic compliance with the
Convention’ [emphasis added].18
Key to the subject matter of this thesis was that the Third Review Conference agreed
a mandate for a group of experts to consider verification issues which became known as
the VEREX process (short for ‘verification experts’).  A key paragraph of the VEREX
mandate was contained within the section reviewing Article V:
The Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the
implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification
could reinforce the Convention, decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group of
Governmental Experts open to all States Parties to identify and examine potential




17. Second Review Conference, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Final Declaration’,
BWC/CONF.II/13, dated September 1986, part II, p 10.
18. Third Review Conference, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Final Declaration’,
BWC/CONF.III/23, dated September 1991, p 13.
19. Ibid., p 16.
The group of verification experts held a number of meetings from 1992 to 1993 which
culminated in adoption of a report containing a number of possible measures considered
worthy of further examination in order to strengthen the Convention.
The VEREX report, published in 1993 concluded:
32. Based on the examination and evaluation of the measures described above
against the criteria given in the mandate, the Group considered, from the scientific
and technical standpoint, that some of the potential verification measures would
contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and improve the implementation of
the Convention, also recognizing that appropriate and effective verification could
reinforce the Convention. [emphasis added]20
Some criteria for evaluating measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention
were used during the VEREX process:
During Verex 3, all 21 potential verification measures, identified during Verex 1
and examined during Verex 2, were evaluated by the group. To evaluate these
measures an agreed methodology was applied based on the six mandate criteria.
The criteria for evaluating the measures are:
1. Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of
information they provide and fail to provide.
2. Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities.
3. Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance.
4. Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements.
5. Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications.
6. Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial
development and other permitted activities; and their implications for the
confidentiality of Commercial Proprietary Information (CPI).
The first three criteria mainly represent the effectiveness of individual measures;
the second three mainly represent their requirements and their impact. According
to these criteria, capabilities and limitations were considered. [emphasis added]21
There were discussions during the VEREX meetings that effectiveness was more than
verification.  This was raised in particular during discussions on Article X issues.
The results of the VEREX meetings were fed into a ‘Special Conference’ of the BWC
states parties held in September 1994.  The report from this conference noted:
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20. Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures
from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Summary Report’,
BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8, dated 24 September 1993, 20 pp at p 9.
21. Ibid., p 10.
that the VEREX Report considered, from the scientific and technical standpoint,
that some of the potential verification measures would contribute to strengthening
the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the convention and that some
combinations of some potential verification measures, including both off-site and
on-site measures, could provide information which could be useful for the main
objective of the Biological Weapons Convention. The Conference noted that the
Report recognised that appropriate and effective verification could reinforce the
Convention. [emphasis added]22
The report of the Special Conference also included the mandate for the ‘Ad Hoc Group’
to be established to carry out negotiations on a possible protocol to strengthen the
Convention which included a number of references to effectiveness and related concepts:
In pursuance of the second part of its mandate under Item 9, the Conference,
determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the
Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the
Convention, decides to establish an Ad Hoc Group, open to all States parties. The
objective of this Ad Hoc Group shall be to consider appropriate measures,
including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the
convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be
submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. In this context, the Ad Hoc
Group shall, inter alia consider :
Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and
types of activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the
Convention;
The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and
transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;
A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as
appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX Report.
Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost
effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the
effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse;
Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article
X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken
under the convention, noting that the provisions of the convention should not be
used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes
consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific
knowledge, technology, equipment and materials. [emphasis added]23
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22. Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, ‘Final Report’, BWC/SPCONF/1, September 1994, para 33.
23. Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, ‘Final Report’, BWC/SPCONF/1, September 1994, para 36.
Discussions in the Ad Hoc Group focused on the development of a new legal
framework in the Protocol under negotiation.  Where discussion occurred on concepts of
effectiveness it was primarily on effectiveness of verification rather than effectiveness of
implementing the provisions of the Convention itself.  
The Fourth Review Conference and the ongoing Protocol negotiations
Fourth  Review Conference was held in 1996 to follow the 5-yearly pattern, but as it was
convened while the Ad Hoc Group was ongoing it was held for only two weeks rather than
the customary three.  There were some general comments on effectiveness that were
repeats of language from earlier Review Conferences so are not repeated in this analysis.
Overall, the references to effectiveness were very general.  One notable reference is
that in the review of Article II which included the following language:
The Conference recognizes that for any State acceding to the Convention after the
entry into force of the Convention, the destruction or diversion to peaceful
purposes specified in Article II would be completed upon accession to the
Convention. The Conference emphasizes that the destruction or diversion to
peaceful purposes specified in Article II should be carried out completely and
effectively.
The context of this reference to effectiveness had been the admissions by both Iraq and
Russia to activities that were construed by many to be in breach of the provisions of the
Convention.
The Ad Hoc Group negotiations continued almost until the Fifth Review Conference,
being brought to a halt in the middle of 2001.
Jez Littlewood summarised the process of the negotiations for strengthening the
Convention in the following terms:
The key deficiency with the Convention is the paucity of provisions to ensure
compliance with the obligations undertaken under it; states parties essentially have
to trust one another to implement the BWC honestly and effectively.  The danger
inherent in this approach was recognised during the negotiations by both states and
non-governmental observers.  Rectifying this weakness in the BWC has been
central to the efforts to strengthen the Convention since 1975.  Although work on
the Protocol began in 1995 the negotiations represented a change in the direction
and speed of a continual evolution of the Convention.  That evolution began in
1980 and continues through to the present day, but is subject to periods of intense
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activity and periods of no activity.  The decade between 1991 and 2001 was not
so much an evolution as an attempted revolution.  Rather than clarify the collective
understanding and interpretation of the obligations contained in the BWC or agree
politically binding measures which states parties were encouraged to undertake to
enhance implementation of the Convention, its states parties attempted to develop
a new, supplemental, legally-binding agreement which would have radically
overhauled the implementation of the BWC. That revolution failed and at this
juncture even the evolutionary process of strengthening the Convention has
stalled.24
The failure of this revolution prompted new efforts to find ways to strengthen the
Convention and the wider regime of which it forms the core.
The Fifth Review Conference and the birth of the inter-sessional process
The Fifth BWC Review Conference  was unable to arrive at any form of consensus in
2001, and was therefore suspended with many uncertainties of what the future might
bring.
The resumed Fifth Review Conference, reconvened at the end of 2002, had one
substantive item on its agenda — the creation of the first inter-sessional process
(commonly referred to at the time as the ‘new process’).  The proposed new process was
a compromise and was discussed on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.
At the core of the new process was an aim to reach ‘common understanding and
effective action’ which has remained the key aim of the subsequent inter-sessional
processes.
A brief numerical analysis
While there is no specific quantitative methodology within this thesis, the creation of a
large dataset of documents from the official BWC meetings allows for some examination
of the level of interest in concepts such as effectiveness within these meetings through
simple text searches.  However, before looking at specific numbers, it is worth raising
some notes of caution.
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24. Jez Littlewood, The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution, (Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishers, 2005), 250 + ix pp at p 9.
There are a number of possibilities that can artificially inflate the number of hits.  The
simplest is that some papers are issued in more than one form; for example, it has become
common practice for some of the working papers to be circulated in advance in informal
versions before there has been a chance to typeset them to the BWC meeting publication
standards.  A document captured in the database in its advance version and then its official
version would then appear twice in the statistics.  Similarly, if a paper is reissued when
additional co-sponsors have signed up to it, both the orginal and the Rev versions will
appear in the statistics.  Other possible duplications can come from similar papers being
issued in successive meetings and from the language used in statements or presentations
being repeated from earlier interventions.  A further complicating factor is that there are
times when effectiveness of weapons or of countermeasures to weapons are referred to.
There are also other factors that might lead to an artificial reduction in the number of
hits.  The most obvious of these is that not all interventions are circulated in written form,
especially if a session is closed.  Some interventions are only circulated in the language
they were given in.25  There may be typographical errors in the circulated versions of
documents.  Finally, and more significant for some of the older documents for which only
poor quality scans might be available, the limits of optical character recognition (OCR)
software can mean than some letters or words are not recognized.  This is especially true
regarding the collection of VEREX documents.
It therefore follows that the information provided in the table below can only be
regarded as a very rough guide to the level of discussion of effectiveness.  It should be
further noted that while considerable effort has been put in to make the dataset as
comprehensive as possible for the period under closest examination within the thesis (i.e.,
from the start of the inter-sessional process in 2003 up to the Seventh Review Conference
in 2011), the other periods covered in the dataset will, with some certainty, have some
identifiable gaps, most notably plenary statements in the early Review Conferences.








First Review Conference (1980) 19 19 102
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25. Official languages used within the BWC are: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
Second Review Conference (1986) 15 13 27
Third Review Conference (1991) 28 27 83
VEREX (1992-93)† 75 28 675
Special Conference (1994) 22 30 77
Ad Hoc Group (1995-2001) 454 298 1086
Fourth Review Conference (1996) 21 16 63
Fifth Review Conference (2001) 71 84 173
First ISP (2003-05) 247 197 638
Sixth Review Conference (2006) 152 148 274
Second ISP (2007-10) 537 527 1129
Seventh Review Conference (2011) 121 135 211
Note: Searches carried out using the Lucerne search software
† The collection of VEREX documents contains many that are of poor scan quality for which OCR is not possible
It is worth noting that documents that contain other terminology relating to effectiveness,
such as ‘implement and strictly comply with its provisions’ tend to appear only in
documents that also include terms deriving from ‘effective’ or ‘strengthen’.
Conclusions
The BWC was in something akin to a crisis in the period following the arrival of the Bush
Administration in the US in 2001.  In the middle of that year, negotiations that would have
strengthened the Convention — through the adoption of a protocol that would have
included formal verification arrangements and an international organization — were
brought to a halt when the US announced it could not agree to anything that might result
from those negotiations.  The scheduled five-yearly Review Conference for the
Convention at the end of the year had to be suspended as no consensus could be reached
– the first time a WMD treaty review had ever been suspended in such a manner.  The
Review Conference resumed at the end of 2002 and agreed a limited statement focused on
a work programme for the following years that became known as the ‘inter-sessional
process’.
While the protocol negotiations were on-going, the focus of the potential effectiveness
of the regime to control biological weapons was on what might result from the
negotiations.  With the negotiations halted, how should effectiveness of the regime be
understood?  The regimes to control chemical and nuclear weapons each had global
inter-governmental organizations connected with them and the post-2001 efforts of many
governments in these fields went primarily into strengthening these existing bodies, their
interaction with states and implementation of the relevant treaties within states.  As there
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was no inter-governmental organization for the BWC, a number of issues had to be
reconsidered from first principles by some governments.
The arrival of the Bush Administration may be regarded as the start of a ‘harsh winter’
in multilateral NACD issues.  At the same time as there was a greater awareness of the
threat biological weapons posed — prompted in many cases through fears of terror attacks
(real and imagined) — there was also no coherent or cohesive thinking internationally on
what was the best way to make progress on the subject.  Moreover, political hostility from
the US froze most multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD)
processes as well as there being some hostility towards the US the way it had introduced
its new policies.
These policies caused some bafflement amongst commentators, for example:
The tabling [by the United States], within two hours of the end of the [2001]
Review Conference, of language, without any prior consultation even with close
allies, proposing termination of the Ad Hoc Group and its mandate showed a
serious misreading of the widespread desire of all the other States Parties to
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention in
accordance with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group.  The attitude of the United
States ... is very hard to understand let alone explain.  The rest of the world
appreciates and recognizes the value of the multilateral regime against biological
weapons in strengthening collective security and following the events of 11
September and the subsequent anthrax attacks in the United States, it would have
been expected that the United States would have been aware of – and would have
wished to benefit from – the considerable benefits that could accrue from
multilaterally strengthening the BWC regime as national measures are always
going to be subject to national interpretation and are unlikely to be harmonised
internationally.26
With other options unworkable in the contemporary political climate, the scene was
set for the ‘new process’, a series of meetings that became known as the ‘inter-sessional
process’, that was adopted in the resumed Fifth Review Conference in 2002.
It is therefore clear that the events of 2001 were a watershed for the efforts to control
biological weapons.  It is the inputs into this post-2002 process, and their focus on
‘common understanding and effective action’ that form the basis of this thesis.
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26. Graham S Pearson, ‘The Central Importance of Legally Binding Measures for the Strengthening of
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)’, WMDC Paper no 28, Weapons of Mass
Destruction Commission, (January 2005) 59 pp at p 45.
5. Conceptual frameworks and the role of theory
Introduction
Having established that earlier literature regarding the regime to control biological
weapons does not contain within itself the answers to the challenges posed by the research
problem, there is therefore a need to examine what other sources might be used to provide
such answers.
While earlier conceptual analysis of regimes and of policy processes should be
examined in order to see what may (or may not) be learned from them, there are also
broader aspects of the role of conceptualizations and identification of other areas of
learning that require consideration.
The examination of theory in this thesis is in three chapters.  This chapter deals with
some overarching issues in relation to theory.  Chapter 6 deals with issues relating to
theories regarding regimes.  Chapter 7 deals with theories regarding policy processes.
This chapter is in five parts.  The chapter starts by examining the role of theory in the
context of this thesis.  The second section examines the distinctions between International
Relations and Political Studies as separate disciplines.  The third section explores broader
disciplines drawn on, or referenced, within this thesis.  This exploration also serves to try
to identify confounding factors that might potentially distort or otherwise influence the
findings of this thesis.  The fourth section of this chapter examines lessons from the
author’s earlier policy world experience which have implications for conceptual analysis.
The fifth section examines some differences between natural sciences and social sciences
approaches.  The chapter contains no specific conclusions as it is followed by two further
chapters relating to theoretical issues. Overall conclusions relating to theories can be
found at the end of the Chapter 7.
The role of theory in the context of this thesis
Any project involving collection of data requires the establishment of a conceptual
framework within which it can be carried out.  Such a framework needs to be based on
conceptualizations, knowledge and understandings derived from earlier analysis.  Such
conceptualizations, knowledge and understandings are often referred to as theory.  Theory
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contributes to the creation of the conceptual framework1 for a research project, and such
a conceptual framework underpins the identification of the research problem and
subsequent research questions.
The relationship between the gathering of data and the role of presuppositions,
including theory, has been neatly summarised by Alan Chalmers:
How can we establish significant facts about the world through observation if we
do not have some guidance as to what kind of knowledge we are seeking or what
problems we are trying to solve?2
As this is a project incorporating features from different disciplines, it is worth noting
that theory has been defined within separate disciplines with distinct, but overlapping,
definitions.  Moreover, even within disciplines there are variations in definition between
analysts.  For most sections of this thesis, these distinctions are not necessarily important
as long as the possibilities of differences in terminology are recognized.  Indeed, if an
aspect of earlier literature is drawn upon, it is more important that the relevance of this
literature for the subject matter of this thesis is recognized by all readers than focusing on
the possibility that one reader will label this as a theory, a second as an abstraction and a
third as an understanding.
Richard Feynman usefully summarises the distinction between giving something a
name and understanding what it is that has been labelled:
[My father] taught me ‘See that bird? It’s a brown-throated thrush, but in Germany
it’s called a halsenflugel, and in Chinese they call it a chung ling and even if you
know all those names for it, you still know nothing about the bird — you only
know something about people; what they call that bird.  Now that thrush sings, and
teaches its young to fly, and flies so many miles away during the summer across
the country, and nobody knows how it finds its way, and so forth. There is a
difference between the name of the thing and what goes on.3
Chapter 5
118
1. Some would specifically call this a ‘theoretical framework’.
2. Alan Chalmers, What is this thing called Science, [third edition] (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 1992), p 12-13.
3. Feynman recounted this anecdote many times.  This rendition is quoted from his ‘What is Science?’
lecture to the National Science Teacher’s Association in April 1966.  At this lecture he went on to
say: ‘The result of this is that I cannot remember anybody’s name, and when people discuss physics
with me they often are exasperated when they say “the Fitz-Cronin effect”, and I ask “What is the
effect?” and I can’t remember the name’.
An often cited summary of the distinction between the hard and soft perspectives on
theory (sometimes viewed as the narrow and broad interpretations) within policy
theorising is given by Harry Eckstein.4  According to Eckstein, ‘hard’ theory has
particular traits, and he identifies four of these traits primarily based on the empirical
nature of any such theory and notes that this is sometimes referred to as ‘formal theory’.
On the other hand, Eckstein describes ‘soft’ theory as being ‘simply regarded as any
mental construct that orders phenomena or inquiry into them’.  This is a very broad and
inclusive perspective of what constitutes theory.
Clausewitz, a very practical analyst, expressed a narrower view on the role of theory
in understanding the world: ‘Every theory becomes infinitely more difficult from the
moment that it touches on the province of moral quantities’ and, therefore, ‘it is easier to
determine, by theoretical rules, the order and conduct of battle, than the use to be made of
the battle itself’.5
A particular difficulty with the broader perspective of theory for a thesis such as this
is that, because this perspective is all-encompassing, it can be harder to distinguish
between types of ‘mental construct’ being used, and therefore what the implications of
such use are.  An example of this might be counterfactuals.6  This thesis, therefore,
follows the narrower perspective of theory.  In short, the distinctive characteristic of a
theory, as opposed to any other conceptualization, is that is contains a suggestion within
it of how one thing leads to another.
This places this thesis within what is sometimes described as the problem-solving
theory.  While so-called critical theory — described by Devetek as ‘essentially a critique
of the dogmatism it finds in the traditional modes of theorizing’7 — has a place, the issues
being examined in this thesis are real-world problems.
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4. Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992) 405 pp at pp 125-26.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, [as translated by Anatol Rapoport] (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul Ltd, 1908), 461 pp [as reprinted in the Penguin Classics series, 1982], quotes used at pages 185
and 190 respectively.
6. From one perspective, counterfactuals are simply one part of theory; yet from another, they are the
basis of thought experiments to test theories.
7. Richard Devetek, ‘Critical Theory’, in: Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Theories of
International Relations [3rd edition], Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp 137-60 at p 143.
There are many lessons to be learned from a variety of theoretical backgrounds that
are relevant to the policy areas within this thesis and, therefore, a key aspect of this thesis
is to identify where such lessons exist, rather than embed the author into one particular
lineage of theory rather than another.
A social sciences method that will be drawn upon is that which has become known as
grounded theory.  Despite the name, grounded theory is not a theory in itself but
represents an underlying approach to generate data from source material.  Grounded
theory techniques have particular implications for the overall research process:
Most grounded theory researchers will begin with research questions but they do
not start with a hypothesis, nor do they begin their investigation with a thorough
review of the literature relating to their topic.  They build up theory from their data
and they do not wait until all data are collected before they begin their analysis
stage.  Instead analysis takes place as the data are collected.8
Theory and the real world
There has been a growing trend in the social sciences in recent times to suggest that there
is no single reality in the world and that whenever an author attempts to relate their
research to the real world there is a suggestion that this is a reversion to positivist thinking.
It is incontestable that there could be no singular objective view of the significance or
otherwise of any single meeting relating to the Biological Weapons Convention as each
individual within that meeting will have their own perspectives on what has taken place.
However, the policy areas covered within this thesis have specific real-world relevance
and there are some objective observations that can be made.  Biological and chemical
weapons have been acquired by governments.  Both have been used to cause thousands
upon thousands of casualties.  Their potential impact is much greater.  Efforts to counter
them, and in particular to counter biological weapons, have significant public health
benefits that save lives.
As will be noted in the conclusions to this thesis, it follows that policy choices made




8. Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 2005 [fourth
edition]), 267 + xv pp at p 19.
An underlying leitmotif of this thesis is the gap between theory and practice in
international relations.  Many analysts have noted the divergence between those that
contemplate international events from an academic perspective and those that are
involved with decision making.  The potential for over-theorizing policy areas has been
specifically recognized by Joseph Nye:
the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less.9
In the same opinion piece, he notes a cost to increasing theory:
Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may
have costs for policy, it has produced better social science theory, and that this is
more important than whether such scholarship is relevant.
This does beg the question as to what criteria should be used to establish if theory is better
if it is not relevant.
Nye suggests there are particular influences at play:
Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the
policy world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one’s career.
Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new
methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to
policymakers.
Other commentators, such as Vendulka Kubalkova, have noted implications for the
lack of relevance to academic study to policy making is not limited to disadvantages to
policy makers:
IR need not be irrelevant to policy making.  The lack of relevance is expressed in
the deepening disdain with which policy makers approach research and advice
proffered by academics.  For policy makers, the ready-made substitute for
scholarly advice is at hand in the Information Age ...  If academic IR does not
perform this role, if the debates become too esoteric or impossible to understand,
the sanctions (often too subtle to be regarded as such) will come into play: funding
for professors and job opportunities for graduates will flow elsewhere, and the
status and the profile of the profession will be lowered.  The franchise will be
taken over by whoever else is capable of performing the relevant tasks: print
media, television commentators, and journalists.10
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9. Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘Scholars on the Sidelines’, Washington Post, 13 April 2009.
10. Vendulka Kubalkova, ‘Reconstructing the Discipline’, in: Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and
Paul Kowert (eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World, (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe,
Theory/policy gap issues
While Nye was referring to International Relations theorizing in a broad sense, in 1997,
Nancy Gallagher posed herself the rhetorical question ‘is arms control immune from the
theory/policy gap?’11  She identified two groups — ‘international relations theorists’ and
‘foreign policy practitioners’ — which she described as both ‘struggling with similar
problems’ in the post-Cold War world.  She noted:
The world does not look significantly different from the ivory tower than it does
from the trenches where policy battles are fought. Scholars are more apt to critique
than applaud current policy, yet their criticisms reflect a range of worldviews and
often amplify debates already occurring in closed-door policy meetings.
Gallagher concluded:
Despite these commonalities, ‘thinkers’ and ‘doers’ often operate in such
divergent ways that they fail to hear each other, or even recognize that the other
group has something interesting to say. The results are wasted effort, unnecessary
duplication, and frustration both for practitioners who lack the time and
detachment needed for long-term planning, and for scholars who wonder whether
their research really matters.
The acknowledgement of real world issues can make the study of international
relations substantially more difficult as the results of research have to be matched with the
real world to assess their validity, leading to greater temptations to retreat to aspects of
epistemic relativism:
Given the small number of entities available for observation, the lack of
appropriate experimental venues, and the inherent desire of human beings not to
be shown up as wrong, it is hardly surprising that in recent decades international
relations scholarship has turned away from the intractable problems of dealing
with the real world and towards linguistic gamesmanship and wordplay.12
Unfortunately, there is a considerable body of writing on the subject of international




11. Nancy W Gallagher, ‘Bridging the Gaps on Arms Control’, Contemporary Security Policy (Special
Issue — Nancy W. Gallagher (ed.), ‘Arms Control. New Approaches to Theory and Policy’), vol 18,
no 2, August 1997, pp 7-13.
12. Henry L Hamman, ‘Remodelling International Relations’, in: Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf
and Paul Kowert (eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World, (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe,
1998), p 174.
world and an important task in a thesis such as this is to identify theory that is relevant to
the areas under examination.
Highlighting situations where such a theory/policy gap manifests itself is one method
by which an attempt can be made to diminish the gap.  The same highlighting can be
useful where there is a gap between declaratory policy and implementation activities.
While it is beyond the scope of the thesis to identify solutions in all cases where these gaps
occur, such highlighting can serve to help future identification of solutions or to learn
lessons.
Drawing from distinct disciplines
Academic disciplines are human constructs.  They have developed over time to have
distinct natures and all are built on traditions of particular forms of study and analysis.
Any study that involves human agency has to reflect social ontologies.  However, this
does not mean that any epistemology applied to a social ontology has to itself have a
social character, although many relevant epistemologies do.13
International Relations vs Political Studies
The definition of International Relations as a distinct discipline is itself the subject of
some controversy.  It is uncontested that the study of International Relations draws upon
many elements of political, economic and social studies.  The question is whether the
nature of the study of International Relations is distinctive enough to warrant being
considered a distinct discipline.  This has some relevance for the methodologies of this
thesis as the nature of the research problem requires a multi-disciplinary approach to
resolve it.  The use of more than one methodology brings with it questions of consilience
with regard to the research results.  While the concept of consilience is normally used
within the realm of the natural sciences it may be usefully applied within this thesis as it
applies to real world activities.
In real world activities within the regime to control biological weapons the distinction
between national political actors (acting within domestic policy processes) and national
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13. See, in particular, the work of John Searle; for example, John Searle, The Construction of Social
Reality (1995) and John Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization
(2010).
actors on the international stage can be illusory as many of the individuals involved
perform both roles.  Yet the boundary between Politics and International Relations ceases
to be an illusion in academic study if the two areas of study are considered to be distinct
disciplines.
For the purposes of this thesis, International Relations will be considered to be a
distinct discipline as this will enable analysis of effectiveness of international regimes
within a more transparent methodology.
Any study of the effectiveness of regimes has to include at least two constituent parts:
an examination of how such arrangements themselves operate (an area of study
traditionally carried out within the discipline of International Relations) and an
examination of how these arrangements influence political entities, usually states,
involved in the arrangements (an area of study traditionally carried out within the
discipline of Political Studies).  The first of these is required as consideration of any
individual regime has to be in the context of previous literature regarding regimes.  The
second is required as any international collaborative arrangement can only be considered
effective in its outcomes if, inter alia, political entities implement any measures required
within such a regime, carry out activities expected within that regime and otherwise
remain in compliance with the provisions of the regime.
The tradition with studies of International Relations has been to treat states as ‘black
boxes’ (or ‘billiard balls’) and to carry out studies at the level of analysis of international
interactions.  This simplification of the role of the state is legitimate in many studies in
order to be able to achieve usable results in a required timeframe.  However, the
consideration of regime effectiveness, with its associated interaction between political
entities and regimes, requires that this boundary between levels of analysis be breached,
at least in part.
To take a hypothetical example, suppose a phenomenon or activity ‘A’ is to be
examined in order to see how it influences ‘B’.  In a straightforward case, any academic
discipline that uses aspects of A as a unit or level of analysis can be used as a conceptual
framework and B can be considered a black box.  If, on the other hand, activities within B
have an influence on A at the same time as A influences B, then considering B as a black
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box is likely to lead to misleading results.  This may not be an issue if the chosen academic
discipline uses aspects of B as a unit or level of analysis as well as aspects of A; but if A
and B are not shared as a unit or level of analysis in the same academic discipline then this
should be considered as a boundary condition and the starting point should be to examine
the interaction from both sides and then compare the results.
Much literature within Political Studies is based upon breaking up policy processes
into analysable sections such that decisions can be analysed by understanding the
influences on the decision makers.  A political arrangement, whether a national system of
governance or an international regime, is considered as the sum of these decisions.
Assumptions that states are rationalist actors lead to assumptions that international
negotiation be broken down into three stages for analysis — national preference
formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice — in a linear process.  However,
there are many cases in which the international situation influences the national
preference formation.  Indeed, if a regime is to be effective, especially in changing global
conditions (both from political and from scientific and technological developments), it
must have some form of influence on the participants in the regime.  It therefore follows
that the international process of the regime, which falls within the definition of ‘interstate
bargaining’, must have an influence on on-going national preference formation if the
regime is to be considered to be effective in achieving its objectives.
The indicative spiral in figure 5.114 illustrates real-world interaction between
governments and regimes.  There are two ways it can be viewed.  The first is that the large
arrows represent national preference formation (A), with the subsequent smaller arrows
representing interstate bargaining (B), institutional choice (C) and then regime
interactions (D) which then leads back into national preference formation.  The second is
that the large arrows represent the regime (A) and its interactions with states with the
subsequent smaller arrows representing national preference formation (B), interstate
bargaining (C), and institutional choice (D) which then leads back into the regime. 
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14. This graphic is derived from the action research spiral published in S Kemmis and R McTaggart,
The Action Research Planner, [Second Edition], (Victoria: Deakin University Press, 1982), p 11.
A leading proponent of rationalist framework analysis notes that this form of analysis
‘avoids a temptation that bedevils scholarship on international relations, namely to
assume that state preferences are fixed’,15
It is important to look at interactions from both the regime and the governmental level.
As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have noted:
The unit or state level exaggerates the differences among states, and
underestimates the impact of the system on the actions of states; the systems level
assumes that states are more homogeneous than they are and overestimates the
impact of the system on the behaviour of the units.16
Chris Brown takes a slightly different approach:
The idea that there is a clear distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘international
relations’ as subjects of theory is partly a reflection of a world composed of clearly




15. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht, (London: Routledge, 1999), 514 + xii pp at p 20.  [Note: this book was initially
published by Cornell University Press in 1998.]
16. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991), pp 226 + vii at p 100.
political activity takes within the boundaries of these entities is dramatically
different from the form of political activity between them.17
Most academic literature regards this boundary between the national and the
international as sacrosanct.  A key point missing in such literature is that people involved
in national policy formulation are also key players within regime processes.  This
crossover of individual participants is important in interactions between governments and
regimes.  In intergovernmental meetings, for example, members of national delegations
take on key roles such as chairing plenary meetings and chairing committees.  In regimes
which include an international organization, staff of that organization are often drawn
from national delegations.
It therefore follows that a balanced consideration of influences that lead to policy and
practical outcomes has to include investigation at both the national and the international
level of analysis.
The classic analysis of this two-level game is by Robert Putnam.18  While Putnam
identified the problem, he was not able to provide a coherent solution.  Indeed, perhaps
there may not be a coherent solution possible for such a complex set of interactions.
Putnam’s focus was on a highly theoretical game theory analysis of win-sets.  However,
this analysis produces results that are very dissimilar to the current author’s practical
experience.
In his classic work on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison
used three analytical models of decision making — Rational Actor, Organizational
Behaviour and Bureaucratic Politics — each of which provided different explanations of
some of Kennedy’s decisions, each of which had significant international repercussions.
Allison noted that each of these three models had implications for understanding
international relations.  For example, he noted: ‘Applied to relations between nations, the




17. Chris Brown, ‘The borders of (international) political theory’, in: Noël O’Sullivan (ed.), Political
theory in transition, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp 190-208 at p 190.
18. Robert D Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’,
International Organization, vol 42, no 3, (Summer, 1988), pp 427-60.
19. Graham T Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Putnam noted, in relation to Allison’s observations:
the nature of this ‘overlap’ remained unclarified, and the theoretical contribution
of this literature did not evolve much beyond the principle that bureaucratic
interests matter in foreign policymaking.20
Attempts have been made to draw together some of the strands outlined above.  For
example, Moravcsik’s work on liberal intergovernmentalism21 which describes
developments in Europe almost as a policy market in which demand for outcomes (based
on liberal, sometimes neo-liberal, conceptualizations) met supply of outcomes (based on
intergovernmental conceptualizations).  These two conceptualizations are mediated
through the European institutions.  Moravcsik illustrated how this policy market idea
could also apply in other international arrangements.
The comparison of policy development with a market situation carries with it an
assumption of changing circumstances over time which can affect both the supply and
demand sides. This is an important recognition of the continually changing political
contexts.
Foreign policy vs good governance
Traditional understandings of international relations are focused on assumptions
regarding foreign policies adopted or activities carried out that are driven by security and
other national interests.  Yet much that happens within the regime to control biological
weapons clearly can be identified as being in the national interests of participating
governments but is not focused on traditional foreign policy concerns but on issues of
‘good governance’.  Literature on good governance has primarily had a focus on capacity
building in less economically developed states, although there has been much activity
within the regime to control biological weapons that has involved the building of
capacities in all states.
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20. Robert D Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’,
International Organization, vol 42, no 3, (Summer, 1988), pp 427-60 at p 431.
21. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht, (London: Routledge, 1999), 514 + xii pp.  [Note: this book was initially published by
Cornell University Press in 1998.]
Broader disciplines drawn upon in this thesis
Much of the academic literature drawn on for this thesis is from the humanities and social
sciences, and in particular theories of international regimes and of policy analysis.  As
these are particularly relevant for the Research Questions in this thesis, each has a chapter
devoted to them (see Chapter 6 and 7 respectively).  There are other bodies of earlier
analysis that have relevance to the subject matter of this thesis, the implications of which
should be noted.  These additional areas include historical analysis, ethnography and
innovation studies.  In some cases, the descriptions provided below of the implications of
these bodies of work also include lessons relating to methodology, it is more appropriate
to include some of these details at this stage rather than Chapter 3 and the review of earlier
analysis of the regime to control biological weapons.
While the sections below provide a brief outline of the relevance of each of these
disciplines and earlier analysis within them, it should be noted that the preparation of a
thesis of this nature also requires some understanding of the life sciences.
In addition, following the sections on disciplines there is some elaboration of lessons
from the author’s previous experience in the policy world that are not covered in other
parts of this thesis.
One of the difficulties of too-tightly focused social science approaches to research
problems is that they are often not good at identifying confounding factors external to the
body of theory and earlier understandings being drawn upon.  To take a hypothetical case,
a researcher examining the traditions of wearing of certain types of clothing would be at
risk of their results being overwhelmed by a confounding factor if they had not identified
that a particular type of cloth was substantially cheaper or otherwise more easily available
than all the others.  This examination of related disciplines therefore also serves as a test
to try to identify confounding factors that might potentially distort or otherwise influence
the findings of this thesis.
Historical analysis
Any research project that compares circumstances pertaining at different times inevitably
has an historical aspect.  When those times are recent, this form of study is sometimes
referred to as ‘contemporary history’; this bears a number of similarities to political
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analysis, although contemporary history tends to have a less prominent theoretical
underpinning than political analysis.  Historical analysis has been criticised for having ‘a
largely descriptive purpose’.22  The development of theories within the social sciences,
including international relations and political studies, have had a particular focus on
parsimony.  This has often led to theories being developed that suggest a single cause for
an outcome.  However, in the real world, there can often be many influences that lead to
an outcome. In situations where there are a series of events that might lead to outcomes,
such as series of meetings within the regime to control biological weapons, many of these
influences may exist throughout the series but the strength of each of the influences may
vary over time.  Historical analyses can more easily accommodate multiple influences in
understandings of the development of situations than conventional political analysis.23
There have been analysts who rather than contrast social science analysis with history
have instead tried to bring together the differing elements.  Alexander George indicates
that ‘the lessons of history’ can be combined into a comprehensive theory in relation to
particular activities and notes that the development of policy-related theory can be based
on intellectual cooperation between historians and political scientists.24
The period covered by contemporary history, according to Jane Caplan, is
‘conventionally identified as that which lies within living memory, the outcome of which
is not yet known’.25  Much of the period of relevance for this thesis could be said to fall
within this definition.
All case studies using historical analysis have a common feature relating to selection
of relevant points.  Jacob Burckhardt, a noted nineteenth century scholar, noted that
history is ‘on every occasion the record of what one age finds worthy of note in
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22. Kim Salomon, ‘What’s the Use of International History?’, Journal of Peace Research, vol 30, no 4,
November 1993, p 376.
23. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, ‘Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory’,
International Security, vol 20, no 1, Summer 1995, pp 5-11.  See also Jack S Levy, ‘Too Important
to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations’,
International Security, vol 22, no 1, Summer 1997.
24. Alexander L George, ‘Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison’, in: Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and
Policy, (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp 43-44.
25. Jane Caplan, ‘Contemporary History: Reflections from Britain and Germany’, History Workshop
Journal, vol 6, no 1, Spring 2007, pp 230-38.
another’.26 The selection in any historical analysis of any particular events or processes to
have prominence over others can mean that these acquire a greater significance at the
expense of those not selected.  In the realm of contemporary history, this selection aspect
of historical analysis remains significant as that which is recorded is remembered and
saved but that which is not recorded is lost.
In policy communities, the history of how policy came to be how it is can have an
influence on how practitioners within any particular policy process see their role.  It can
therefore be important to have an understanding of how practitioners see their role in an
historical context.  While this very quickly moves beyond the boundaries that need to be
set for a research project such as this thesis, it is important to be aware of the ‘conventional
wisdom’ that exists within a policy community (see page 44).
Historical analysis can highlight limitations of use of documentary evidence which
can create a potential confounding factor which is discussed later (see page 137).
Ethnography
It may be argued that officials and diplomats involved in international issues form a
community which operates within its own sets of rules and social conventions.  To
understand the context in which decisions within the scope of this thesis are discussed and
adopted requires approaches derived from ethnographic methods.  It should be
emphasized that this thesis is not a true ethnographic study, but simply a study that draws
on ethnographic understandings and methods in circumstances that are relevant to its
scope.  Ethnography has been defined in the following terms:
The study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by methods of data
collection which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving
the researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also in the activities, in




26. As quoted in the Oxford Dictionary of Scientific Quotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006), citing the 1958 compilation of Burckhardt’s work entitled Judgements on History and
Historians
27. John D Brewer, Ethnography, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), at p 10 [accessed via
Google Books].
The term ‘naturally occurring’ is used to encompass circumstances that have not been
designed or arranged by the researcher and will often include structures or arrangements
that are human creations or constructs by the community that is being studied.
The relevance of ethnographic understandings and methods to the subject matter of
this thesis can be simply summarised:
There is an emphasis within ethnographic methodology on the importance of
understanding events in context.  Out of context the nature of what has occurred
may be misunderstood.28 [emphasis in original]
A number of lessons of ethnographic research need to be heeded.  Not least that the
researcher, in interacting with the community being researched, has to be aware of their
own preconceptions and assumptions about activities and events within that community.
In the case of this thesis, the author has been involved with this community for a
number of years and has contributed materials that have influenced understandings within
the community.29  However, the interactive nature of this relationship need not cast doubt
upon any research results.  Moreover, this interaction falls short of the type of activity that
would be considered Action Research.
The need for groundrules during ethnographic research has been clearly stated.  Much
literature has been produced relating to ethnographic research where the cultures of the
researched and the researcher are significantly different.  However, in the research carried
out for this thesis this does not necessarily apply.  In the field of research into education
— circumstances where the cultural differences are not so stark — there has been much
writing on groundrules in ethnographic research.  For example:
It is undoubtedly necessary for every ethnographer to establish some type of
‘contract’ with the society to be studied.  Such a ‘contract’ may include
specifications about what records may or may not be examined; where the
ethnographer may or may not go, when, and under what circumstances; which
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28. Martyn Hammersley, What’s Wrong with Ethnography?, (London: Routledge, 1992), 230 + ix pp at
p 23.
29. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention, the author of this thesis has produced Daily
Reports from each of the Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties since 2007 as well as
from the 2006 and 2011 Review Conferences which can be found at
<http://www.bwpp.org/reports.html>.  He also co-edited a Briefing Book for each of these Review
Conferences.  The 2011 edition can be found at <http://www.bwc2011.info>.
meetings may be attended and which are closed; how long the researcher will stay
in the field; who (if anyone) has access to field notes, and who has the right to
review and/or approve the ethnography and its analysis prior to publication, or
under what circumstances they may or may not be published at all.30
Within meetings relating to the regime — whether formal meetings of the BWC,
workshops or seminars by groups of individuals interested in issues related to the regime,
or within individual governments (or groups of governments) — there are issues of
political sensitivity.  The development of new policies or the elaboration of new means by
which to enhance the regime can sometimes require exploration of issues behind closed
doors.  There are times in these circumstances where novel ideas are being explored and
it is important to be able to distinguish between those in which officials are representing
the considered views of their governments and those in which ideas are being presented
and discussed on a level where personal expertise is being drawn upon to explore potential
solutions to shared problems.
Other issues have a different form of sensitivity.  Indeed, in understanding the utility
of certain technologies for the potential contributions they might make within a
programme to develop biological weapons, a by-product of such research can be the
accumulation of information that itself becomes proliferation sensitive.  The level of
expertise of some of the participants means that it is important to avoid disclosure of
proliferation-sensitive information in reporting their activities or views.  Fortunately, it
has been possible to draw up this thesis without reference to proliferation-sensitive
information or breaching confidentiality of otherwise privileged information.
Innovation literature
Literature on innovation forms part of the study of science policy.  Some of the analysis
in this literature can be applied in other circumstances.  As noted earlier (see page 64), the
concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ is significant in understanding the dual-use nature of the




30. Frank W Lutz, ‘Ethnography: the holistic approach to understanding schooling’, in Martyn
Hammersley, Controversies in Classroom Research, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1986),
pp 107-19 at p 114.
Tacit knowledge within diplomacy
Within innovation literature there is a clear distinction between ‘information’ which can
be codified, so be easily transferred between people, and ‘tacit knowledge’ which cannot
be codified but is learnt through practice and experience.
An analogy often used within the teaching of innovation studies is that of driving a
motor vehicle — there is only a certain amount that can be learnt through reading books
and so much of the skill of driving comes through the development within each driver of
relevant tacit knowledge — ‘learning by doing’.
Within diplomacy there is much that is uncodified and which is learned through
experience.  While there is much process and procedure — and what anthropologists
might describe as ‘ritual’ — that can be codified, a substantial proportion of official
interaction in formal and informal settings is at a level that includes tacit knowledge.  For
example, to gain a sense of how far to push a certain proposal within an international
meeting, or to assess with some confidence how an amendment might be perceived, takes
a considerable time to learn by doing.31
The tacit knowledge element in diplomacy is often missed by scholars as, by
definition, it is uncodifiable.
Assumptions of path dependency and the concept of the adjacent possible
Any conceptualization of an artifact that has been created by human action is prone to
suffer from assumptions that, because the artifact exists, the artifact’s coming into being
in that form was inevitable.  This applies whether the artifact is a political structure or an
artifact that is a manifestation of a particular technology.  In relation to both of these types
of artifact, a concept of ‘path dependency’ has been highly prevalent in the literature.
In developments in both international politics and in technological innovation there
have been assumptions that there were pathways to be followed and sometimes an
implication that these pathways contained an element of inevitability.  For example, the
path of technological innovation was considered to be distinct from the society that
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31. There have been some attempts to write what might be described as training manuals for
representing governments in inter-governmental meetings.  See, for example, Ronald A Walker,
Manual for UN Delegates, United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2011, 194 + xii pp.
created it.  Technological artifacts were examined in isolation.  Yet examinations of the
history of the typewriter and the adoption of the QWERTY keyboard layout, the adoption
of the clutch-brake-accelerator arrangement in motor vehicles, or the battle for video
standards between Betamax and VHS illustrate that the derivation of all of these were in
interaction with society.  There was no inevitability in the outcome.  There is now a
considerable literature on the interaction between technological innovation and society.32
The same pattern of examination can be identified in the analysis of international
arrangements.  Early writings examined international arrangements in isolation with later
analysis taking into account some of the domestic political aspects of policy making,
including influences on individual policy makers.
The understandings from the lessons of innovation literature in the context of this
thesis is important as there is no absolute reason why international diplomacy has to be
carried out the way it does, the process is as much a human construct as the QWERTY
keyboard.  There are similar issues in questions of how international arrangements within
the regime to control biological weapons are implemented on a national or other
sub-international basis.
Within innovation literature the concept of path dependency has been supplemented
by concepts such as the ‘adjacent possible’.  Kauffman, a complexity theorist, defined this
as the ‘set of configurations, reachable from any configuration in one step’ and that this
‘plays a role in formalizations of the self-organization of biological and other complex
systems’.33  The notion of the ‘adjacent possible’ has been applied in areas as diverse as
biology, physics, economics and innovation.34
It is relevant to the subject matter of this thesis to understand that what may be
interpreted with hindsight as a path-dependent trajectory of development of a regime
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32. See, in particular, the writings of Andy Stirling on innovation issues.  See also Donald MacKenzie
and Judy Wajcman (eds.), The Social Shaping of Technology, (Milton Keynes: Open University
Press, 1988), 327 pp.
33. Stuart Kauffman and Lee Smolin, ‘A possible solution to the problem of time in quantum
cosmology’, Santa Fe Institute Working Paper no 97-03-020, 5 March 1997, 15 pp, citing: Stuart
Kauffman, ‘Investigations on the character of autonomous agents and the worlds they mutually
create’, Santa Fe Institute preprint, 1996.
34. A recent application of this concept to innovation is: Steven Johnson, Where Good Ideas Come
From: The Natural History of Innovation, (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2010), 336 pp.
could have been simply a sequence of adoption of next steps within the adjacent possible
at each stage.  This also has implications for other forms of historical analysis.
Lessons from policy world experience
There are two theoretical/analytical themes that are relevant to the subject matter of this
thesis, neither of which appear to be represented in the academic literature, but which have
previously been used by the author in his earlier policy work.  As they are both touched
upon later in this thesis, it is worth examining them here.  One relates to groups of factors
that impinge upon decisions; the other relates to categorising roles that individuals play
towards policy formation.  Also noted in this section are lessons from the author’s
experience in the policy world relating to the uses of documentary evidence and
distinctions between mysteries and puzzles in the world of policy analysis.
Power/status, finance/resources and intellect/knowledge
Any decision — whether personal or in local, national or international policy — involves
three groups of factors to be taken into account.  These three groups have been used in
understanding decisions for many years by the present author:35
• power/status, each on an absolute basis as well as on a relative basis between
those involved — these might be summarised as intangible benefits;36
• finance/resources, essentially costs and benefits in an accountable manner,
usually focused on financial costs and benefits — these might be summarised as
tangible benefits; and
• intellect/knowledge, essentially those factors based on intellectual arguments,
based on knowledge of a situation or process; sometimes this takes on a moral
aspect in terms of the pursuit of a decision because ‘it was the right thing to do’.
This group of factors also includes questions of culture and values.
A key feature of these groups of factors is that it is generally relatively easy to understand
conflicting influences within each group — for example, the financial costs and benefits
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35. This is a separation of influences used many times by the present author in previous incarnations in
the policy world.  In this use, it was never formalised and the groups of factors have been used with
a variety of names but always reflecting the three fundamental areas.  However, it is not possible to
say for certainty where it originally derived.
36. The category of power/status could also include other forms of human-human interaction including
such aspects of individual decision making as social networks.
of a potential decision, or where the balances of power lie between entities — but it is
more difficult (if not impossible in almost all cases) to compare directly between groups.
As, in most cases, one or other of these groups of factors is dominant in any individual
decision, it can be a highly successful political strategy to ensure debate is focused on the
area in which a protagonist has most advantage.
A simple example of the interplay of these groups of factors would be an individual
decision about purchase of a car.  For some, the status symbolism of a particular model
might be most significant in the choice of model.  Others might be most influenced by
financial issues, such as how much it costs to run.  Yet more will be most influenced by
outside intellectual issues such as what is the impact on the environment.  In most cases,
the decision will be brought to a conclusion on more than one factor.  The key point here
is that the separate groups of factors are broadly incommensurable.  A particular model
may be associated with power or status; how much status is worth a particular financial
cost?
It is perhaps no coincidence that regime theorists suggested that there were regimes
based on processes on power, interests and knowledge — in this work they had stumbled
into the understandings that had existed for some time in certain parts of the policy world,
although no direct reference is made to this by the leading regime theorists.  Nor does
there seem to be any substantive analysis of the interaction between these three groups
within policy making.
Policy formation — making, shaping and implementing
A second method of policy analysis used in the author’s previous policy experience is to
analyse policy formation is to separate those who might be involved in policy
development in any particular case into one of three categories — policy makers, policy
shapers and policy implementers.  This technique is particularly useful when seeking to




37. This is a technique used many times by the present author in previous incarnations in the policy
world.  However, it is not possible to say for certainty where it originally derived.
This technique recognises that policy decisions are not taken in a vacuum and that the
initial policy decision does not dictate the overall outcome of a policy.  A simple example
of this discontinuity in the UK context is policing policy, where a new power to stop and
search was introduced by policy makers, but the police forces — the policy implementers
— utilizing the power ended up with a policy outcome not intended by the policy makers,
nor anticipated by the policy shapers.38  A second UK example would be the introduction
of new powers of investigation within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
which were then used in relation to much more trivial situations.39
As both international regimes and national policy processes are analysed in later
chapters, it will be seen that regimes have a potential for a direct influence on each of these
three groupings within national policy processes.
Issues relating to documentary evidence
A further element of previous work by the present author relevant to this thesis relates to
how meetings come to agreements on language such as that for treaties or conference
declarations.  Six methods by which consensus can be achieved in a negotiated text were
identified — agree to disagree, persuasion, bargaining, deferral, deletion and ambiguity.40
Another method, which is more of a procedural trick, was subsequently identified
following further conversations with practitioners — that of limiting who it is that is able
to participate in the negotiations.41  The processes that lead to ‘consensus by deletion’ and
to what might be described as consensus by limited participation are of particular concern.
Chapter 5
138
38. See, for example: ‘Whilst we accept that there may be circumstances where the police reasonably
believe, on the basis of intelligence, that a demonstration could be used to mask a terrorist attack or
be a target of terrorism, we have heard of no examples of this issue arising in practice. We are
concerned by the reports we have received of police using counter-terrorism powers on peaceful
protestors. It is not clear to us whether this stems from a deliberate decision by the police to use a
legal tool which they now have or if individual officers are exercising their discretion
inappropriately. Whatever the reason, this is a matter of concern.’ Joint Committee on Human
Rights [House of Lords & House of Commons], Demonstrating respect for rights? A human rights
approach to policing protest, HL Paper 47-I / HC 320-I 2008-09, 23 March 2009, para 93.
39. See, for example: [No author listed], ‘Family’s shock at council spying’, BBC News, 11 April 2008,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/dorset/7343445.stm>
40. Richard Guthrie, ‘Tackling ambiguities: lessons for the Review Conference from the Chemical
Weapons Convention negotiations’, discussion paper, 28th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group
on the Implementation of the CBW Conventions, ‘The Second CWC Review Conference and
After’, Noordwijk, the Netherlands, 5-6 April 2008, 4 pp.
41. The present author is indebted to Christopher Park of the US State Department for the identification
of this method.
Working with documentary histories has to take into account the limitations that are
inherent in any documentary record.  In addition to general contextual concerns —
identifying why a particular document might have been written, who might have been the
intended audience and were there any particular messages the author(s) might have been
meaning to convey or to divert attention from — the issues of consensus by deletion and
consensus through limited participation have to be taken into account as these processes
do not always leave clearly visible traces in the public record.  This is of less concern if
access to the processes that lead to the documents are visible ones, or if participants in the
process are able to be open about what went on behind closed doors.
Delegations at inter-governmental meetings within regimes are usually in favour of
attempting to reach consensus rather than voting for the simple reason that once the
precedent has been set for voting this might become commonplace.  With consensus,
every state party has the power to stop anything it is sufficiently concerned about.  With
voting, although you might win the vote today on something you want to pass, you might
also lose the vote tomorrow on something you felt was more important.
A point often missed by analysts looking into diplomatic processes from the outside is
that nothing moves forward without the consent, or at least the grudging acceptance, of all
the governments represented in the meeting.  While academic literature often uses the
term ‘consensus’ to mean a large majority, the term is used in international diplomacy to
mean a lack of dissension.  It should be noted further that while lack of dissension is very
similar to unanimity in favour, there are subtle differences which users of the term should
be aware of, especially if a consensus document or consensus declaration from an
inter-governmental meeting is being referred to.  Within EU circles, the term ‘unanimity’
includes situations in which abstentions are declared.  In UN circles, a consensus would
not normally be considered to have been achieved if there was any explicit expression of
abstention.
As the suggestions compiled within each Meeting of Experts are not consensus
documents and so each delegation can ensure its suggestions are incorporated into the list,
many of the issues involved with documentary evidence are avoided.
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Conclusions on conceptual frameworks and the role of theory
While overall conclusions on theory will be presented at the end of Chapter 7, it is worth
noting at this stage that the examples provided within this chapter illustrate that a thesis
such as this must be informed from a variety of theoretical inputs.
As summarised in the old adage, often cited as from Frederick Engels but sometimes
attributed to Karl Marx, that ‘Practice without theory is blind, theory without practice is
sterile’ summarizes the need for theory to both implement and examine practical action.
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6. Regime Theory, the Oslo-Potsdam Solution and theoretical understandings of
effectiveness
Signposting
The context and background of the problem of biological weapons was examined in
Chapter 2 and the regime to control biological weapons was examined in Chapter 3,
including a review of how this regime has been understood in earlier analysis.  The
background to some theory relevant to investigating the research problem and related
research questions was provided in Chapter 5.  This Chapter examines a body of work
known as ‘Regime Theory’ that was specifically elaborated with the intention to bring
new understandings to the study of international regimes.  This Chapter specifically
tackles this body of work and illustrates why this body of theoretical work does not
provide tools needed for the area of study.
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of what was, at an early stage, to be the main
theoretical focus of this thesis; that is the body of thinking on international regimes that
has become known as ‘Regime Theory’.  However, as the work on the thesis progressed,
it became apparent that the tools within Regime Theory were not ideally suited to the
work within this thesis.  A clear understanding of Regime Theory is required in order to
have sense of its applicability and its limits.  Understandings of the effectiveness of
regimes are then explored, together with an examination of how methods of evaluation of
effectiveness have been developed, including those outside of Regime Theory.  The
chapter continues with exploration of what is really meant by describing a regime as
effective and whether the concept of effectiveness is an either/or quality or whether there
are degrees of this quality.
This chapter was prepared as part of the initial effort to utilise existing Regime Theory
as a framework of analysis for analysing effectiveness of the regime to control biological
weapons.  As research progressed it became clear that the limitations of Regime Theory
outweighed its benefits for use as an analytical tool in the issues being examined within
this thesis.  Nevertheless, the examination of Regime Theory threw up a number of
lessons learned which are relevant for this thesis.  It has therefore been recast to allow
such lessons to be drawn.
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Regimes and Regime Theory
It should be of little surprise that literature in the realm of international relations on the
subject of international regimes reflects the diversity of theoretical approaches that have
been used in the study of international relations since the Second World War.  These
range from realist state-centric approaches that are dismissive of international regimes
exercising influence on the behaviour of states, to neoliberal approaches which interpret
creation of regimes as a demonstration of self-interest and rational choice, to
constructivist approaches that explain compliance through the lenses of norms and rule
following.
One of the pioneers of ‘Regime Theory’, Stephen D Krasner, defined regimes as
institutions consisting of:
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international
relations.  Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are
standards of behavio[u]r defined in terms of rights and obligations.  Rules are
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.  Decision-making procedures are
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.1 
This has become known as the ‘consensus definition’ notwithstanding that there is no
consensus that this is the most appropriate definition but that there is simply a mainstream
view.2  While Krasner is credited with this definition, he himself acknowledges the prior
work of others in this area.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of discussion this will be
referred to herein as the Krasner definition.  The Krasner definition has been referred to as
‘classic and famously vague’.3
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1. Stephen D Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 372 +
x pp at p 2; It is worthy of note that many commentators omit the words ‘implicit or explicit’ from
the beginning of the quote when using this definition.  See, for example, Hasenclever, et al., 1996.
2. While academic literature often uses the term ‘consensus’ to mean a large majority, the term is used
in international diplomacy to mean a lack of dissension — a criterion that the Krasner definition
certainly does not fulfil.  It should be noted further that while lack of dissension is very similar to
unanimity in favour, there are subtle differences which users of the term should be aware of,
especially if a consensus document or consensus declaration from an inter-governmental meeting is
being referred to.  Within EU circles, the term ‘unanimity’ includes situations in which abstentions
are declared.  In UN circles, a consensus would not normally be considered to have been achieved if
there was any explicit expression of abstention.
3. Radoslav S Dimitrov, Detlef F Sprinz, Gerald M DiGiusto and Alexander Kelle, ‘International
Nonregimes: A Research Agenda’, International Studies Review, vol 9, (2007), pp. 230–58.
A second definition that is often referred to is that by Keohane in which he defines
regimes as:
institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to
particular sets of issues in international relations.4
The Keohane definition is explicit in focusing on the actions of states.  While the
Krasner definition does not limit regime activity to states, the focus of the book it is
quoted from is on state activities.  Keohane refers to the Krasner definition as ‘a collective
definition, worked out at a conference on the subject’.5
Notwithstanding that many analysts distinguish between principles, norms and rules
in relation to the Krasner definition, Keohane calls this a ‘false dichotomy’ and elaborates
on this point by pointing out:
at the margin norms and rules cannot be sharply distinguished from each other
[and] it is difficult if not impossible to tell the difference between an ‘implicit rule’
of broad significance and a well-understood, relatively specific operating
principle.6
Some authors try to compare norms, or at least a subset of norms, with legally-binding
rules.7  This ambiguity has its uses in declaratory policies, but creates difficulties for
analysis at a political level.  Other authors have been more explicit and have attempted to
draw out some of the distinctions while recognizing certain key similarities: 
legally binding measures, of course, carry the greatest obligation: only legal norms
need be treated as obligatory in international relations.  Norms of a political or
moral nature do not enjoy the same status ... However, the decisive factor is




4. Robert O Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations
Theory, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 4, , as cited in: Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and
Volker Rittberger, ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge Studies in International
Relations, (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), p 12.
5. Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p 57.
6. Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p 59.
7. Ethan A. Nadelmann, ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International
Society’, International Organization, vol 44, no 4, (Autumn 1990), pp 479-526.
8. Sverre Lodgaard, ‘The building of confidence and security at the negotiations in Stockholm and
Vienna’, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1986 (Stockholm/Oxford:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute/Oxford University Press, 1986), p 427.
There will be situations within this thesis where distinctions between principles, rules
and norms will be less significant than the common aspect they share which is that they
form an obligation, expectation, or standard of behaviour of some sort.
Outside of Regime Theory, there are many other uses of the term ‘regime’ in the
literature.  The major part of the variation in the use of the term derives from the adoption
by the theorists  of this word that was already in more general use.9  However, it would be
erroneous to simply assume that the adoption of this sort of term from the general to the
specific means that the specific suggested definition is locked into place with no
possibility of other interpretations.  In addition there has been somewhat loose further use
of the term in other forms such as ‘verification regime’.
While both the Krasner and the Keohane definition define regimes as institutions, it is
important to note that there is a distinction between international institutions and
international organizations.  While organizations would fall within the Keohane
definition of regimes, they are generally regarded as being outwith the Krasner definition.
However, international organizations may in their own right be valuable contributors to
international regimes that they are part of — for example, the OPCW in the regime to
control chemical weapons.
The field of study of international institutions has itself been known as ‘international
organization’ and the journal of that name has been a key focal point of this field.10 It is
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9. For example, John Simpson, has defined the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the following
terms: ‘The measures put in place to deter the spread of nuclear weapons, more commonly known as
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, comprise an integrated network of unilateral, bilateral, regional
and multilateral treaties and other standard-setting arrangements.  Collectively, these measures
provide a comprehensive framework for the behaviour of states, international organizations and
other actors in the nuclear area. These measures constitute a global regime which has been evolving
since the end of the Second World War.’ Emily Bailey, Richard Guthrie, Darryl Howlett and John
Simpson, ‘Volume I: The Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime’ (Sixth Edition),
PPNN Briefing Book, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, March 2000, p 3.  Other
researchers dealing with WMD control issues have a broad interpretation of the term ‘regime’:
‘Despite the discrimination inherent in the [nuclear] non-proliferation regime, it thus serves the
security objectives of all states that desire peace.  This assessment can be sustained only if — within
the framework of the regime — leading parties take effective steps to foster peaceful resolution of
conflicts in trouble-prone regions and to contain and reverse arms races, not only between the
industrialized states but also between antagonists in the South.’ [emphasis added] Harald Müller,
David Fischer and Wolfgang Kötter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order,
(Stockholm/Oxford: SIPRI/OUP, 1994), p 9.  A note within the book states that Harald Müller was
the lead author of the chapter this quote was taken from.
10. See, for example, J Martin Rochester, ‘The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of
in this journal that many of the early articles on Regime Theory were published, including
versions of most of the chapters of the Krasner 1983 book.11
It is important to note that Regime Theory is not the only suggestion offered to explain
the observed phenomena.  Buzan notes that Regime Theory stands in contrast to the
Rationalist/Grotianist/International Society research strand of the English School.12
The origins of and impetus behind Regime Theory
The impetus behind the initial work on defining regimes was in a particular subject area:
The original normative concern ... was a desire to understand the consequences for
the international economic order of a relative decline in American dominance.13
With this economic aspect in relation to a particular country as the focus, it is immediately
apparent why many of the early papers on Regime Theory were published in the United
States.  However, as the application of this theory was broadened, the literature on the
theory derived from a more diverse body of authors.  A few early authors also tackled
regimes outside predominantly economic areas.14
The economic basis of development of Regime Theory was made explicit by Keohane
who noted ‘my study focuses on relations among the advanced market-economy
countries’.15 However, politics and economics are inextricably linked and the possibility




Study’, International Organization, vol 40, no 4, (Autumn 1986), pp 777-813.
11. The chapters appear in the vol 36, no 2, (Spring 1982) edition of the journal.
12. Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: an underexploited resource in IR’, Review of International
Studies, vol 27, no 3, (July 2001), p 475.
13. Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, ‘The Study of International Regimes’, European
Journal of International Relations, 1995, vol 1, no 3, pp. 267–330.
14. See, for example, Ernst B Haas, ‘Is there a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology,
Interdependence, and the Construction of International Regimes’, International Organization, vol
29, no 3, (Summer 1975), [special edition: International Responses to Technology], pp 827-76.
15. Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p 6. Also worth noting from the same page ... ‘I begin
with the premise that even where common interests exist, cooperation often fails’.
It would be an error to assume that there is a single ‘Regime Theory’, although many
authors equate Keohane’s 1989 contractualist (or functional) theory16 that has become
known as ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ with the term.17
Other analysts view the study of regimes to be ‘regime analysis’ rather than an area of
study based on a coherent body of ‘regime theory’:
Regime analysis as such is not a full-fledged theory, but rather a conceptual
framework that needs to be ’filled’ with theories.  Most studies on international
regimes have indeed made use of several types of social science theories, in
particular, structural approaches (e.g. hegemonic stability theory), game theory,
public choice theory, functional theory and cognitive approaches.  In line with
what we said before, none of these theories should a priori be regarded as superior.
Every theory has particular strengths and weaknesses in terms of selecting,
organizing and relating the information we observe in reality.18
Critiques of Regime Theory
A number of critiques of Regime Theory are presented here which challenge assumptions
about regime types, the limitations of state centredness and the difficulty of analysing
single elements in a complex international system.
Critiques relating to measures of effectiveness are provided within the discussion of
regime effectiveness that appears later in this chapter.
Just as varying styles of music become popular for particular periods or as hemlines
rise and fall, so there is a fashion element in the social sciences.  This is sometimes
beneficial as new analytical techniques or concepts are applied to many cases within short
periods of time within a variety of areas of study.  However it can also be limiting as the
popularity of use of a technique or concept may be more to do with its fashionable nature
at the time, or that it is being promoted by those with the loudest voices, rather than it
being the most useful to bring forward greater understanding.  This has the consequence,
in some cases, of making the study of theories of international relations a study of the
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16. Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).
17. Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Theories of International Regimes’,
Cambridge Studies in International Relations, (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 248 + x pp at p 28.
18. Thomas Bernauer, The chemistry of regime formation, Geneva: United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, 1993), p 10.
academic community in the subject area rather than a study of how international relations
are actually carried out.
General critique
The creation of a body of theory relating to regimes was not universally supported.  The
classic general critique of Regime Theory was provided by Susan Strange in 1982.19 She
noted criticisms on five counts:
first, that the study of regimes is, for the most part a fad, one of those shifts of
fashion not too difficult to explain as a temporary reaction to events in the real
world but in itself making little in the way of a long-term contribution to
knowledge.  Second, it is imprecise and woolly.  Third, it is value-biased, as
dangerous as loaded dice.  Fourth, it distorts by overemphasizing the static and
underemphasizing the dynamic element of change in world politics.  And fifth, it
is narrowminded, rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of a wider
reality.
It should be noted that the use of the term ‘paradigm’ in this context is itself ‘imprecise
and woolly’.  It is also possible to note that if Regime Theory were ‘for the most part a
fad’ it would be unlikely to be being debated in such detail some 30 years later.
Other commentators also found the concept of regimes insufficiently specific:
In fact the regime concept, as used by adepts of this approach, has never been
clearly defined ... Definitions of the concept cover a mixed bag of subjects
reflecting different meanings.20
Not only are these definitions of regimes criticised, but the fact that there are many
other definitions in use has been commented upon.  One of the contributors to the Krasner
edited volume started his contribution with the following words:
Grappling with the problem of trying to describe and explain patterns of order in
the anarchic world of international politics, scholars have fallen into using the term
‘regime’ so disparately and with such little precision that it ranges from an
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19. Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’ which appears in:
International Organization, vol 36, no 2, (Spring 1982), pp 479-96 and Stephen D Krasner (ed.),
International Regimes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp 337-54.
20. Pierre de Senarclens, ‘Regime Theory and the Study of International Organizations, International
Social Science Journal, vol 45, no 4, pp. 453-62, as quoted in Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and
Michael Zürn, ‘The Study of International Regimes’, European Journal of International Relations,
1995, vol 1, no 3, pp. 267–330.
umbrella for all international relations to little more than a synonym for
international organizations.21
Other scholars have felt that bringing forward definitions for regimes had brought about
more confusion than clarification:
Despite attempts to clarify the concept, confusion reigns. What used to be simple,
commonly understood distinctions between order and disorder, cooperation and
conflict, and international institutions and international behavio[u]rs have become
blurred from prolonged exposure to deep scholarly rumination.22
Realists have criticised the emphasis on regimes/institutions and perhaps the most
cited realist critique of regimes is that of Mearsheimer on the realist belief that
international institutions have ‘minimal influence on state behavio[u]r’23 and that
‘Institutions are not a form of world government.  States themselves must choose to obey
the rules they created’.24
It is worth noting that realists from the days of EH Carr have stressed the limitations
of international institutions.25 Those realists that do take issues of international
cooperation seriously argue that issues of power and of direct benefits to states are
uppermost in regime formation where the world view is of a zero-sum game.  This
followed directly from the views of Kenneth Waltz who suggested the distribution of
material capabilities within the international system of states was key to shaping any
international order.26  To Waltz, the primary ordering principle in the international system
is power, rather than international law or international institutions.27  Although he later
acknowledged that his theories were ‘built up from the assumed motivations of states’.28
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21. Arthur A Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world’, in Stephen D
Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p 115.
22. J Martin Rochester, ‘The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study’,
International Organization, vol 40, no 4, (Autumn 1986), p 800.
23. John J Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, vol 19,
no 3 (Winter 1994-1995), p 7.
24. John J Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, vol 19,
no 3 (Winter 1994-1995), p 9.
25. This point is inserted in order to recognise what so much of the literature says, even though the point
is fundamentally in error.  If it were correct, there would have been no individuals with a realist
perspective in the 1920s (i.e., before Carr) who might have questioned the collective abilities of the
League of Nations, for example.
26. Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp 97-99.
27. Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p 97.
28. Kenneth N Waltz, ‘International politics is not foreign policy’, Security Studies, 1996, p 6.
From this realist perspective, perceived direct benefits from regimes are more
important than any contributions that norms provide.  The neoliberalist and constructivist
perspectives have the role of norms at the core of their understandings of regimes.
However, questions of power still have a role to play:
Neoliberals readily concede that cooperation is affected by power relationships,
but argue that constellations of interests (which are not readily reduced to
configurations of power) and prevailing expectations — which, in turn, are
strongly influenced by the presence and content of international institutions — are
at least as important.29
Nonetheless, norms and the regimes built around them are only as potent as the
perception of their importance by those who might be influenced by them.  When norms
come into direct contest with issues of national interest, political forces come into play
that are often beyond the theories espoused in the study of international relations other
than the most basic tenets of realism.  An example of this is the Bush Administration
rejection of certain norms as hindering national security interests in the early part of the
21st century.
One of the difficulties of power-based analysis of regimes is that this is often
accompanied by an assumption that governments operate as unified entities.  Indeed, as
will be discussed in Chapter 7 this is rarely the case.
The liberal perspective is a counterpoint to this, as societies within countries are
understood to be comprised of individuals and privately constituted groups which seek to
promote their independent interests.  By this understanding, a government should reflect
the interests of the society (or from a segment of that society) from which it derives its
authority and these interests will be further reflected in the international behaviour of
states.
Indeed, this relates to one of the fundamental difficulties with Regime Theory in some
areas of application — the assumption that cooperation has to be enhanced in an anarchic
world of states, where states are fundamentally rivals.
Chapter 6
149
29. Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Theories of International Regimes’,
Cambridge Studies in International Relations, (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 248 + x pp at p 23.
Assumptions about regime types
Does Regime Theory equally apply to all forms of regime, and if it does not, can the
theory underpin equally valid understandings to these different types of regime?
To take an example to illustrate this point, imagine that there is “Motor Vehicle
Theory” that suggests that to be a motor vehicle, an item must have particular defining
characteristics — say: wheels; a mechanical method of propulsion; a method of steering;
and so forth.  This might be the starting point for much literature about motor vehicles.
However, understanding whether a particular motor vehicle is capable of being used to
move two large boxes from one place to another is not enhanced by discussion under
motor vehicle theory of how well colour coordinated the interior is; nor by discussion of
whether the occupants have comfortable seats or other aspects that might relate to
enjoyment of the ride.
To extend this analogy, how far could the same body of writings be applied to a sports
car and a 7.5 tonne lorry?  Is it correct to assume equivalence or similarity between the
regime relating to behaviour in open waters, centred on the Law of the Sea Convention,
with that relating to control of biological weapons?  That the concept of regimes has been
stretched to include a wide variety of disparate international activities has been
recognised:
For the international organization field, the concept of regime has meant almost
intellectual chaos.  The problem is that the term has been stretched to embrace
everything from a patterned set of interactions (an international system), to any
form of multilateral coordination, cooperation, or collaboration (provision of
collective goods), to formal rules (international law), to formal machinery
(international organization).30
Ruggie recognised in 1975 that not all regimes were similar.  He identified three
purposes for regimes: ‘Acquiring a capability’, ‘Making effective use of a capability’ and
‘Coping with consequences of use of a capability’.  Alongside this, he identified four
‘instrumentalities’ relating to the relationship between a regime and national behaviour:
‘A Common Framework for national behavio[u]r’, ‘A joint facility coordinating national
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30. J Martin Rochester, ‘The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study’,
International Organization, vol 40, no 4, (Autumn 1986), p 800.
behavio[u]r’, ‘A common policy integrating national behavio[u]r’ and ‘A common policy
substituted for independent national behavio[u]r’.31
Keohane overtly stated that his study was on international regimes relating to money,
trade and oil.32  There appears to be no evidential basis for an assumption that an
international technology control/arms control regime such as that to control biological
weapons should share key characteristics with regimes in these areas.
State centredness
While the Krasner consensus definition contains no reference as to whether the actors
need be governments or even to have any official authority, by defining regimes in terms
of decision-making procedures Krasner, perhaps inadvertently, introduces a circular
argument which results in analysis using this definition being focused on states — as,
under this definition, participants in a regime must have some form of authority to adopt
decisions.
The introduction of consideration of decision-making procedures, requires that
regimes become a matter of policy for the actors.  Combined with the reference within the
definition to ‘a given area of international relations’ means policy has to be made by the
actors within the regime and this can therefore only be done at a level of government.
This assumption of policy being made at a high level can, wittingly or unwittingly, lead to
lack of attention to contributions to the regime at a lower level, for example by
professional or trade associations or by public interest non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).33
Some analysts have noted that Regime Theory derives much of its analytical bite
through focus on states as unified rational actors.34  Other analysts note the difficulty of
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31. John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’, International
Organization, vol 29, no 3, [special edition on: International Responses to Technology] (Summer
1975), pp 557-83, see in particular the table at p 572.
32. Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p 15.
33. Although it has somewhat gone out of fashion, there used to be a distinction made in policy circles
between public interest non-governmental organizations (PINGOs) and business interest
non-governmental organizations (BINGOs).  One joke doing the rounds at the time was that
Australian NGOs should be called DINGOs ...
34. Lisa L Martin and Beth A Simmons, ‘Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions’,
treating states as rational actors.  As noted earlier, governments are not like individual
people and do not instantaneously acquire a unified perspective on any issue.  Therefore
it is not possible to apply rational actor model analysis to governments as a whole.  This
will be explored in Chapter 7.
The state-centred nature of Regime Theory has meant some analysts have questioned
its applicability to a regime such as that to control biological weapons:
Whether the framework of regime analysis is still adequate to conceptualize and
understand this plethora of activity [within the regime to control biological
weapons] is debatable.  Although regime analysis was, in part, intended as a shift
away from realist conceptions of international relations with its acknowledgement
of normative factors and of the influence of domestic politics on state behaviour,
regime analysis is still a largely state-centred framework.  However, the biological
weapons problem is no longer (if, indeed, it ever was) one that is solely confined
to or manageable by states.35
Non-equality of states
Within most analysis of regimes, and in particular the behaviourist model of regimes,
there has to be expectations by actors within a system of the behaviour of others; but are
all actors equal?  There may be obvious economic and political differences between
states, yet the differences run deeper and have far more subtle effects.  To take an
example, would an assurance by a state about enactment of technology controls under the
aegis of an international regime be perceived the same no matter which state gives it?  To
extend this example further, would the reaction by officials in most countries be the same
to an identical statement that might be given in the names of Iran, Kiribati or Switzerland?
As cited earlier, Keohane notes ‘my study focuses on relations among the advanced
market-economy countries’, (see page 145).  Clearly relations between market-economy
and non-market-economy countries might be somewhat different.  This market-economy
focus is prevalent in writing on Regime Theory.
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International Organization, vol 52, no 4, (Autumn,1998) [special edition: International
Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics], p 738.
35. Daniel Feakes, Brian Rappert and Caitríona McLeish, ‘Introduction: A Web of Prevention?’, in:
Brian Rappert and Caitríona McLeish (eds.), A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life
Sciences and the Governance of Research, (London: Earthscan, 2007), pp 1-13 at p 7.
One element in a complex system
A particular issue in a situation such as the regime to control biological weapons is that it
exists in a broader context.  For example, the negotiations on the Biological Weapons
Convention were heavily influenced by factors relating to nuclear weapons, in the form of
the SALT negotiations, and to chemical weapons, and in particular their transport across
the United States.36  It follows that if an analysis of the development of the regime to
control biological weapons during the period 1968-72 did not take these factors into
account it would not be able to adequately explained how events unfolded.  Nonetheless,
there exists, even in respected academic literature, a number of myths about the Nixon
Administration’s renunciation of biological weapons.37  This is a clear example where
mythology surrounding WMD issues has been taken by some analysts as literal truth so
that such research takes on an almost euhemeristic character.
Although most analysts recognise broader contexts that regimes sit within, Regime
Theory can fail to take account of such wider political situations which can contain many
influences that are not directly related to a regime but which may impinge upon it.  This
is a consequence of developing parsimonious theory and need not be a failing so long as




36. The memo that triggered the US National Security Council review of chemical and biological
warfare policy in 1969, which is cited by many as being a significant step in allowing negotiations
for the BWC has this as the major paragraph: ’I am increasingly concerned about the structure of our
chemical and biological warfare programs, our national policy relating to such programs, and our
public posture vis a vis chemical and biological warfare activities. It is clear the Administration is
going to be under increasing fire as a result of numerous inquiries, the more notable being
Congressman McCarthy’s and Senator Fulbright’s.’ — untitled memorandum, Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird writes to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, dated
30 April 1969,  as retrieved from: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC
330–75–0089, Box 50, 370.64 CBR [the document carries a ‘Confidential’ security marking until
declassified 3 February 2003, although there was a Nixon Presidential Library copy released in 2001
but subsequently withdrawn before being re-released].  McCarthy’s focus of these issues had started
with the transport of chemical weapons across the USA.
37. For a useful commentary about how the US position unfolded that provides a corrective to the
mythology, see Jonathan B. Tucker, A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and
Toxin Warfare 1969-70, International Security, vol 27, no 1 (Summer 2002), pp 107-48, in
particular the section starting from p 115.
General Regime Theory conclusions
The study of regimes is not contiguous with Regime Theory, yet Regime Theory has
come to influence much of the scholarly analysis of regimes.  While there is no single
Regime Theory, there are common threads.
Regime Theory covers a diversity of regime types — including those that cover
international finance, trade, oil, security through military cooperation as well as security
through control of materials and technologies.  Each of these issue areas has unique
characteristics and this diversity of issues, purposes and instrumentalities are too broad for
a general theory to apply in all cases.  Key variations mean that understandings that might
be valid in one flavour of regime, such as one relating to economic cooperation, may not
apply in another, such as technology control or arms control.
A key question remains regarding evaluating regime effectiveness.  If a problem such
as the threats and risks associated with hostile uses of the life sciences is to be tackled
through regime activities then a more nuanced understanding of effectiveness is required
in order to assist development of better policies and activities under the auspices of the
regime.
Understanding effectiveness of regimes
In the early development of Regime Theory, the focus of understanding of the
effectiveness of a regime was on how it affected the interaction of the states involved.  For
example, some of the most respected promoters of Regime Theory note that measures of
effectiveness should include evaluation of the purposes of a regime, but that:
The most fundamental and most widely discussed of these purposes is the
enhancement of the ability of states to cooperate in the issue area.38
Within the realm of Regime Theory, there is no consensus on what effectiveness is.
An early example deriving from hegemonic stability theory posits that a regime is
effective if it results in cooperative behaviour among the participants that they would have
been unlikely to have carried out if the regime had not existed.  However, this can be very
difficult to test except in specific circumstances that occur by chance or by exploration
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Cambridge Studies in International Relations, (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 248 + x pp at p 2.
through counterfactuals.  Moreover, in the period of this case study, the supposed
hegemon, the United States, was at odds on key policy issues with many of the other BWC
States Parties.
A further consideration is that there is a difficulty in defining precisely what an effect
is:
When regimes analysts looked for effects, these were understood to be outcomes
influenced by a constellation of rules rather than just tasks performed by a
collective international agency.39
Within the remit of Regime Theory, there is much written about the defining
characteristics of a regime, much about how participants operate or act together within a
regime and some about what the situation might be if there wasn’t a particular regime in
place.  However there is relatively little written about the level of effectiveness of the type
of regime being examined in this thesis in achieving the principles for which it was
established.  A clear example of where measures of effectiveness through results are
important would be the international efforts to eradicate smallpox or polio.  While
cooperation and interaction between the major players are key aspects of whether the
eradication effort succeeds, the most significant measure of success/failure in such a
regime would be the numbers of cases of infections that occur in each year of the
continuing effort.40
A new direction in trying to come to terms with questions of effectiveness was
attempted in the environmental arena in the 1990s by a research team headed by Oran




39. Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, ‘Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions’,
International Organization, vol 52, no 4, (Autumn,1998) [special edition: International
Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics], p 737.
40. More extreme examples could be cited to make this point even stronger.  Imagine a regime to stop
the tides; a Convention to Nullify Unwanted Tidalflows (CNUT), for example.  Would the simple
fact that CNUT could not stop the tides have any impact on whether this regime should be
considered a success or failure and the only measure should be if there happened to be close
participation amongst those involved?  How about a regime to control pink elephants?
41. Oran R Young, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and
Behavioural Mechanisms, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 326 + xiv pp.
Young’s team recognized that effectiveness could be approached in five separate
ways; none of which might be expected to provide a complete answer in evaluating
effectiveness in any particular circumstance.  The five approaches are:
• problem-solving, which might be summarised by the question: how far does the
regime assist in alleviating the problem?
• legal, how well are contractual obligations met?
• economic, is the regime efficient?
• normative, are the embedded norms being absorbed?
• political, does the process of regime activity improve the political situation?
Each of these approaches has its own advantages and limitations, many of which are
recognized by the members of Young’s team.
Practitioners views of regimes
Amongst practitioners, there are broadly three views of the purposes of regimes.  The
elaborations provided below are based on numerous conversations and interactions with
practitioners and others.  While there will be a bias in the locations that these discussions
took place as most will have occurred during meetings relating to the control of weapons,
most practitioners also have previous experience in other areas.  No assumption is made
about what proportion of the population takes any particular view on any particular
regime.  Note that the terms used for the different views will vary between individuals.
These views are of direct relevance to assumptions of how regime effectiveness should be
understood.
This distinction amongst practitioners on views of regimes does not always mean that
an individual practitioner will see all regimes from the same perspective.  For example,
one individual might view the international efforts to control climate change as a
transformative regime while regarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime as having
started as a patrician regime and become a conservative regime.
The terms used within this sub-section come from a number of practitioners.  Often
just one of these terms would be used to describe a particular circumstance which would
imply that the users do not have an overarching conceptualization of these terms.
Searches for the terms through search engines such as Google Scholar, Google and
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DuckDuckGo pick up very few related hits, highlighting that there are times that terms
used by practitioners do not enter the common lexicon of academic analysis.
Patrician or hegemonic view of regimes
The patrician view of regimes is that they exist in order that larger states can bring smaller
states into line.  This view is sometimes espoused by delegates from both larger and
smaller states.  Although this view is strongly held, it embodies a particular paradox as
many larger states are often lagging in terms of compliance or national implementation.
Moreover, the presumed hegemon in many international regimes, the United States, is
itself deeply conflicted about multilateralism.
Transformative view of regimes
The transformative view of regimes is that they exist in order to aspire to a goal without
necessarily having a consensus at the beginning of how this might be achieved.
This has the consequence that effectiveness can be difficult to assess as any progress
towards the objectives of the regime would be seen as a success, but it is hard to make an
assessment of what proportion of possible progress that progress represents.
Conservative view of regimes
The conservative view of regimes is that they can only exist once consensus has been
reached on an issue.
From this view, regimes are not effective at bringing about change but are effective at
locking in a situation and retaining the status quo.
Escaping circular arguments
Measures of effectiveness are hampered by one of the circular arguments involved within
the definitions of regimes.  By defining a regime as an entity that contains rules, if any
participant were no longer to be in compliance with the rules, that participant would no
longer be a member of the regime and therefore the regime remains effective as the
remaining members are still in compliance with the rules.  This circular logic is implicitly
recited by Hasenclever et al. who, acknowledging the writings of Nollkaemper,42 note:
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if the ‘effectiveness’ of a rule is defined technically as the extent to which the
behavio[u]r of those subject to the rule conforms to it, the rules of regimes, by
definition, are not ineffective.42
This may be perfectly acceptable logic for a regime relating to trade, for example, where
non-participants may be essentially irrelevant to the regime.  However, for a regime
where global security is involved, this logic does not work as a reference point for
effectiveness as any entity outside the regime may pose a threat to those within the regime
through use or threat of use of whatever that particular regime prohibits.
Effectiveness vs Regime Theory
It is perfectly possible for a regime to be evaluated for its success in one aspect or another
without Regime Theory being invoked, as was done before Regime Theory itself was
developed.43
Neither effectiveness nor cooperative behaviour are simply on-off activities.  As well
as any new participant engaging in cooperative behaviour, increased cooperative
behaviour by an existing participant would increase effectiveness of the regime by this
measure.  But how should cooperative behaviour itself be measured?  One aspect of
cooperative behaviour within a regime that included controls on technologies might be a
national export control arrangement — but are all export control arrangements equal, or
does an export control arrangement that has a greater probability of preventing an export
that would be against the aims of the regime be considered to constitute a greater level of
cooperative behaviour?
The opposite of this argument provides a clearer answer.  If a regime can only exist in
one of two states ‘effective’ or ‘not effective’ without any gradation of these states, then a
regime with 100 participants but only 1 that had engaged in any form of cooperative
behaviour that they would not have engaged in were it not for the regime would be
considered equal to a regime in which all 100 had engaged in new behaviour.  To anyone
interested in analysis of regimes in order to understand what would make better policy to
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43. See, for example, Inis L Claude jr, ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United
Nations’, International Organization, vol 20, no 3 (Summer 1966), pp 367-79.
achieve aims and objectives that might be encompassed within the principles and norms
of regimes this would be an absurd proposition.
Differences between regimes
The difficulties of applying understandings deriving from regimes in one issue area to
regimes in a second issue area was explored in the section on critiques of Regime Theory
above.  These argument also apply to issues relating to effectiveness.
One problem in some of the literature is that questions are too generalised — for
example, some analysts pose a simple question ‘are regimes effective?’
This question has direct parallels with the question ‘are laws effective?’  To test this
question, would it be considered valid to study compliance with laws relating to road
traffic, for example, and then presume the results would be valid for crimes of violence?
In simple terms, would knowledge of levels of compliance with laws on speeding provide
any evidence for understanding compliance with laws on murder?
This is not to say that analytical tools to assess one regime or one law could not be
used to analyse another successfully, but simply that it is not possible to presume that the
results from a regime (or group of regimes) in one area, such as trade, could be applied to
a regime (or group of regimes) in another area, such as security, unless detailed analysis
of the circumstances has been made.
Assessment of effectiveness of regimes
In order to develop understandings of how assessment of regimes could be improved,
Underdal proposed three questions:
(i) What precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? (ii) Against which
standard is the object to be evaluated? (iii) How do we operationally go about
comparing the object to our standard?44
These three questions have been much cited, but essentially boil down a common
system of assessment that exists in a wide variety of circumstances — from an identified
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starting point, identify the best-case scenario that might have been possible and then
attempt to identify what progress has been made towards this scenario.  It is, perhaps, an
illustration of the paucity of ideas in this field that these three questions are cited so often.
The baseline, end point and the real-life situation can be used in measuring systems in
a number of ways.  How far has progress been made from the baseline?  What progress
towards the end point is needed?  Is the real-life situation closer to the baseline or the end
point?
The method within the study of regimes that has become predominant for using this
technique of assessment has become known as the ‘Oslo-Potsdam solution’ and is
essentially an effort to quantify a baseline and an idealised end-point and to compare these
with the situation in real life.
However, not all aspects of effectiveness are directly measurable.  In a case such as
that of the regime to control biological weapons, the effectiveness of the overall regime
may be contested as it is not possible to determine with absolute certainty how many
efforts to acquire such weapons may be being carried out in a covert manner.45
Creating a baseline for assessment
Any assessment requires a baseline — that is the point at which progress (or otherwise) is
measured from.  However, such a baseline does not have to be at the start of a regime.
Indeed, an assessment of effectiveness could be from one particular moment to another —
has regime X been effective from time A to time B or after a particular event; or has the
level of effectiveness increased or decreased over the relevant period?
In evaluating effectiveness of either an overall regime or a disaggregated regime, the




45. Even if the Biological Weapons Convention were to have universal membership and a set of
comprehensive verification arrangements, there would still be no absolute guarantee that no covert
acquisition efforts were taking place.
Three distinct methodologies have been brought forward to promulgate a baseline
assessment: before and after snapshots; counterfactuals; and regimes covering only part of
a jurisdiction.
Before and after snapshots
A popular way of attempting to create a baseline is to examine the situation before a
regime was in place.  In the case of regimes this can be difficult to isolate a situation in
which a regime does not exist for the simple reason that if there is a policy concern that an
issue has to be tackled, it is likely that some policy-making bodies in some jurisdictions
would already be doing some activity in the issue area.  This makes it hard to establish a
baseline for comparison.  Moreover, it may be that many states could have been giving
consideration to some form of activity in the issue area for which there is the prospect of
a regime being created but have not yet acted in anticipation that a regime may be created.
Such hesitation in action is especially prominent in issue areas where legislation requiring
definitions is needed in implementing policy or where the same government department
has competing policy priorities.46  Getting a slot in a legislative calendar can be difficult
and no government department would wish to introduce two sets of legislation on the
same topic within only a few years of each other if such a situation can be avoided.  As
noted by a former Director of the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Department for
Disarmament Affairs, writing about why some Pacific island countries had not joined the
BWC:
It must be remembered, however, that in these small countries the resources
required to get the legislation onto the legislative calendar are competing intensely
for the attention of their governments with other formal measures.47
To create a hypothetical example to illustrate the point, suppose there is a growing
concern in a number of countries that there should be some form of collective action
relating to the global trade in ‘widgets’.  In most of these countries, policy on the trade in
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47. Tim Caughley, ‘Pacific Islands’, in: BioWeapons Prevention Project, Building a Global Ban: Why
States Have Not Joined the BWC, April 2009, pp 17-19 at p 17.
widgets may not have been fully developed, not least because each country perceives a
benefit in having, for example, a common definition of what a widget is that has not yet
been reached.  If no regime is established, for whatever reason, most of these countries
will adopt a policy on widget trade in any case.  Any before and after analysis of any
international regime on widget trade may possibly over-estimate the effectiveness of the
regime in encouraging policy adoption as the motivations for action existed prior to the
regime being formed.  Nevertheless, such an analysis would correctly identify the effect
of the regime in promoting common standards.
These arguments also apply to situations where some states are outside of a regime, as
the regime may influence behaviour of states not within it.
Counterfactuals
A second popular way of attempting to create a baseline is to carry out a thought
experiment to create an estimate of what the situation would have been if a regime had not
existed.  This concept is referred to within the Oslo-Potsdam solution as the ‘non-regime
counterfactual’ or ‘NR’.
The limitations of analysis of regimes through counterfactuals  have been long
recognised:
Regime analysis has suffered from conceptual problems with the dependent
variable; that is, the outcome to be explained.  Firstly, the definition of the
dependent variable — usually related to regime formation, regime change, regime
decline, or regime effects — tends to be unclear in many studies. One of the
reasons for this circumstance is that many inquiries are preoccupied with
theoretical aspects of regime analysis and provide only selective empirical
evidence to support their hypotheses and assumptions. ... in cases where the
dependent variable is well defined, it is often oversimplified, for example
dichotomized as the existence or non-existence of an international regime in a
particular issue-area.48




48. Thomas Bernauer, The chemistry of regime formation, United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research/Dartmouth Publishing, (1993), p 77.
The no-regime counterfactual does not suffice as the only evaluative criteria
because it gives only a very vague indication of how well a regime serves the
purpose it has been designed for.49
The greatest limitation of counterfactuals is that their use relies on judgement.  A
judgement is, when all is said and done, no more or less than a guess — albeit an educated
guess.  This element of guesswork creates large possibilities for error margins in any
baseline for assessment.
When a short timescale is chosen for assessment, such as two or three years, the errors
that might be introduced through counterfactuals can be kept to a minimum.  When
counterfactuals are used to assess a situation that continues over a number of decades
greater errors can be introduced.
International relations are an accumulation of non-linear processes and are therefore
essentially chaotic.  This means that a small change in initial conditions can lead to
significant changes to the outcome.  This is recognised by analysts of regimes, and in
particular the Nash equilibrium50 that is often used as a no regime counterfactual:
the Nash equilibrium is not always robust against small changes in the
assumptions about the model’s parameters. In fact, even minor changes in the
assumptions can sometimes make a substantial difference to the conclusions.51
A common error in counterfactuals relating to the regime to control biological
weapons is to assume that if the conditions had not existed to bring the negotiations for the
Biological Weapons Convention to a successful conclusion in 1971 then there would have




49. Carsten Helm and Detlef Sprinz, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol 44, no 5, October 2000, pp 630-52 at 634.
50. A Nash equilibrium is arrived at when each player’s strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the
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51. Jon Hovi, Detlef F Sprinz and Arild Underdal, ‘The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime
Effectiveness: Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead’, Global Environmental Politics, vol 3, no 3,
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Regimes covering only part of a jurisdiction
One approach that formed a baseline for work by the team lead by Oran Young was to
examine the impact of an air pollution regime on the USSR as the Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) Convention only applied west of the Urals in that
country.52  However, while this might be superficially attractive, the team makes no
reference to the system of governance by decree that existed in that country at the time and
the greater complications of running such a system in circumstances in which different
standards were applying in separate parts of the country.  This would tend to reduce the
variation in national policy between the two areas.  Indeed, as Young’s team
acknowledges, a major part of the reduction in the European area was achieved by moving
some of the most polluting activities east of the Urals.
Should two regimes be considered to be equally effective if both reduce the problem
or issue the regime is designed to counter by an equal amount, but one achieves the
reduction absolutely and the other achieves it by simply transferring the problem from one
place to another?
Defining an end point for assessment
In any system of assessment there is a requirement to have a benchmark of what could
have been achieved in order to measure real progress against it.  However, should such an
end point be placed realistically, taking into consideration broader political and economic
contexts as examples, or should it be based on what could have happened in an idealised
world?
The problem of where to place the end point, and the problems of pragmatism over
idealism is summarized by Underdal in the following terms:
it may be argued that the concern with regime effectiveness provides no role for
some purely hypothetical frontier that is not generally achievable given the
institutional constraints under which actors actually operate.  To qualify as
‘potential’, a solution must be accessible within the kinds of setting that do in fact
exist or can feasibly be brought about.53
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There may be circumstances in which it is more realistic to evaluate a regime against a
pragmatic end point rather than an idealised end point.
Idealised end point issues
The idealised end point may be conceptualised in a number of ways.  This concept is
referred to within the Oslo-Potsdam solution as the ‘collective optimum’ or ‘CO’.
However, what constitutes the idealised end point is not easily defineable, except in
limited cases.  For example, for a regime relating to reducing emissions of particular
substances an idealised end point might simply be taken as zero; but there could be certain
uses for such substances that might not have significant negative impacts but which bring
particular benefits.  Indeed, this is why many agreements only include partial reductions
as a practically achievable objective.  However, in the real world such clear-cut cases are
rare, especially as many regimes have more than one principle, norm or rule that has to be
considered in evaluation of effectiveness.
If the objectives or goals of any particular policy process, whether an international
regime or in domestic politics, are then influenced by questions of what might be
practically achievable, an understanding is needed of how such objectives or goals were
reached in order to make an assessment of regime effectiveness.
The pressures on defining objectives or goals can also apply in the opposite direction,
making it only possible to adopt an aspirational goal that is known by those that adopted
it as being unachievable.  An example of this is the question of targets for progress on
universality adopted at the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons
Convention as part of an Action Plan on the issue.  It became politically impossible to
adopt a target that was not 100 per cent even though this was known to be not achievable
within the proposed timescale.  The Action Plan on Universality was widely considered to




54. See, for example: ‘We note with satisfaction the increase in the membership of the CWC. We
welcome the States that joined the Convention in the period after the lst Review Conference. We
believe that the implementation of the Action Plan, as well as efforts by States Parties and the
Technical Secretariat played a significant role in this regard.’  Statement by Victor Kholstov for the
Russian Federation to the Second CWC Review Conference, 8 April 2008; and ‘We are pleased to
Pareto optimization
One method of examining what might be considered an idealised end point is embodied
in a concept known as the Pareto frontier.  Pareto-optimal solutions are derived from
non-zero sum conditions55  Underdal summarizes the Pareto frontier as ‘when no further
increase in benefits to one party can be obtained without thereby leaving one or more
prospective partner(s) worse off’.56  It can be understood that there may be many
Pareto-optimal solutions to any particular set of circumstances and this range of solutions
is represented by the frontier.
Pareto optimization is based on economic principles and while there may be some
crossover into other areas, the economic derivation of this abstraction/conceptualization
has to be recognized in order to consider when it is appropriate to apply it to a particular
set of circumstances.  Within the Oslo-Potsdam solution, the collective optimum is often
equated with the Pareto frontier.  This is an approach favoured by Helm and Sprinz.57
Irreversibility issues
A further aspect of defining the idealised end point is whether measures for promoting
irreversibility should be included.  Irreversibility measures are those that reduce the
possibility of those activities prohibited under the regime being restarted or, indeed, in
some cases being started in the first place.  The assessment of irreversibility measures
provides an example of the difficulties of quantification of effectiveness of regimes.
This is clearly illustrated by comparing two hypothetical environmental regimes that
have reduced emissions to their stated target.  Each would have an identical (100 per cent)
quantitative score on effectiveness of emissions reductions and would, on a superficial
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gain by another. See, for example, Stephen D Krasner, ‘Global Communications and National
Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier’, World Politics, vol 43, April 1991, pp 336-66.
56. Arild Underdal, ‘The Concept of Regime “Effectiveness”’, Cooperation and Conflict, vol 27, no 3,
1992, pp 227-40 at p 233.
57. Carsten Helm and Detlef Sprinz, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol 44, no 5, October 2000, pp 630-52.
level, be considered equally effective.  Yet suppose one of these had active measures in
place to prevent future emissions above the target level while the other did not.58  In such
circumstances, could these regimes be considered equivalently effective?
It therefore follows that a truly idealised end point has to include irreversibility
measures.  But how should such measures be quantified?  If no attempt to reverse the
goals of the regime is made, then such measures are untested.  Nevertheless, it could be
the presence of such measures that deterred any attempt towards a reverse.  Yet, as not all
such measures are equivalent — a comprehensive reporting mechanism is very different
from an arrangement for voluntary provision of information — there is no clear method
for quantification and therefore some qualitative assessment has to be made.
Irreversibility measures increase the ability of a regime to withstand external shocks.
For some analysts, a distinction is made between regime effectiveness and robustness.59
For the purposes of this thesis, robustness will be considered as an element of
effectiveness.
Other end point definition difficulties
Difficulties with measuring or defining an idealised end point go beyond simple
contestation.  There are situations where the idealised end point can only be elaborated in
general terms — ‘an end to conflict’ or ‘global free trade’ — which don’t easily translate
into easy quantitative measurements.
Furthermore, there are situations where developments in other fields mean that the
context of the idealised end point is changing, or is perhaps even unknowable.  A good
example of such a situation is the regime to control biological weapons.
For the regime to control biological weapons, two distinct changes have happened
which will influence the perceived idealised end point for at least some of the participants
in the regime.  The first of these is the new political context relating to international
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perceptions of the significance of terrorism and the concerns that those carrying out
terrorist acts could utilise biological weapons (see discussion of terrorism approaches to
analysis, Chapter 3, page 83).60  The second of these is the rapid development within the
life sciences that includes, but is not limited to, the rise of synthetic biology.  These two
evolving influences are fundamental to the new frame of reference relating to the dual-use
nature of the problem as elaborated in Chapter 1 (see page 58).
The new political context relating to terrorism concerns means that some participants
within the regime perceive that new measures are needed to counter new and emerging
threats.  It goes without saying that to measure effectiveness against new and emerging
threats might require the definition of a different end point from that which might have
existed earlier.  However, these threats may have existed even if they hadn’t been
perceived by regime participants.  In such a case, the actual level of effectiveness of the
regime would have remained the same.
The rapid advances in the life sciences mean that it is only possible to estimate what
may be of concern in the five to ten year timeframe at maximum.  The recent development
of CRISPR gene editing techniques has occurred at a much shorter timescale than this.61
As many measures within a regime such as that to control biological weapons are
introduced and implemented within a similar timeframe, it may not be possible to know
what the effectiveness will be of these measures in the light of changing circumstances.
Measuring the real-life progress
Once a baseline and a an end point have been established, an assessment of the
effectiveness of a regime can be made once the real-life progress from the baseline
towards the end point can be established.  The concept of real-life progress is referred to
within the Oslo-Potsdam solution as the ‘actual performance’ or ‘AP’.
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61. The first CRISPR paper was published in August 2012 and highlighted the potential to use the
system for programmable genome editing.  Very rapidly a multitude of papers were published
elaborating methods to do this with great accuracy and reliability.  By early 2016, the technique has
been well established.  Notably, the delegation of Switzerland has been raising potential
implications of CRISPR during the third BWC inter-sessional process; see, for example, the
statement by Ambassador Urs Schmid to the Meeting of Experts, 12 August 2015.
Measuring progress has an inherent difficulty as it hard to accurately62 measure
certain activities.  In the case of the regime to control biological weapons, for example, if
one measure of effectiveness were to relate to how difficult it was for a country to acquire
biological weapons is it enough to simply count the number of potential supplier countries
that have systems to control exports?  As there is a great variation in how well individual
export control systems work would this number have any meaning?  There can also be
deliberate efforts to reduce the effectiveness of a dual-use goods regime within a country’s
governance system for political or economic reasons.63
This difficulty of measurement is made much simpler in cases where a regime is just
regulating one tangible function, such as the emissions of one particular substance or a
discrete group of substances.  This is perhaps a contributory factor in this sort of regime
being the focus of effectiveness evaluations.
Problems with Oslo-Potsdam and related regime effectiveness assessment systems
There has been a long-recognised problem that there are many activities of governments
that are not easily quantifiable.64
The Oslo-Potsdam solution has a particular fundamental problem – NR, AP and CO
are all based on judgements and assumptions, so error margins for each of these individual
judgements are compounded. Indeed, humans are notoriously bad at instinctive
quantitative judgements and error margins are often severe.65
There are a number of underlying assumptions to the Oslo-Potsdam work.  For
example, the quantitative work by Sprinz and Helm in 199966 includes a number of
equations with variables relating to costs.  By placing them in the same equation there is
the implicit assumption that the relevant costs — abatement costs and costs of mitigating
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damage above a threshold — all share the same dimensions and that the ‘political
coefficient’ that might influence the perception of damage (but somehow not influence
abatement) is dimensionless.  This would be reasonable if all costs could be related to a
financial equivalent, but there are many non-financial costs in regimes.  Within the realm
of environmental policy, a key issue that has continued since the beginning of
environmental protection concerns has been the difficulty of assigning financial values to
environmental impacts.67
Moving beyond environmental issues to other forms of regime, the equivalent
equation in an area such as the regime to control biological weapons would have to
replace the environmental damage term with one that would include loss of security and
damage (injury) from possible use of such weapons.  What should be given as the cost of
a life?
The equations of Sprinz and Helm are highly reminiscent of the pseudo formulae that
the tabloid press likes encouraging academics to come up with to fill their news pages,
such as a calculation of the most depressing day of the year.68
A numerical value for effectiveness of a regime may satisfy a certain type of curiosity,
but what does such a quantification tell us?  Is there any benefit for understanding a
regime to control something for security purposes from knowing a score for one regime
in, for example, the area of trade?  Does a numerical value of effectiveness provide any
form of information that would allow practitioners within the regime to improve it?
More useful for practitioners involved in efforts to try to improve particular types of
regime would be a method of evaluating regime effectiveness that would identify or
highlight areas in which the regime might be enhanced.
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Credibility of the situation as presented by Underdal
Notwithstanding all of the issues identified above, the case made by authors such as
Underdal is substantially undermined further, at least in the situation as it relates to the
regime to control biological weapons, by comments such as this one:
I suspect, though, that most governments in the industrialized world in fact tend
not to pay much attention to the costs of international problem-solving efforts —
at least as far as transaction costs in the most basic sense are concerned (salaries,
office costs, travel and accommodation expenses, etc.)69
While this might sometimes be true of some countries such as Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland in situations where some of the costs are marginal, the subject of costs comes
up in decision making processes within regimes on a regular basis.  Take, for example, the
situation at the Sixth BWC Review Conference and the position of Japan over whether the
proposed Implementation Support Unit should have two or three staff members, which
was entirely based on financial issues.70  This situation in 2006 was by no means unique
and similar examples can be found going back long before the publication of the quoted
article, although most of the time there is no written record of such proceedings.71
That this statement ended up in the final article raises issues of the credibility of the
journal as well — a simple wild supposition such as this should have been picked up by
both editors and reviewers.  The clear implication is that this is a guess about a key issue
without the author checking any possible evidence base.  As the suspicion elaborated in
the quote is far from the correct situation in the real world, there has to be a concern that
the author, reviewers and editors are not familiar with the realities of international
decision making.  Moreover, not only would it seem that none of these individuals were
sufficiently familiar with any individual negotiators to contact them to check this detail
but that the author, editors, and reviewers had not themselves had any experience of
international negotiation.  This inevitably critically weakens the credibility of the rest of
the arguments in the article.  Nonetheless, Underdal should be given credit for being
transparent in his speculation.
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This credibility issue goes to the heart of the theory/policy gap discussed Chapter 5
(see page 122).
Conclusions relating to Regime Theory and concepts of effectiveness
The key conclusion of this section is simple.  Although the existing methods that have
been used to understand effectiveness that have been identified within this chapter provide
lessons and some tools for application in relation to a regime such as that to control
biological weapons, none are suitable in their entirety for the task required here.  This
therefore requires that some form of new approach will be needed.
The existing literature on understanding success or failure in a regime like that to
control biological weapons is weak.  Much focuses on how ‘robust’ a regime is, rather
than its effectiveness.  There is much less written on aspects such as cooperation, within
the framework of Regime Theory, in the regimes such as that to control biological
weapons than there is in literature on regimes relating to trade issues, for example.
Robustness may be defined as the ability of a regime to deal with external challenges
and influences.  Clearly a regime that falls apart is not likely to be effective in advancing
its objectives.  Therefore, while robustness could be considered to be a significant
contributor to effectiveness of a regime, it can be only one factor in an overarching
assessment of effectiveness of an individual regime.
Much of the assessment of effectiveness within Regime Theory relates to whether a
regime enhances cooperation between states, rather than whether the regime is effective at
achieving its objectives.  Much literature is focused on individual legal instruments rather
than the broader regimes.  Some analysis relies on highly contested techniques such as the
use of counterfactual scenarios.  Other analysis looks at regime effects in individual states
involved in a regime  The limitations of a quantitative approach such as Oslo-Potsdam
have been explored.  Taken with the new frame of reference resulting from the dual-use
nature of the biological weapons problem (see page 58), it is clear that new measures for
success/failure will need to be developed.
The focus on cooperation misses further key aspects of a regime such as that to control
biological weapons.  A key obligation of the Biological Weapons Convention in
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embodied in Article III through which States Parties undertake not to ‘transfer to any
recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or
otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery’ as
specified in Article I of the Convention.  This is so that States Parties to the Convention
do not assist any state, other entity or person outside the Convention to carry out
prohibited activities.  Clearly, the drafters and adopters of the text of the Convention felt
this to be an important part of the overall package agreed to.  Yet to an analyst working
under the rubric of Regime Theory, this aspect would have little relevance.
There are further reasons to believe that examining regime success/failure as a
measure of effectiveness appears somehow to be outside the scope of Regime Theory
academic studies.  It is worth remembering the perspective that: ‘The most fundamental
and most widely discussed of these purposes is the enhancement of the ability of states to
cooperate in the issue area’ (see page 154)  For a regime such as one relating to trade, this
would be a useful measure of success if 99 per cent of regime members were cooperating
with enhanced ability or capacity — any other member would essentially be irrelevant.
But on the other hand, according to this measure a weapons-control regime in which over
99 per cent of the participants had been cooperating extremely well would also be seen as
effective by this ‘most fundamental’ measure, even if another participant had caused
millions of fatalities with the weapons that were supposed to be under control.  As this






7. Theories regarding policy processes and policy analysis
Signposting
This chapter is the third dealing with aspects of theorization and conceptualization.  The
background to theory relevant to investigating the research problem and related research
questions was provided in Chapter 5 with details of theories regarding international
regimes explored in Chapter 6.  The concept of regime effectiveness and the different
theoretical understandings that have been developed in this area were explored in this
chapter.
This chapter provides an overview of the second of the strands of this thesis; that of
policy analysis, and in particular analysis of processes by which policy organs come to
decisions within governance structures.  This is relevant at both the governmental level as
well as the sub-national level, such as governance decisions within professional or learned
bodies.  The exploration of theoretical work in this Chapter identifies a consistent
difficulty with modern systems of analysis.  In response to this difficulty, the author
presents a conjecture of a generic idealized policy decision.  As a regime can only be
considered to be effective if it has some form of influence on the behaviour of participants
within it, such a generic decision becomes a useful tool for analysis of regime
effectiveness.
The relevance of ‘behaviour’ and generic policy development to understanding
effectiveness of regimes
If regimes such as that to control biological weapons are worthy of study, it would have
to be because their existence changes something — for better or for worse.
A fundamental assumption underlying the work of many earlier researchers
examining effectiveness of regimes is that a regime has effect if it influences behaviour of
its participants, see the discussion in Chapter 6,1 whether at the level of governments, at
the level of individual officials within governmental processes or at the level of other
governance processes or individuals whose actions may either contribute to or operate
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1. There is also influence on non-participants but this is harder to analyse than for participants.
against the purposes of the regime.2  What, therefore, can be understood to constitute
‘behaviour’?
In the simplest of terms, for the purposes of this thesis, behaviour can be understood
as a combination of activities and attitudes that influence those activities.  These are the
taking of decisions or the implementation of decisions that are core to all policy
processes.3  Behaviour results from the development of policy and the enactment of
decisions, both conscious and unconscious, but this is not a one-way process.  An
alternative way of looking at this is that governance, however defined, relies on policy of
one form or another.  Regimes are a manifestation of international aspects of policy
development and governance on issues that are a shared concern of more than one
government or other regulatory system.  In order to understand the interaction of regimes
and other layers of governance, there has to be an underlying understanding of generic
policy development.
This requirement to understand generic policy development becomes more significant
if the purpose for studying a regime or regimes is to come to some form of conclusion
about regime effectiveness.  Indeed, perhaps the simplest benchmark for effectiveness of
a regime is whether it has achieved any policy objective that the members of the regime
may have had.4  To utilise any such benchmark other than in the most superficial way,
however, requires the understanding of generic policy development.
Much of what is discussed in this chapter applies not only at the level of the state, but




2. This does not work against the classic definition of a regime between governments because, as will
be shown in this Chapter, governments are composed of individuals.
3. Decisions that are not acted upon fall within that category of pseudo-policy sometimes derided as
‘resolutionary politics’.
4. However, if such an achievement would have taken place even if the regime had not existed, such
an achievement could not be attributed to the regime.
Policy processes
As noted in Chapter 5 there are a variety of approaches to theory within academic studies
(see page 117 onwards).  Of particular relevance to this chapter are the distinctions
between  hard/soft or broad/narrow perspectives on theory.
The position taken in this thesis is that theory is there to guide the research and place
it in an appropriate context rather than dictating the path that research should take.  As the
old saying goes, ‘rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men’.5
Much of the English-language literature on national policy processes derives from the
United States and is focused on the political system of that country.  This produces a
major skew in what is written as there are many distinctions and differences between
national systems.  Most notably, the US constitution is elaborated in some detail and so
the core of the political system might be described as having been designed from
scratched rather than having evolved over a number of centuries.  While the design has
been subject to modification, most of the underlying ideas remain the same.  Literature
examining policy processes in such a system has a baseline from which to analyse them.
This makes analysis much easier.  [For a discussion of the difficulties of baseline
assessment, see Chapter 6, page 160 onwards.]
Other systems, such as that in the United Kingdom and in many Commonwealth
countries, have evolved over time and do not necessarily have a written constitution.6  It
is much more complicated to analyse policy processes in a system without a written
constitution and any assumption that all methods used to analyse a written-constitution
system can be applied in these circumstances would appear to be optimistic.
Classically, much literature has focused on structure and agency.  These definitions
broadly cover the activities of actors (‘agency’) in the contexts they work in (‘structure’).
However, there are political, social and cultural influences on national policy making
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5. The quote, and many variations of it, have been variously attributed to Douglas Bader and Oscar
Wilde.
6. It is a common misperception that the lack of a written constitution in the UK means there is a lack
of written materials on what constitutes the ‘constitution’.  Most of what might be considered
constitutional elements are codified and thus written down; they are simply not in a single document
and elements are subject to evolution.  In addition to this there is a considerable amount of process,
procedure and precedent that is not so much codified as expected.
processes that are not clearly reflected in such theoretical literature which need to be taken
into account.  There are also sociological and psychological influences that include, for
example, role perception of the individuals involved.  While sociological and
psychological aspects are beyond the scope of this thesis there is a need to be conscious
that they exist — not least to identify external factors that might be missed by the
Research Question which might influence the results of research.
As noted in Chapter 5 (see page 123 onwards) in the traditional divide of academic
disciplines, politics is seen as a field of study distinct from international relations.
However in real-world analysis it is difficult to separate national policy processes from
international processes when it comes to aspects of international regimes, not least
because the individuals involved in both processes are often the same.
Nevertheless, in the context of this thesis, it is useful to contrast national policy
processes with those within international regimes.
Not least as this enables a form of triangulation to further assess the credibility of the
results of this thesis achieved through the top-down approach.  Some analysts have noted
that Regime Theory derives much of its analytical bite through focus on states as unified
rational actors.7  However, this assumption that governments operate as unified entities is
rarely the case:
Most governments are not, in fact, the equivalent of a single individual with a
single purpose and the ability to control completely the government’s actions.
Rather, each government consists of numerous individuals, many of them working
in large organizations.  Constrained, to be sure, by the shared images of their
society, those individuals nevertheless have very different interests and priorities,
and they are concerned with very different questions.  Many of them are
preoccupied by events at home and deal with events abroad only as these events
interact with and affect their ability to pursue their interests at home.  Others are
concerned directly with what happens abroad but do not agree on what should be
done.  At any one time a government is concerned with countless issues and
problems at home and abroad.8
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7. Lisa L Martin and Beth A Simmons, ‘Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions’,
International Organization, vol 52, no 4, (Autumn,1998) [special edition: International
Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics], p 738.
8. Morton H Halperin and Priscilla A Clapp with Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign
Policy, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006; 2nd edition), p 362.
The liberal perspective is a counterpoint to this, as societies within countries are
understood to be comprised of individuals and privately constituted groups which seek to
promote their independent interests.  By this understanding, a government should reflect
the interests of the society from which it derives (or from a segment of that society) and
these interests will be further reflected in the international behaviour of states.
Bureaucratic politics, rational actor and organizational behaviour models
In his classic work on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison
used three analytical models of decision making — Rational Actor, Organizational
Behaviour and Bureaucratic Politics — each of which provided different explanations of
some of Kennedy’s decisions, each of which had significant international repercussions.
For example, he noted: ‘Applied to relations between nations, the bureaucratic politics
model directs attention to intra-national games, the overlap of which constitutes
international relations’.9
As noted in the discussion on theory and the distinction between analysis at the regime
level and the state level (see page 127 onwards), Putnam observed, in relation to Allison’s
bureaucratic politics model:
the nature of this ‘overlap’ remained unclarified, and the theoretical contribution
of this literature did not evolve much beyond the principle that bureaucratic
interests matter in foreign policymaking.10
Mac Destler observed: 
Bureaucratic politics is the process by which people inside a government bargain
with one another on complex public policy questions.  Its existence does not
connote impropriety, though such may be present.  Nor is it caused by political
parties and elections, though both influence the process in important ways.
Rather, bureaucratic politics arises from two inescapable conditions.  One is that
no single official possesses either the power, or the wisdom, or the time to decide
all-important executive branch policy issues himself.  The second is that officials




9. Graham T Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1971), p 149.
10. Robert D Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’,
International Organization, vol 42, no 3, (Summer, 1988), pp 427-60 at p 431.
11. I M Destler, Presidents Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p 52.
The rational actor model is based upon some fundamental assumptions.  The key
assumption is that individuals, and by extension any bodies that individuals are involved
with, can identify goals and they then act in a rational manner in their attempts to achieve
those goals.  If this assumption holds true in any particular situation it is then possible for
the analyst to explain and potentially predict the activities of participants in policy
processes once their goals have been identified.  However, such goals might not be
overtly expressed.  Moreover, the overtly expressed goals may in fact be subordinate to
other goals that are not publicly known.  [See Chapter 1, page 17, for an example of
unstated goals.]
It is worth noting that most formalised theories within the discipline of policy studies
are based on the rational actor model.  These theories do not overtly recognise the three
groups of factors identified in Chapter 5 (see page 136 onwards) — power/status,
finance/resources and intellect/knowledge — the implications of which for policy studies
are discussed later in this Chapter.
As governments are not like individual persons they therefore do not instantaneously
acquire a unified perspective on any issue.  Therefore it is not possible to apply rational
actor model thinking to governments as a whole, except in the simplest of situations.
Indeed: 
The rational actor model simplifies and obscures the persistently neglected fact of
bureaucracy as the ‘maker’ of government policy is not one calculating
decision-maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political
actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on a
particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental
decisions and the actions of their government.12
The experiences of practitioners in decision making illustrate that these conventional
theories are insufficient to explain what occurs in the real world.  Amy Sands, who served
in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, wrote of some of her experiences:
The generally employed decision-making models (the rational actor model, the
organizational model, and the bureaucratic politics model) have pursued
single-factor explanations that oversimplify a very complex, multifaceted process.
Focusing on only one aspect of the overall environment eliminates or downplays
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12. Graham T Allison and Morton H Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy
Implications’, World Politics, vol 24 (Spring 1972), pp 40-79 at 42.
other factors.  Because alternative decision-making models are derived from
diverse theoretical conceptions about society, attempts to integrate them can be
problematic. Yet, the failure to consider interconnections between factors
identified by different types of model weakens the practical application of such
approaches to policy-making.13
Another perspective on the limits of the rational actor model when compared with real life
is provided by Christopher J Lamb and Irving Lachow:
While the rational actor model has generally done a good job of explaining human
decisionmaking in the aggregate, close observation of human behavio[u]r clearly
demonstrates that people rarely act in a purely rational manner.  Often, people use
a variety of mental shortcuts to simplify and speed up their decisionmaking.  Thus,
people exhibit ‘bounded rationality’, which not only helps them make decisions
but also introduces a range of nonrational psychological factors into their
thinking.14
Foreign Policy Analysis
Moving on from Graham Allison’s groundbreaking work, a literature known as Foreign
Policy Analysis (FPA) has evolved which is based upon breaking up policy processes into
analysable sections such that decisions can be analysed by understanding the influences
on the decision makers.  A political arrangement, whether a national system of
governance or an international regime, is considered as the sum of these decisions.  It is
worth noting that there is little written about effectiveness of international collaborative
arrangements within the FPA literature, although there is a concept of ‘output legitimacy’
used in analysing policies.  Rather than dealing with questions of effectiveness of
achieving stated aims, this concept is more related to whether the aims are consistent with
the policy-making process.  In summary, the key assumption behind FPA is that the
preferences expressed by governments in international interactions are derived, at least in
part, from domestic bargaining and decision-making processes.15
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13. Amy Sands, ‘The impact of governmental context on negotiation and implementation’,
Contemporary Security Policy [Special Issue — Nancy W Gallagher (ed.), ‘Arms Control. New
Approaches to Theory and Policy’], vol 18, no 2, August 1997, pp 116-37 at p 116-17.
14. Christopher J Lamb and Irving Lachow, ‘Reforming Pentagon Strategic Decisionmaking’, Strategic
Forum, no 221, July 2006, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 8
pp at p 1.
15. This is the key point other practical regime analysts take from FPA.  See, for example, Thomas
Bernauer, The chemistry of regime formation, (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research/Dartmouth Publishing, 1993), 480 pp at p 64 and p 90.
Challenges in policy analysis for the topics examined in this thesis not overcome by
conventional methods
There is an extensive academic literature on policy analysis and it would be impossible to
examine it all in the preparation in a thesis such as this.  Much of what is written overlaps
in key areas and so it is probably more fruitful to take a compilation of descriptions of
policy analysis methods and take that as a starting point for developing ideas about the
challenges that exist.
An oft-cited text for students of policy analysis is an edited volume by Paul Sabatier.16
This volume contains chapters on theories such as Institutional Rational Choice, the
Multiple Streams Framework, and the Advocacy Coalition Framework.
A useful distinction is made within the book between policy processes and
‘authoritative decisions’:
The term process connotes temporality, an unfolding of actions, events, and
decisions that may culminate in an authoritative decision, which, at least
temporarily, binds all within the jurisdiction of the governing body.  In explaining
policymaking processes, the emphasis is much more on the unfolding than on the
authoritative decision, with attention devoted to the structure, context, constraints
and dynamics of the process, as well as to the actual decisions and events that
occur.
17
The regime to control biological weapons is not a field where policy is made around
only a few major decisions, instead a myriad of smaller decisions come together to form
policy practice.
The forms of analysis outlined in the Sabatier volume (and policy theories more
generally) come with a number of challenges that can be easily identified from the policy
world experience of the present author.  Some apply across a range of policy areas while
some are more specific to the type of issue area being dealt with in this thesis.
The first challenge is that much policy analysis implicitly assumes desirable policy is
a static target, yet it is hard to find a policy area in which the desired outcomes do not
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16. Paul A Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process, (Boulder: Westview, 2007), 344 + vi pp.
17. Edella Schlager, ‘A comparison of frameworks theories and models of policy processes’, in: Paul A
Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, (Boulder: Westview, 2007), pp 293-319, at p 293.
fluctuate in some way over time.  Moreover timescales for policy analysis identified by
Sabatier in his introduction to the volume18 are described in terms of decades.  Can it be
a reasonable assumption that a desirable policy outcome remains static over such a
timescale?  If so, it can only be on the broadest of terms, e.g., biological weapons are bad,
wealth creation is good, etc.
The second challenge is that many policy areas are not subject to overarching
decisions which are suitable for analysis as a make or break moment.  Control of
biological weapons falls precisely within this form of abstraction.  Policy processes are
ongoing and decisions, even at the level of Review Conferences for the BWC, are rarely
make or break landmarks, although they may form critical junctures in policy
development.  A list of potential make-or-break landmarks would be relatively limited but
would include the decision to open negotiations on the BWC (1970-71), adoption of the
BWC text (1971), the Special Conference that adopted the mandate to negotiate a protocol
(1994), the stalling of the protocol negotiations (2001), the suspension of the Fifth BWC
Review Conference (2001), the resumption of the Fifth BWC Review Conference and
adoption of the inter-sessional process (2002), and the creation of the Implementation
Support Unit (2006).  From this list it is possible to see that the first decade of the 21st
century had more such potential make-or-break landmarks than three decades that
preceded it.  However, much of the practical activities to maintain or strengthen the
regime – through activities such as domestic control of materials and technologies and
export controls – went on regardless.
It is therefore more appropriate to look at policy processes in this issue area as ongoing
flows of activity of various sorts, all interacting and interwoven, which may vary in their
composition and direction as circumstances change.  This is the third challenge.
The fourth challenge is that most policy analysis identifies influences towards
particular outcomes.  This has analytical utility but has limitations in that such forms of
analysis may illustrate more than one influence in favour of a particular policy direction
but be unable to identify whether any of the influences was more significant than another.
Taking the example text examined here, all of the theories for understanding policy
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18. Paul A Sabatier, ‘The need for better theories’, in: Paul A Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy
Process, (Boulder: Westview, 2007), pp 1-18.
processes examined in Sabatier are focused on factors pushing towards policy outcomes.
This is a feature of commonly used established policy analysis theories.  A useful step
would be to identify a means of analysis that would allow for a separation of these
influences and identification in which circumstances certain influences may have been
critical to a particular outcome.
Overcoming the identified challenges - using hindrances to separate influences
It is possible to carry out a form of analysis that allows a separation of influences and
which, in some cases, can identify whether a particular influence or driver was needed in
an individual instance.  This would be to identify potential obstacles to the particular
policy outcome.  Potential obstacles are more than simply negative influences.  If an
obstacle can be identified, together with the influence or driver that overcame that
obstacle, then that influence or driver would have been required for that policy outcome
to be achieved in that particular case.
Identifying obstacles in specific cases can sometimes be relatively simple — for
example, there may be insufficient funding for a particular policy implementation or a
particular policy option was not in the interests of those who hold power.  However, in
each of these situations there would be further questions about such hindrances — who
decided funding allocations or who held those in power to account?
This ability to identify obstacles only in specific cases would have limited application
as an analytical framework.  Therefore, any analytical framework for separating
influences would be most useful if it could be applied as a general theory rather than a
special theory.
A second significant utility would be for it to have applicability across the policy
making, policy shaping and policy implementing sectors (see page 137 onwards).
A third significant utility would be if it could be applied to decisions at multiple levels
within any organizational structure.
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Utility of a generic idealized policy decision
Wrapping up potential hindrances within policy processes such that they lie within a
generic idealized policy decision would provide a useful tool to assist policy analysis.
For maximum utility, a generic idealized policy decision should make provision for or
be applicable to:
• the activities of policy makers, policy shapers and policy implementers;
• individual decisions at any level of an entity; and
• policy processes that evolve over an extended time period, allowing changing
circumstances to be taken into account.
With any general theory there may be clear limitations which are discovered during its
application which may require its modification.  There may also may be policy areas
where these limitations do not apply.  However the limitations in examining policies in
relation to control of biological weapons appear to be minor.
Identifying the groups of generic hindrances
Three groups of factors relating to decision making were identified in Chapter 5 (see page
136 onwards) – power/status, finance/resources and intellect/knowledge.  As noted
earlier, much of the earlier writings on decision making can be understood within a
broader framework in which most of the parsimonious theories apply only to decisions in
which the most relevant group of these factors predominates.  Indeed, it can be seen from
the most cursory of examinations that the power/status group is the focus of most realist
analysis, finance/resources the focus of neoliberal political economy approaches and
intellect/knowledge the focus of normative thinking or constructivist approaches.  Where
one of these bodies of analysis is unable to explain a decision it is often referred to as that
body of theory ‘breaking down’ at that point when all that has happened is that a different
group of factors has been dominant.
When power, interests and intellectual concepts all drive policy development in the
same direction there is sometimes little to distinguish between them.  When the main
influences (either positive or negative) on development of a particular policy derive from
only one of these aspects — so that the key factors relate to a clash of power bases or of
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interests, for example — then analysis of only that aspect may lead to an understanding of
the policy development process in that instance.
As noted in Chapter 5 a significant point here is that these separate groups of factors
are broadly incommensurable.
Interesting case studies of policy development occur when these three aspects are not
coincident.  A clear example of this would be the development of policy against slavery,
in which an on-going intellectual (therefore knowledge-based) campaign had won over
much of the public discourse on the subject, but which had not been able to overcome the
interests of the plantation owners who exerted considerable influence in support of the
status quo.  It has been suggested that the true tipping point in this policy development
was not when the economic interests were overcome in the traditional political sense, but
when the slave owners came to realise that the costs of employing ‘reliable’ staff to guard
and oversee the slaves was greater than employing staff to do the work of the slaves
instead, and thus this interest-based opposition was reduced.19
It should therefore come as no surprise that when regimes are analysed, there is this
same power/interest/knowledge separation in methods of analysis in which analysts focus
on one or other of these aspects of influence.20
The conjectured generic idealized policy decision
In light of the discussion above, in order to examine decision making, and influences upon
decision making that might be identified, it would be useful to identify what a generic
idealized policy decision might look like.  The following conjecture relating to a generic
decision will be useful in analysing policy processes:
if an entity recognises a challenge and identifies a course of action to tackle that
challenge which brings appreciable benefit of one form or another at minimal cost
— whether in resource terms, opportunity costs or political costs; which is
coincident with the influences that those able to express power might bring to bear;
which is coincident with interests of those affected; for which there is support from
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177–228.
the intellectual and moral arguments; and for which there is the
knowledge/experience-based skills to carry it out, that entity will undertake this
course of action.
For the sake of developing an argument, the collection of conditions within this
generic decision might be conceptualized as an idealized policy decision.  The challenge
at the focus of the assumption can be anything that involves a change from an existing
situation to one that is perceived to be preferable in some way to other possible outcomes.
The following table breaks down the suggested generic idealized policy decision to
explain the elements:
Table 7.1 Conjectured generic idealized policy decision elements
Element Explanation
‘recognizes a challenge’ A challenge can be simply defined as something that is acknowledged that has
to be changed or dealt with — a task to be done or a situation or set of
circumstances to be modified.
‘identifies a course of action’ The term ‘course of action’ is intended to encompass all policy options that
might be decided upon and could include short-term and long-term elements
‘benefit of one form or another’ There has to be a purpose that provides a gain of some sort, even if this is a
very simple gain or a reduction in loss.
‘cost — whether in resource terms,
opportunity costs or political costs’
While broadly self-explanatory, it should be noted that costs can be measured
in different ways.
‘coincident with the influences that
those able to express power might
bring to bear’
Assumes policy develops in line with the consent of those that wield power.
‘coincident with interests of those
affected’
Assumes that those affected could exert some influence.
‘support from the intellectual and
moral arguments’
Assumes that anyone who might agree or disagree with ideas presented could
exert some influence.
The conjecture is as follows, if all of the conditions in the assumption are not met,
some possible courses of action will be either not identified or not be considered worthy
of being carried out.  Any condition that is not met will be considered for the purposes of
examining this conjecture as a ‘hindrance’ or ‘obstacle’.
Costs and benefits should not simply be regarded in a classic light of considerations
for self-interested utility maximizers but should, in this circumstance, include
non-utilitarian aspects such as perceptions relating to activities that give the entity
legitimacy.  The recognized challenge can also include how to implement legal
obligations.
If the idealized policy decision is broken down into its sections, some potential
hindrances become immediately apparent:
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Table 7.2 Conjectured generic idealized policy decision potential hindrances
Element Potential hindrance
‘recognizes a challenge’ Policy area [and/or potential outcome] not seen as having sufficient priority.
No sense of expectation upon/within entity
Perceived as too large a challenge to deal with by any one entity [individual
contribution not seen as achieving anything]
If one entity puts in effort to tackle the challenge, other entities might benefit
from this effort without having incurred any costs [freeriding]
‘identifies a course of action’ Uncertainty whether any action could make a real impact on the challenge
Uncertainty of process to be undertaken
Uncertainty of what might be the optimum course of action
Uncertainty of what the next step might be
‘benefit of one form or another’ Benefit not perceived or understood
Skills or capacities may be missing and creating them would be beyond the
means available
Benefit outweighed by cost
‘cost — whether in resource terms,
opportunity costs or political costs’
Costs of a course of action may be perceived as not worth pursuing.
Costs outweigh the benefits
True costs misunderstood or perceived incorrectly
‘coincident with the influences that
those able to express power might
bring to bear’
Those in power lose power/status from the decision
Those in power don’t understand the purpose of the decision
‘coincident with interests of those
affected’
Costs and benefits do not fall in the same places.
Costs and benefits may be of different types.
‘support from the intellectual and
moral arguments’
Not perceived as the correct thing to do.
Intellectual arguments exist suggesting other courses of action.
Lack of knowledge or skills available.
There are overlaps between these potential hindrances, most obviously in questions of
cost/benefit calculations.  Attempts to formulate an alternative construction which did not
have such an overlap proved fruitless as costs and benefits can be considered in
sufficiently diverse ways that anything more parsimonious risked oversimplification.
It should also be noted that there is a need to recognise not only those in power but
those subservient to power as they often act in support of what they believe to be in the
interests of those who hold power or have status.
A basic credibility test for the generic decision
The introduction of a conjecture of a generic idealized policy decision requires that some
evidence be presented that it has some relevance to the real world.  The paragraphs above
illustrate that the conjecture has some internal coherence, but does it match real-world
decisions?
During the elaboration of the conjectured generic idealized policy decision it was
tested in a series of thought experiments against a number of policy decisions encountered
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during the author’s previous experience and modified to take into account those
experiences.
As an additional test, a general policy area, education, was tested against the
conjectured generic idealized policy decision.  A simple test to check the credibility of the
generic decision would be to test whether there are any aspects of policy decisions in
education that would fall outwith the suggested hindrances.
In such a policy area, a challenge that might be recognized would be a need for skills
amongst the population.  The course of action that might be identified is that people
should be provided with educational opportunities of a relevant nature.
While there may be many ways to measure benefits of educational policy options, if
there was no substantial benefit of one form or another resulting from the policy
implementation there would be opposition to it.21
Chapter conclusions
The material within this chapter, and in particular the conjectured generic idealized policy
decision and identified potential hindrances, provides a basis to triangulate the top-down
result, from analysis of the regime to control biological weapons, contained in the
following chapter, Chapter 8, by looking at a bottom-up analysis of national and other
policy processes.  This test is carried in Chapter 9.
The first three of the four challenges identified in this Chapter that existing methods
for policy analysis do not overcome in many cases (see page 182 onwards) — the implicit
assumption that desirable policy is a static target (as opposed to movable objectives); that
many policy areas are not subject to overarching decisions which are suitable for analysis
as a make or break moment; and that policy processes can be viewed as ongoing flows of
activity of various sorts, all interacting and interweaving — do not necessarily need new
tools but potentially could be overcome through researchers seeking a broader
conceptualization of the issues they are investigating.
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21. This should not be taken to mean that all policies have to benefit those that are the supposed
recipients.  It may be that those who benefit most are those that are in power.
The fourth challenge — that most policy analysis is focused on influences towards
particular outcomes — brings forth severe analytical limitations as correlation does not
equate with causation.  The conjectured generic idealized policy decision creates a means
of analysis that allows for a separation of influences and identification in which
circumstances certain influences may have been critical to a particular outcome.
In addition, the conjectured generic idealized policy decision can be used to study the
roles of entities that fall within the categories of policy shapers and policy implementers
as well as policy makers (see Chapter 5, page 137 onwards).  This could prove valuable in
examining policy development in some areas.
General conclusions on theory
As shown in Chapter 5, a thesis such as this must be informed from a variety of theoretical
inputs as there are many influences on policy in issues under consideration.  Following on
from the identification of a significant theory/policy gap in Chapter 1, there is a clear need
to develop policy-relevant theory in this issue area.
As Chapter 6 illustrated, the existing literature on understanding success or failure in
a regime like that to control biological weapons is weak.  Much of the assessment of
effectiveness relates to whether a regime enhances cooperation between states, rather than
whether the regime is effective at achieving its objectives.  This can lead to the absurd
situation where, according to this measure, a weapons-control regime in which over 99
per cent of the participants had been cooperating extremely well would be seen as
effective by this ‘most fundamental’ measure, even if one country had caused millions of
fatalities with the weapons that were supposed to be under control.  As this proposition is
clearly absurd, new suggestions for evaluating success/failure are required.
The proposed idealized policy decision, elaborated in this Chapter, is a second new
framework of analysis, following the new framework of analysis to analyse effectiveness
of regimes.  As the major part of this thesis is about the creation of a new framework of
analysis for evaluating effectiveness within the regime to control biological weapons,
there has to be some hesitation in using a further new method as a means of triangulation.
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The pre-eminent danger in using two new methods in the triangulation is there may be
errors that may not be detected if there were to be related flaws in the two frameworks.
While it might appear to be better to attempt triangulation of a new framework against an
existing established framework, the limitations of the existing frameworks for the area
under examination outweigh this benefit.
A final conclusion regarding the theories of policy analysis at a variety of levels is an
observation that there are some commonalities in how policy development structures such
as committees work whether they are local committees within an academic institution or
the UN Security Council. Policy making has a fractal-like characteristic to it; as the level
of magnification increases to increase the level of detail in how policy is derived, the
nature of the underlying influences remains the same — the interaction of people






8. Proposed dimensions to conceptualize and analyse ‘effectiveness’ in the context
of this thesis
Signposting
The Research Problem identified within this thesis is:
How should success or failure, and therefore ‘effectiveness’, in a regime such as
that to control biological weapons be categorised and assessed?
As noted in the conclusions (see page 172 onwards) of Chapter 6, the existing
academic literature on understanding effectiveness in a regime like that to control
biological weapons is weak, with much analysis focused on cooperation and robustness
rather than effectiveness in achieving the aims of the regime.  The key conclusion of that
section was that earlier analyses within Regime Theory to understand effectiveness are
not suitable in their entirety for the task required in this thesis.  For example, for a regime
concerning promotion of international trade, the level of interaction between states may
indeed be a suitable proxy for the effectiveness of the regime itself; but the regime to
control biological weapons is very different and such a focus might bring about
misleading results.  A more suitable, but incomplete, model is the example given in
Chapter 6 of the international efforts to control smallpox or polio (see page 155) in which
cooperation and interaction between the major players are indeed key aspects of whether
the eradication effort succeeds; however, the most significant measure of effectiveness
relates to the numbers of cases of infections that occur in each year of the continuing
effort.  Moving such a model from disease eradication to weapons eradication brings
additional complications and aspects to be considered, not least that many aspects of
weapons control are impossible to quantify with certainty.  This therefore requires that
some form of new approach will be needed.
The approaches identified in earlier analyses of the regime all provide partial answers
to broader questions relating to regime effectiveness.  The problem-oriented approaches
identified in Chapter 3 (see page 78 onwards) — scientific developments approach,
terrorism approach and public health approach — are each focused on those particular
aspects.  Each approach may lead to an understanding of one form or another about
regime effectiveness in that particular area, but not an understanding of effectiveness of
the overall regime.  The methodological approaches identified in that Chapter (see page
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90 onwards) — events approach, critical period approach and sectoral approach —
produce analyses that each contain aspects of regime effectiveness but with some
limitations.  The first two of these provide time-limited analyses of situations within
which some assessment of regime effectiveness can be made, but limited to the
parameters of the event or the critical period being studied.  The sectoral approach can be
used to discuss matters of effectiveness, but again it is not possible to translate any results
of such analysis from one sector to another.
While all of the above can produce analysis that may contribute to understandings of
regime effectiveness, what is missing from earlier analysis is any form of overarching
measure for regime effectiveness that can consider the regime as a whole.  With such a
key gap in the body of theory relating to regimes and true measures of effectiveness, this
Chapter includes an attempt to provide a system of assessing effectiveness of regime
activities in order to partially plug this gap by developing understandings of aspects of the
regime to control biological weapons which might enhance or diminish regime
effectiveness.  These aspects can be presented as dimensions for analysing regime
effectiveness.  For some of these dimensions it is possible to identify potential
benchmarks or criteria for assessment of regime effectiveness.  The dimensions,
benchmarks and criteria are then tested against real policy suggestions put forward during
inter-governmental meetings and examined in relation to earlier writings on principles,
norms and rules (i.e., obligations) identified in the regime.
Conceptualizing and analysing ‘effectiveness’ in the context of this thesis
As noted earlier (see page 18), the first Research Question of this thesis is:
How can the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in relation to the regime to control
biological weapons be broken down into separate dimensions in order to create a
more rigorous framework of assessment?
This Research Question came about owing to the change of focus brought about in this
thesis following the identification of the limitations in the use of measures of effectiveness
within existing work in Regime Theory to understand effectiveness in the regime to
control biological weapons.  The regime to control biological weapons covers a broad
spread of activities.  If there was a single obvious measure of regime effectiveness
available this would have been utilized long ago.  It therefore follows that regime
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effectiveness will have to be considered on more than one axis or dimension, taking into
account that any individual axis will include positive as well as negative developments.
These are sometimes best expressed as successes or failures in such a dimension.
There are two common meanings of the term ‘effectiveness’ that are relevant to the
thesis.  In the realm of traditional International Relations theory, if regime participants do
not carry out any activity that they would not have done in any case had the regime not
existed then the regime cannot be considered to be effective in terms of the theories of
International Relations (see Chapter 6).  Nonetheless, taking the other common meaning
of effectiveness, activities undertaken by regime participants that they would have
undertaken regardless of whether the regime existed, may, on aggregate, form an effective
set of measures that have some effect in achieving the stated aims of the regime; thus in
this case the regime may be interpreted in this second meaning as being effective even if
it is not effective in an International Relations theory sense.  It is not always possible to
disentangle these two meanings of effectiveness as soon as some international cooperation
takes place within a regime.  The path taken to try to overcome these limitations can be
summed up in the two sub-questions of the first Research Question:
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria suggested for use within this assessment
of regime effectiveness be related to the considerations, lessons, perspectives,
recommendations, conclusions and proposals put forward in presentations,
statements, working papers and interventions during meetings of the BWC
inter-sessional processes?
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria suggested for use within this assessment
of regime effectiveness be related to principles, norms and rules (i.e., obligations)
within the regime?
Deriving dimensions of effectiveness
In attempting to derive a system of dimensions to be assessed, it is worth considering what
it is that should be answered or assessed to come to a conclusion about whether individual
policies or activities might contribute to effectiveness or not.  It is worth noting in this
regard that any dimensions have to take into account that there is no unified or integrated,




Taking the example of disease eradication noted above as a starting point, a simple
measure of effectiveness of a regime such as that to control (or, indeed, eradicate)
biological weapons would be to count how many times such weapons were actually used.
As will be noted later in this chapter, the number of confirmed cases of use of these
weapons is small.1  Use would be a relatively limited measure on its own as it is the
culmination of a process which starts with development and acquisition of the weapons; it
would therefore be pragmatic to include these stages within a dimension as well.  This
leads to the derivation of the ‘Threat Ambition’ dimension outlined below.
The next most obvious question relating to regime effectiveness might be cast in the
following terms: if there are states, other entities or individuals that wish to use biological
and toxin weapons, how easy is it for them to acquire the weapons and use them?  This
leads directly to a requirement to make an assessment of availability of relevant materials
and technologies and the opportunities to exploit them.  Therefore any system of
assessment should include ‘Availability/Opportunity’ aspects within the dimensions.
In following the disease eradication model of regime effectiveness, a further question
that illustrates aspects of effectiveness would be: if the eradication effort is not successful
at any particular time or place, how effective would the regime be to respond to an
outbreak?  In the terms of the regime to control biological weapons, such an ‘outbreak’
may not only be the use of deliberate disease, but might also result from other steps in the
process of development or acquisition of prohibited weapons such as a leak from a
production facility or an experimental release of a weapon under development that has a
more readily detectable result than intended.  Within traditional Regime Theory there is a
concept of ‘robustness’ which, as noted in Chapter 6 (see page 172), may be defined as the
ability of a regime to deal with external challenges and influences.  Also noted in that
chapter is that many analysts, focused on Regime Theory, do not see robustness as being
a contributor to effectiveness (see page 167).  The concept underlying this question is far
broader than robustness and relates not only to questions of whether the regime itself is
strong in itself to withstand shocks but, more importantly, to questions of whether the
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1. Confirming whether an alleged use of biological or toxin weapons has indeed taken place can be a
complex task; especially as there are many cases of spurious allegations being made during
inter-state and intra-state conflicts that an opponent has used such weapons which are based on
nothing more than a propaganda desire to portray the opponent as being unworthy and underhand.
regime improves ‘Resilience’ of societies to withstand attacks and whether the regime
promotes or provides means by which the effects of breaches of key aims of the regime —
acquisition or use of biological or toxin weapons being the key ones in this regard — can
be militated against.
A fourth question that might be asked about regime effectiveness would be: how does
this all fit together and are there gaps in policy implementation?  This requires that any
assessment of the effectiveness of a regime should include aspects of whether policies and
activities prompted by the regime, or adopted under the aegis of the regime, form a
coherent whole.  Traditional studies of regimes follow a perspective that suggests the
most important element of regime effectiveness: ‘is the enhancement of the ability of
states to cooperate in the issue area’ (see page 154).  While this level of cooperation is
important, for a regime like that to control biological weapons the level of engagement in
cooperation is only a partial measure of effectiveness; a better measure includes aspects of
policy implementation and coherence as well as levels of engagement on the sub-national,
national regional and global level.  The final dimension proposed here is therefore one of
‘Coherence/Engagement’.
A potential further question, which might have led to an additional dimension, was
also considered: does the regime make participants feel more secure?  While classic
Regime Theory would embrace questions of perception, the evaluation of effectiveness
contained within this thesis is based upon actions rather than perceptions.  If actions
achieve a real reduction in threat, then this should be caught by one of the other
dimensions — such as being reflected in an enhancement in countering Threat Ambition
or enhancing the Availability/Opportunity dimension.  After some consideration, this
dimension was ruled out as a perception dimension would be influenced by changes in
political and cultural circumstances outside of the regime and which did not necessarily
reflect any substantive change in actual level of threat.2  In this way, the regime could be
seen to be defective simply because one constituency/grouping is more fearful or more
confident at any particular moment than another.
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2. See, for example, Debora MacKenzie, ‘Tilting at Windmills’, New Scientist, 28 November 2015, pp
30-31.
Once dimensions had been identified in their first iteration, there was a need to then
identify a method to test whether these dimensions were a credible tool, not least by
attempting to establish whether they were comprehensive enough to encompass differring
perceptions of effectiveness.
It is possible to test the validity of the four selected dimensions through tabulation
comparing them with two particular external bodies of text: proposals for strengthening
and enhancing the regime that have been raised through the BWC inter-sessional
processes and earlier analytical writings on the principles, norms and rules of the regime
to control biological weapons.  Key to this process is a deliberate effort to see if there are
any aspects of regime effectiveness that fall outside of the four dimensions.  Confidence
in the applicability and comprehensiveness of the suggested dimensions can also be tested
by comparing them with other statements and papers within the regime and the
experiences of practitioners within the regime through informal discussions.
Proposed dimensions for evaluation
Following on from the discussion above, four dimensions are proposed in this chapter to
create one element of a new framework of assessment of effectiveness for the overall
regime to control biological weapons.  These dimensions are drawn up in broad terms and
should also be applicable in similar regimes such as that to control chemical weapons.
The first part of this chapter will focus on the regime to control biological weapons.  After
examination of the proposed dimensions in this context, their potential suitability for other






In the analysis below, each proposed dimension will be outlined and then be described in





While it might be difficult to define effectiveness in non-proliferation, arms control and
disarmament (NACD) regimes directly [recalling the differences between these regimes
noted in Chapter 2 on page 46 onwards], there is a measure of effect that can be
represented in a form of success/failure hierarchy that might be elaborated in terms that







Each of these is explored further below.  To some extent, each of the levels of this
success/failure hierarchy would apply to potential possessors whether they were states or
non-state actors.  The levels in this hierarchy are not homogeneous, as there may be
variations within a level.  For example, scales of effort towards acquisition or scales of
usage might vary but would nevertheless fall within the same level within this hierarchy.
Although the wording in the descriptions is somewhat repetitive, this repetition serves to
reinforce the distinction between the levels.
Most of the levels suggested here relate directly to a principle, norm or rule identified
within the regime.  For example, non-use has a direct parallel with the provisions of the
Geneva Protocol.3
However, if levels were only derived from any principle, norm or rule that was
explicitly stated within the regime elements then the gaps between levels might be too
great.  For example, there is a wide gap between the first possession of a full set of
components for a prohibited weapon and that possessor being in a position to use such a
weapon.  Hence the suggestion of an intermediate level between the two.4
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3. A direct comparison between the dimensions and identified regime obligations appears later in this
chapter.
4. An alternate intermediate step that might have been considered would be the testing of weapons and
related devices.  In the nuclear field, the prohibition of nuclear explosive testing has become an
explicit element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  However, in the biological field, testing of
biological munitions or other delivery devices that did not involve human exposure to pathogens or
(Non-)use
While use of any prohibited weapon would be perhaps the most explicit and fundamental
failure of a regime, any continued non-use of prohibited weapons by a possessor might be
considered a limited success of that regime.  Furthermore, if there might have been twenty
uses of the prohibited weapons if a relevant regime had not existed, then only a single use
under a regime could be considered a considerable, but not total, success. 
(Non-)integration
If a possessor has integrated a type of prohibited weapon into its planning (through
doctrine or other preparations for use) then this would be considered a failure of a regime,
but not as severe a failure as use would constitute.  On the other hand, if a possessor has a
type of prohibited weapon available to it, but has not integrated it into its planning, this
might be considered a partial success of a regime as this reduces the likelihood of such
weapons being used.
(Non-)possession
If a possessor has a type of prohibited weapon available to it this would be considered a
failure of a regime, but not as severe a failure as having such a type of weapon integrated
into the planning process for possible use.  On the other hand, if a potential possessor has
expended effort into acquisition of a type of prohibited weapon available to it, but has not
actually acquired a complete weapon system, this might be considered a partial success of
a regime.
(Non-)acquisition
If a potential possessor has expended effort into acquisition of a type of prohibited
weapon this would be considered a failure of a regime, but not as severe a failure as a
possessor having completed acquisition of such a type of weapon.  On the other hand, if
a potential possessor has aspired to acquisition of a type of prohibited weapon, but has not




toxins might fall under the rubric of ‘research’ which is not explicitly prohibited under the BWC,
although the general purpose criterion would still apply.
(Non-)aspiration
If a potential possessor aspires to acquire a type of prohibited weapon this might be
considered a failure of a regime, but not as severe a failure as that potential possessor
actually expending effort into such acquisition.
The highest level of success of a regime on the threat hierarchy measure would be that
no state or non-state actor has a desire to acquire nor, in an ideal world, senses or
perceives any pressure (either internal or external) to acquire a type of prohibited weapon.
Relation to other proposed dimensions
This dimension relates to the most fundamental measure of the effectiveness of the regime
— that of the acquisition or use of the prohibited weapons.  Yet even a cursory
examination of policies that are contributors to the regime show that there is little that can
be done through any individual policy to influence directly another state to move to the
non-aspiration end of this hierarchy.  As the question of influences on policies of
decision-making bodies within governments is core to the very concept of regime
effectiveness, this can be seen as a significant limitation.  For example, the most obvious
related policies, such as export control measures, merely delay or hinder the acquisition of
materials or technologies with no guarantee that these will not be acquired eventually.
Nevertheless, the implementation of export control policies, for example, may influence
decisions by making acquisition more difficult and costly; or introduce delays in
procurement or research through lack of available items, and thus less attractive as a
policy option.  However, while anything that might reduce availability could conceivably
impact upon Threat Ambition, it is important to keep these dimensions distinct where
possible.
A major influence of states on each other in this regard can be considered as
normative.
Use of this dimension in evaluation of effectiveness
The first point worth noting is that the regime lacks formal verification arrangements.
Where there is a verification system, it is much simpler to evaluate compliance (see page
52) and it is much more difficult to evaluate without.  However, even if the Biological
Weapons Convention were to have universal membership and a set of comprehensive
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verification arrangements, there would still be no absolute guarantee that no covert
acquisition efforts were taking place.
A policy development, or a proposal for a policy development, would be assessed as
enhancing effectiveness if it contributes to policies of a state or relevant non-state entity
moving down this hierarchy towards the non-aspiration end.
The other extreme of this hierarchy is the question of use.  The UN
Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons has
existed since the 1980s but has not been triggered for any alleged use of pathogens as
weapons in that time (see page 70).5  In a 2004 publication, the World Health
Organization (WHO) lists only three occurrences of biological or toxin weapons in its
table ‘Antipersonnel toxic and infective agents whose hostile use since 1918 has been
verified’.  These occurrences are: the use of Yersinia pestis in Manchuria within the
period 1937–1945, the use of Salmonella enteritidis serotype typhimurium in the United
States in 1984 and Bacillus anthracis used in the anthrax letters in the United States in
2001.6
Other analyses of alleged use have been made, most of which has been centred on
work by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)7 or the Harvard Sussex Program
(see page 78).  Indeed, the WHO list is based on a list originally compiled by HSP.8
While some CNS compilations, including some of those hosted by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, include large numbers of threats and hoaxes, none adds a significant number of
confirmed incidents to those referred to in the WHO report.  A key aspect of the list in the
WHO report is that drafts of the report were seen by representatives of many WHO
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5. Toxins, being poisonous substances produced by living things, are also chemical weapons and so an
investigation into alleged use of hydrogen cyanide in Azerbaijan is commonly regarded as an
investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons although it could also be regarded as an
investigation into alleged use of toxins.  The investigation report can be found in UN document
S/24344, dated 24 July 1992.
6. World Health Organization, Public health response to biological and chemical weapons - WHO
guidance, [2nd edition], 2004, 340 + xix pp at p 35.
7. See, for example, pages on the CNS website on CBW Past Use at
<http://cns.miis.edu/cbw/pastuse.htm> or Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 320 pp.
8. Full disclosure: the current author was working with HSP when this list was compiled.
member states and it would have been difficult to include the list in the final publication
if any of these representatives had objected to it.
The WHO puts this low level of confirmed activity in a broader context:
The long and continuing period during which no substantial biological attack has
occurred suggests that the number of competent groups or states actually intending
to use biological weapons must be small.9
Taken together with the work of researchers such Leitenberg, (see page 84), this evidence
would suggest that, taken at a global level, the overall Threat Ambition is relatively low.
This does not, of itself, mean the regime is necessarily effective unless this situation of
low Threat Ambition is difficult to reverse.
Coherence/Engagement dimension
A second dimension might be elaborated in terms which relate to the coherence of
participants’ policies and implementation of the regime, which looked at from another
perspective could be seen as relating to the level of engagement of States Parties in the
regime.  This is closest to the more classic understanding of regime effectiveness, in that
it refers specifically to co-operative elements of the regime.
Governments, or any other body of governance or authority, cannot be active
participants in any regime if they do not take steps to implement the provisions of such a
regime.  As noted earlier (see pages 59 and 68), the regime to control biological weapons
is broad.  Implementation provisions include, for example, transfer controls on materials
and technologies; national controls for securing pathogens; measures for responses to
deliberate outbreaks; and training for military forces so that they are aware of their
government’s position on prohibition of biological methods of warfare.  This list is in no
way extensive, but these measures have been selected simply to illustrate the breadth and
variety of implementation activities.  This selection also serves to illustrate the variety of
actors within governmental structures that a regime must interact with or influence.
Transfer controls would normally fall within the remit of a trade ministry, pathogen
security within an interior ministry, outbreak response within a health ministry and
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9. World Health Organization, Public health response to biological and chemical weapons - WHO
guidance, [2nd edition], 2004, 340 + xix pp at p 21.
military training within a defence ministry.  Furthermore, this selection provides a useful
counterpoint to assumptions that the agencies within governments most involved with
international regimes are foreign ministries.10
The following table illustrates the diversity of government departments and agencies
represented on the UK delegation to the inter-sessional meetings in the period under
consideration. 
Table 8.1 UK government departments and agencies represented at inter-sessional meetings



































Foreign & Commonwealth Office X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Ministry of Defence [including Dstl] X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Department of Trade & Industry [Department for
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (from
2007), Department of Energy and Climate Change
(from 2009)]
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs X X
Department of Transport X
Food and Environment Research Agency X
Health and Safety Executive X X X
Health Protection Agency X X X X
Home Office X
Office of Science and Technology X
Veterinary Laboratories Agency [later Animal Health
and Veterinary Laboratories Agency]
X
Information derived from the affiliations given in the list of participants published at each meeting.  The list for MX 2010 was not
published and so there may have been further representation at that meeting not reflected in this table.
On occasion, meetings have sometimes been held in parallel to an MX or MSP, such
as meetings of the G8 Global Partnership, and UK officials may have been in Geneva and
attended these without being registered for the MX or MSP but would have been able to




10. The OPCW, in a presentation to the BWC Meeting of Experts on 23 August 2007, suggested that
National Authority/inter-ministerial coordination for implementation of the CWC can involve:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Economy and/or Industry or
Commerce, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of
Labour, Ministry of Justice or Attorney-General, Ministry of Finance and Central Bank, and
Customs.
Similar issues apply between levels of governance, such as local or provincial
governments where there have responsibilities for relevant activities and national
government.
It follows that for an entity (usually a state) to be an active participant in the regime it
must not only be involved in policies relating to the selected issues in the paragraph
above, but that these policies are more effective if they are within a coherent policy
framework in which relevant actors interact.
Further coherence issues relate to relationships between national governments and
inter-governmental bodies and relationships between inter-governmental bodies.  These
have been included within this dimension rather than create a separate dimension for
inter-governmental coherence.
A straightforward success/failure hierarchy is less appropriate in this dimension than
that of Threat Ambition.
Relation to other proposed dimensions
Enhancements within the Coherence/Engagement dimension make it make it easier to
employ measures to reduce Availability/Opportunity possibilities for misuse and so there
is some overlap and mutual reinforcement between these dimensions.  In addition,
transparent and active implementation of a coherent set of regime provisions means a state
is more likely to have fewer barriers to access to materials and technologies for peaceful
purposes from other states.  This results in a further enhancement of the
Availability/Opportunity dimension.
Coherent policies can also contribute to Resilience within a state.
Enhancements within this dimension can raise costs for acquisition for non-state




Use of this dimension in evaluation of effectiveness
A policy development, or a proposal for a policy development, would be assessed as
enhancing effectiveness if it contributes to an under-developed policy or if it has the effect
of promoting coordination or interaction between the policy areas on relevant issues, such
as between health and law enforcement agencies on handling of possible medical
evidence of alleged use of biological weapons.
Analysis later in this Chapter will highlight selected suggestions made during the
inter-sessional meetings that directly impinge upon this dimension.
Availability/opportunity dimension
The dimension focuses on the availability of materials and technologies for potential
misuse.  It is an obvious statement, but seems often overlooked, that misuse of materials
and technologies requires access to those materials and technologies in the first place.
The dimension takes into account more than traditional apects of technology control
such as controls on exports.  The dual-use nature of the materials and technologies
relevant to the regime to control biological weapons means that controls on access to them
has to be carried out at many levels.  It would be within this dimension that issues of
biosafety and biosecurity would be included.
Again, a straightforward success/failure hierarchy is less appropriate in this dimension
than that of Threat Ambition.  However a few benchmarks can be identified at a basic
level in which relevant materials and technologies are:
• easily available to possible or potential possessors
• costly and/or difficult to acquire
• impossible to acquire illegitimately
This dimension needs to take account of Article X and related issues as the flipside of the
question of technology availability.  A particular controversy with Article X is a question
of how much needs to be done to fulfil obligations undertaken under its rubric:11
The adjective used by most declared supporters of a mechanism for Article X
implementation is ‘full’, yet it is not clear what ‘full implementation’ really means.
Chapter 8
206
11. Richard Guthrie, ‘The Fifth Day: conclusion of the meeting’, MSP report no 6, BioWeapons
Prevention Project, 14 December 2009, p 2.
Clearly, the desire is to have something that means greater implementation in the
form of more activity by donor states which would lead to greater capacities and
capabilities within recipient states.  But how much does this greater
implementation have to be to constitute ‘full implementation’ at any particular
time? ... It is unlikely that any Western countries would be ready to agree to any
form of mechanism unless the issue of what is expected by ‘full implementation’
is clarified.
Relation to other proposed dimensions
A reduction in Availability/Opportunity has an impact on Threat Ambition calculations
within any entity as it influences cost/benefit analyses.  A follow-on impact on Threat
Ambition-related activities is that reduced Availability/Opportunity is key to robustness in
the regime in making non-acquisition policies less reversible.
Use of this dimension in evaluation of effectiveness
A policy development, or a proposal for a policy development, would be assessed as
enhancing effectiveness if it reduces access to relevant knowledge, materials or
technologies for possible hostile use.  However, owing to the provisions of Article X, any
contribution to effectiveness should allow for access for legitimate peaceful purposes.
The balance between these two issues is at the centre of a number of discussions within
the BWC meetings and Review Conferences and it is possible that an individual policy
suggestion may be enhancing effectiveness in one of these at the same time as degrading
effectiveness in another.
Analysis later in this Chapter will highlight selected suggestions made during the
inter-sessional meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention that directly impinge
upon this dimension.
Resilience dimension
This dimension focuses on the ability of the regime to respond to breaches of regime
obligations.  This bears some relation to the traditional Regime Theory concept of
robustness, but the robustness concept focuses more specifically on shocks rather than
more general external influences.
As use of biological weapons is the most overt breach of the regime, a simple
benchmark is to assess how effective the regime is in withstanding challenges such as
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deliberate release.  However, this is impossible to provide an absolute value for.
Moreover, response capacities may only be truly known once a deliberate release has
taken place.
As use of biological weapons is nothing more than inducing deliberate disease, many
responses to use rely on measures to improve public health responses to natural disease
outbreaks.  While public health enhancements are valuable contributions to the regime to
control biological weapons, general public health issues are beyond the scope of the
regime to control biological weapons.  Lessons have been learned for dealing with
deliberate disease outbreaks from the natural outbreaks of SARS and H1N1A influenza in
the period under consideration in this thesis.12
Key to mobilising response capabilities for deliberate release is the ability to detect
and identify suspicious outbreaks.  Indeed, much assistance activity in the event of use
may be predicated on an internationally accepted confirmation of use.  This means that
methods of determining if a deliberate release has taken place are relevant to this
dimension as well as direct response efforts combatting any deliberate disease.
Relation to other proposed dimensions
This dimension has an interaction with the Threat Ambition dimension.  A reduced global
Threat Ambition reduces the probability that Resilience activities would be called into
play.  Conversely, effective Resilience preparations would reduce the impact of any use,
making such use less attractive; this in turn would then make acquisition less attractive.
A further interaction occurs with the Availability/Opportunity dimension as many
items required for Resilience preparation, such as components for diagnostic tests, are
dual-use and may therefore be constrained by measures designed to reduce
Availability/Opportunity.  This is an illustration of the significance of Article VII and
Article X of the BWC.
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12. Moreover, between the period under consideration in this thesis and the preparation of this thesis
there has been a significant outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in west Africa and sporadic
emergence of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome.
Use of this dimension in evaluation of effectiveness
A policy development, or a proposal for a policy development, would be assessed as
enhancing effectiveness if it contributes to the ability to respond to breaches of the
obligations of the regime.
Analysis later in this Chapter will highlight selected suggestions made during the
inter-sessional meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention that directly impinge
upon this dimension.
Conclusions relating to the four dimensions
The four dimensions suggested are not mutually-exclusive axes.  The four dimensions
each have some influence on each other.  For example, improved Resilience to deliberate
release in most jurisdictions leads to reduced effect of any such release; such a reduced
effect leads to a reduced advantage of use which should lead to a reduced Threat
Ambition.
Just because a State Party has no Threat Ambition in relation to biological weapons
does not mean it is doing all that may be seen as desirable.  For example, it may be
complacent with regards to technology availability issues.
It is possible to argue that three of the dimensions — Coherence/Engagement,
Availability/Opportunity and Resilience — are directly related to implementation of the
regime within any entity’s jurisdiction while the fourth — Threat Ambition — is rooted in
the policy outcomes of other entities that may be inside or outside of the regime.
Comparison with suggestions by States Parties for strengthening the regime
The comparison with proposals for strengthening and enhancing the regime that have
been raised through the first two BWC inter-sessional processes is of particular
significance.  As part of the inter-sessional processes there were seven pairs of annual
meetings with each year discussing an allocated topic.
As noted earlier, the first sub-question of the first Research Question of this thesis is:
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria suggested for use within this assessment
of regime effectiveness be related to the considerations, lessons, perspectives,
recommendations, conclusions and proposals put forward in presentations,
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statements, working papers and interventions during meetings of the BWC
inter-sessional processes?
The Meeting of Experts in each year includes opportunities for BWC states parties to
discuss in a frank manner the allocated topic.  There have been these annual meetings in
the periods 2003-05 and 2007-10, known as the first and second inter-sessional processes,
respectively.  Other than at the 2003 Meeting of Experts, the meeting secretariat has
collated ‘considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and
proposals put forward in presentations, statements, working papers and interventions
during the meeting’.  This collation was appended to the report of the Meeting and later
summarized into a Synthesis Paper presented to the Meeting of States Parties later that
year.  In 2003, the secretariat instead produced a 172-page compilation of statements and
interventions in the Meeting.
The reports of the Meetings of Experts are made available to participants in the
meetings in draft form, they are then also made available online via the BWC
Implementation Support Unit website at <http://www.unog.ch/bwc> as well as from the
UN online document server at <http://documents.un.org> .13
While the suggestions embodied in these documents will inevitably be biased towards
the topics discussed in each meeting (listed below), collectively they represent the most
comprehensive compilation available of indications of what BWC states parties would
consider to be policies or activities that could strengthen or enhance the regime — in other
words, they are directly related to understandings of effectiveness of those that proposed
them.  Although the meetings were of the BWC, many of the suggestions relate to the
broader regime beyond the BWC itself.  The proposed dimensions for evaluating
effectiveness can then be set against these suggestions to establish whether the dimensions
capture all of the suggestions — if they do not, then modification to the existing
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13. The reports are: Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I), dated 18
September 2003, 10 pp; Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part II)
[Statements, Presentations and Contributions Made Available to the Chairman], dated 18 September
2003, 172 pp; Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/3, dated 11 August 2004, 56
pp; Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2005/MX/3, dated 5 August 2005, 50 pp; Report
of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2007/MX/3, dated 3 September 2007, 30 pp; Report of the
Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2008/MX/3, dated 8 September 2008, 51 pp; Report of the Meeting
of Experts, BWC/MSP/2009/MX/3, dated 16 October 2009, 42 pp; and Report of the Meeting of
Experts, BWC/MSP/2010/MX/3, dated 8 September 2010, 38 pp.
dimensions or an additional dimension might have to be considered — and whether the
dimensions can be used to indicate relative effectiveness of different proposals.
In some ways, the analysis below follows Karl Popper’s thinking about ‘black
swans’
14
 — no matter how many proposals from the BWC meetings that pass the test of
being examined to check that they fall within the scope of the dimensions, this provides
good evidence, but not proof, that the dimensions are comprehensive.  There has therefore
been a deliberate and active search within this process to try and identify any ‘black swan’
in order to be able to falsify the proposed dimensions.  Additional sources have included
general debate statements from BWC meetings and Working Papers presented by States
Parties to BWC meetings as well as public presentations at side events.  No black swan
has yet been found.
The topics of the annual meetings
The topics under consideration in the various annual meetings have been as follows: 
the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set
forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation [2003]
national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of
pathogenic microorganisms and toxins [2003]
enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or
suspicious outbreaks of disease [2004]
strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and
existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of
infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants [2004] 
the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists [2005]
ways and means to enhance national implementation, including enforcement of
national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among
national law enforcement institutions [2007]
regional and sub regional cooperation on BWC implementation [2007]
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14. See, for example, Karl R Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge,
(New York: Basic Books, 1962), 412 + xii pp.
national, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and
biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins
[2008]
oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of
codes of conduct with the aim to prevent misuse in the context of advances in bio
science and bio technology research with the potential of use for purposes
prohibited by the Convention [2008]
with a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in
biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity
building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and
containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance,
identifying requirements and requests for capacity enhancement, and (2) from
States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, opportunities
for providing assistance related to these fields [2009]
provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request
by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons,
including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and
diagnosis and public health systems [2010]
Analysing the suggestions
The compilations of the suggestions made in each meeting are substantial documents
which are repetitive as some suggestions are made by more than one State Party and some
others are no more than rhetorical debating points.  In some cases the political nature of
international diplomacy makes this inevitable.  For example, if ‘Anywhere’ makes a
statement the delegate may indicate afterwards that they would like to see a particular
paragraph reflected in the suggestions compilation — notwithstanding that this paragraph
boils down to a general statement — the meeting secretariat has essentially no choice but
to accede to this request.
With these practical factors in mind, the following criteria for elimination of any
individual suggestion in the compilation for the purposes of testing the validity of the
proposed dimensions are as follows:
• Rhetorical/Political ‘R’ — any suggestion that is essentially rhetorical, political
or a simple restating or rephrasing of a basic obligation of the Convention or the




• Descriptive ‘D’ — any suggestion that is essentially descriptive such as
providing a comment on a contextual aspect such as global threat levels.
Sometimes proposed definitions of terms are included in the compilations and
these are counted as descriptive entries unless they are used to guide policy.
• Process/Procedural ‘P’ — any suggestion that suggests the process for
something rather than whether that something is required or not.  Such
suggestions may also be used to divert attention about a political aspect of an
issue.
General potential diminution, such as straightforward opportunity costs, are not included
unless there is a specific potential for this to happen.
With over a thousand suggestions being made, and therefore captured in the
tabulation, it is beyond the scope of this tabulation to detail how every individual policy,
activity or other suggestion enhances effectiveness in each particular dimension, merely
to note that it does.  However, sample entries from the tabulation are included below in
order to illustrate the assessment under the dimensions.
As it took considerable time to collate and annotate these compilations of suggestions,
there were ample opportunities for the present author to interact with practitioners to
discuss possible subtleties of meanings of individual suggestions.
Selection bias issues
With any research, there is always potential for an inadvertent bias in selecting data to test
any question.  The inclusion of the full list of suggestions in Volume II avoids selection
bias in the process of this thesis.  As the list is circulated in draft in each meeting before
the publication of the meeting report there is a chance for every participant to ensure that
what they have said/presented is included so there is no selection bias in this regard.
However, as noted earlier, as the meetings followed the preset topics, there is a bias in the
suggestions towards those topics.  However, at each of the inter-sessional meetings, and
in particular the Meetings of States Parties, there were opportunities for delegations to
make general statements which could cover any topics within the remit of the Convention,
but also any topics outside of the remit of the Convention, but which might have an impact
on the Convention.  There were also many opportunities for delegations to raise issues
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within the five-yearly Review Conferences.  This means that if a State Party were to feel
strongly that some aspect of activities under the Convention (or the broader regime) that
might contribute to effectiveness were not being given attention within the themed
interactions of the inter-sessional process there would be ample opportunity to raise this.
It is worth noting that many of the suggestions made within the Meetings of Experts
fall outside of the Biological Weapons Convention per se but fall within the wider regime.
Entry formats
Each of the suggestions made in the meetings and added to the compilation by the meeting









For every proposal, each dimension is marked ‘X’ for relevant or ‘–’ not significantly
relevant,15 so that a suggestion that is relevant in the Threat Ambition and
Availability/Opportunity dimensions would be annotated in the following way:






X – X –
This can be summarized as ‘X – X –’ to save space where necessary.
Entries listed in this section are simply samples for illustrative purposes.  The full
listings are provided in Volume II.
Themes from the meetings
Before looking at specific sample entries, it is worth taking a brief overview of the
relationship between the topics under consideration in each of the annual meetings and the
proposed dimensions as, for some topics, many of the proposals will fall only within
certain dimensions.  While broad themes are identified here which may include many of
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15. Strictly speaking, it would be simpler to have a label of ‘not relevant’, however there are a number
of cases where a suggestion impinges on a dimension in a very minor way which might lead to less
clarity than if the threshold was ‘not significantly relevant’.
the suggestions for particular years, there are always some suggestions that don’t follow
the trend.  These are often the ones that provide the most interesting lessons.
The two topics in 2003 were about national implementation and pathogen security.  While
the discussion under the national implementation topic included much on export control
issues which would clearly fall within the Availability/Opportunity dimension, there was
much discussion on other aspects of national implementation including legislation on
prohibitions that would have an impact on Threat Ambition.  Most of the discussion on
pathogen security would fall within the Availability/Opportunity dimension.  In both
cases, there were elements of cross-government activities that would fall within the
Coherence/Engagement dimension.  Although there was no tabulation of suggestions
made in 2003, most of the proposals for the first topic in the 2003 Meeting of Experts









X X X –
Most of the proposals for the second topic in the 2003 Meeting of Experts would have









– X X –
The two topics in 2004 were about responses to disease outbreaks.  Clearly these
primarily fall within the Resilience dimension.  As the first topic deals with international
capabilities and the second with national and international institutions dealing with
disease surveillance there are many proposals that fall within the Coherence/Engagement
dimension.  Improvements in effectiveness of measures to investigate alleged use would
also impinge upon the Threat Ambition dimension in general terms.  The proposals
relating to disease surveillance have considerable overlap with each other.  In general
terms, the dimension relating to Threat Ambition is enhanced as rapid detection of an
deliberately induced outbreak of a disease would not only increase the ability for rapid
response but also reduce levels of panic and concern within the general public.  This
would make the potential use of deliberate disease less attractive and therefore the
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acquisition of biological weapons perceived to be less beneficial.  Enhanced disease
surveillance would add to coherence of the regime by bringing different responsible actors
together.  The impact of enhanced disease surveillance on technology availability is
double-sided; by enhancing laboratory capabilities would make the security of pathogens
more secure, but with the downside that an expansion of laboratory capacities would
widen the access of individuals to pathogens and technologies used to handle them.
Resilience of the regime would increase with better disease surveillance.  Therefore, most










X X – X
Most of the proposals for the second topic in the 2004 Meeting of Experts would be









– X – X
– – – X
The topic for 2005 was on codes of conduct.  Much of the discussion in the meetings
was about ensuring that scientists and engineers had levels of awareness of relevant issues
so as not to allow their work to be misused either deliberately or inadvertently.  Much of
this work would therefore fall within the Availability/Opportunity dimension, with
aspects of the Coherence/Engagement dimension also being relevant as codes establish
benchmarks against which activities can be assessed and this enhances engagement.
Efforts towards awareness raising would also impinge upon the Threat Ambition
dimension in general terms.  While codes of conduct might make it more difficult for an
entity to recruit scientists to work on a biological weapons programme, the contribution
towards the Resilience dimension would be minimal.  It therefore follows that most of the












– X X –
X X X –
The two topics in 2007 were about national implementation and regional and sub
regional cooperation on BWC implementation.  The discussion under the first of these
included much on technology control issues which would clearly fall within the
Availability/Opportunity dimension.  While much of the second topic also fell within the
Availability/Opportunity dimension, the main focus fell within the
Coherence/Engagement dimension.  There were few proposals that impinged upon the
Threat Ambition and Resilience dimensions under either topic.  Therefore, most of the









– X X –
The two topics in 2008 were about pathogen security and codes of conduct.  Most of
the suggestions under pathogen security fall within the Availability/Opportunity
dimension, there are also aspects that fall within the Coherence/Engagement dimension.
The codes of conduct discussions followed on from those in 2005 where again much of
this work falls within the Availability/Opportunity dimension, with aspects of the
Coherence/Engagement dimension also being relevant.  Again, efforts towards awareness
raising would also impinge upon the Threat Ambition dimension in general terms.  It
therefore follows that most of the proposals within the 2008 Meeting of Experts would be









– X X –
X X X –
The topic in 2009 related to disease surveillance.  As disease surveillance is a key
element is response to deliberate relase, the proposals primarily fall within the Resilience
dimension with elements that fall within the Coherence/Engagement dimension.
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Improvements in measures that would identify a deliberate release would only impinge
upon the Threat Ambition dimension in very general terms.  Very little within this topic
falls within the Availability/Opportunity dimension except in very general terms that there
might be fewer possibilities to handle pathogens without being detected.  Therefore, most









– X X –
The topic in 2010 was about responses to allegations of deliberate use of disease as a
weapon which primarily falls within the Resilience dimension with aspects that fall within
the Coherence/Engagement dimension.  Therefore, most of the proposals in the 2010









– X – X
Sample entries
The entries listed in this section are simply samples for illustrative purposes.  Some were
selected because they illustrated a particular point, but about half were deliberately chosen
in a random process to ensure there was a spread of topics.  The full listings are provided
in Volume II .
This analysis is made on the assumption that each suggestion being examined is acted









Those that conduct, fund, administer and regulate
biosciences and biomedicine have an ethical, social
responsibility and obligation to actively deliberate
measures necessary to minimize risk that their
work could be employed for hostile ends
[Malaysia, presentation, 14 June 2005]
– X X –
In this example suggestion, the regime would be enhanced in the Coherence/Engagement
dimension as there has been less than perfect interactions between those agencies
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involved in research funding and those looking at hostile implications of research in many
parts of the life sciences and related fields.  In the past, some funders have assumed that
regulation is the responsibility of governing authorities, yet these authorities cannot
regulate what they don’t know. Active deliberation of measures should improve
coherence of policies and engagement of policy-making bodies on issues relevant to the
regime. The Availability/Opportunity dimension is enhanced as deliberations on measures
to minimize risk should identify means to reduce the possibility that unauthorized persons
would get access to sensitive materials and to reduce the possibility that those authorized
to have access would misuse their access.  There is no aspect of this suggestion that falls









National implementation of the BTWC does not
only mean to transform legally binding BTWC
obligations into legislative and administrative
measures. It also includes the full implementation
of measures agreed at BTWC Review Conferences
[Germany, BWC/MSP/2007/MX/WP.4, 7 August
2007]
– X X X
In this example suggestion, the regime would be enhanced in three dimensions.  Overall
enhancement comes from including the politically binding measures as well as the legally
binding ones.  Such measures include the system of Confidence-Building Measures
(CBMs) and action on universality.  Enhancements in the Coherence/Engagement
dimension would stem from the process of producing a CBM return as this process
prompts governments to ensure they have an understanding of relevant activities taking
place under their jurisdiction.  This includes interactions between a variety of departments
and agencies.  The regime would also be enhanced in the Availability/Opportunity
dimension as the Review Conferences have noted the importance of transfer controls
which fall within legislative and administrative measures together with other aspects
relating to security of relevant materials.  The Resilience dimension is enhanced as the
2006 Review Conference noted the importance of measures such as disease surveillance.











Code of conduct is voluntary [Nigeria, statement,
21 June 2005]
X X X –
Codes of conduct should be voluntary at all levels
[India, intervention, 15 June 2005]
X X X –
Code should be voluntary at the national level; no
mandatory enforcement [USA, presentation, 20
June 2005]
X X X –
Voluntary codes do not achieve much [ABPI,
presentation, 16 June 2005]
X X X –
One reason for selecting this connected group of proposals is that they rest on the cusp of
being marked as ‘procedural’ owing to the focus on the voluntary nature of codes.
However, this set of suggestions is useful to illustrate that suggestions were made in the
inter-sessional processes from a variety of perspectives and so many suggestions
disagreed with each other.  Notwthstanding this, the codes suggestions have the potential
to enhance regimes ability to deal with the Threat Ambition dimension by enhancing
norms against misuse of the life sciences.  The Availability/Opportunity dimension would
be enhanced by codes of conduct as they should reduce the availability of life scientists to
work on prohibited programmes.  The Coherence/Engagement dimension would be
enhanced through the process of maintaining codes and utilising them in an on-going
education and outreach programme.  There are no aspects of these suggestions that fall









Informal cross-border network[s] among experts,
etc, can be useful. [Japan, statement, 22 August
2007]
X X X X
All four dimensions are relevant in this example suggestion, which is relatively rare in the
compilation.  However, some of these rare cases can provide interesting illustrations.
Cross-border networks have the potential to enhance the ability of regime participants to
deal with the Threat Ambition dimension not only by enhancing norms against misuse of
the life sciences but also by the greater potential for detection of misuse.  The
Coherence/Engagement dimension would be enhanced through the process of creation of
a community dealing with relevant issues, although this author would hesitate in using the
term ‘epistemic community’ in this context.  The Availability/Opportunity dimension
would be enhanced though network interactions which should enable technology controls
to be more effective and by greater interactions prompting an earlier identification of
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potentially anomalous or suspicious situations.  If such networks also included experts
relating to response to deliberate use, for example, it would also contribute to the
effectiveness of the Resilience dimension.  There is no aspect of this suggestion that falls









A single regulatory framework should govern
work with human and animal pathogens. [UK,
BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.7, 30 July 2008, and
statement, 19 August 2008]
– X X –
A common set of containment measures should
apply to both animal and human pathogens. [UK,
BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.7, 30 July 2008, and
statement, 19 August 2008]
– X X –
In these related example suggestions, the Coherence/Engagement dimension is enhanced
through ensuring systems work together and that there are no gaps between controls on
the two groups of pathogens.  The regime to control biological weapons covers threats to
humans, animals and plants, a point which is sometimes overlooked.  The
Availability/Opportunity dimension would be enhanced as better pathogen controls
should reduce availability for misuse.  The Threat Ambition dimension would be
enhanced only indirectly so is not indicated here.  There is no aspect of these suggestions









Scientists who become aware of activities that
violate the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention or international customary law should
raise their concerns with appropriate people,
authorities and agencies. [IAP, statement, 20
August 2008]
X X X X
This sample suggestion is another rare example of a suggestion that falls within all four
proposed dimensions.  The Threat Ambition dimension may be enhanced as potential
perpetrators may have increased concerns about getting caught.  The
Coherence/Engagement dimension would potentially be enhanced as this contributes to
the coherence of policies.  The Availability/Opportunity dimension as it would contribute
to reluctance of people to provide skills or materials to a possible perpetrator in case they
were caught.  Enhancements to the Resilience dimension would derive from increased
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abilities of relevant authorities to deal with a situation of non-compliance.  There is no









Incorporating environmental values into codes of
conduct (could be accomplished by focusing on)
• post-materialist values
• deep ecology and the Gaia hypothesis
• stewardship
• sustainable development
• the precautionary principle
• quality of life [Australia, presentation, 21 June
2005]
– X – –
In this example suggestion only the Coherence/Engagement dimension is directly
impinged upon, although an argument could be put forward to contest the relevance to
that dimension.  This suggestion is on the cusp of being labelled ‘rhetorical/political’ as it
represents more of a viewpoint of what the world should be like rather than a suggestion
for an enhancement to the implementation of the regime.  There is no aspect of this









In assessing the overall effectiveness of an
enforcement strategy, it is useful to measure that
strategy against the likely scenarios law
enforcement and public health authorities may
encounter concerning the release of biological
agents.  Viewed collectively, the threats posed by
the illicit use or transfer of biological agents or
toxins may manifest themselves in one of five
different scenarios.
Listed in order of decreasing frequency of
occurrence (and increasing severity of risk to
public health), these scenarios include (1) “hoaxes”
or false reports of biological agents being released;
(2) illicit transfers involving certain particularly
dangerous pathogens; (3) possession of an
unreasonable quantity or type of a biological
agent; (4) possession of a biological agent (or toxin)
with the intent to use it as a weapon; and (5) the
actual use or deployment of a biological agent or
toxin as a weapon of mass destruction. [USA,
BWC/MSP/2007/MX/WP.11, 15 August 2007]
– X X X
In this example suggestion the Coherence/Engagement dimension is potentially enhanced
through bringing together public health and law enforcement authorities.  The
Availability/Opportunity dimension would be enhanced, notwithstanding that much of
this suggestion relates to after-event issues.  However, systems to identify what might be
‘unreasonable quantities’ would reduce availability.  The Resilience dimension would be
enhanced as the suggestion deals with issues relating to responses to misuse.  The Threat
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Ambition dimension is only indirectly impinged upon and so is not indicated.  There is no









[Impose] effective export controls on dual-use
biological agents and related equipment and
technology. [Attach] great importance to the
establishment of… effective [national] export
control mechanism[s]. [China, statement, 21
August 2007]
– – X –
This suggestion is entirely captured in the Availability/Opportunity dimension.  There is










• Decide what information will reach media
• Joint elaboration of reports
• Presentation of exact and precise information to
the media
• Open and honest about actual threat assessment
• Pro-active in order to prevent panic and/or
irresponsible or tendentious use of information.
[Interpol, presentation, 25 August 2010]
– X – X
In this example suggestion provides some interesting illustrations.  It is clear that the
Coherence/Engagement dimension would be enhanced as acting on this suggestion would
bring different parts of government structures together.  It is also clear that the Resilience
dimension would be enhanced as the suggestion would improve responses to incidents.
Aspects of the Threat Ambition dimension are more difficult to assess.  The possibility
that impression within the minds of potential perpetrators that there would be an effective
media response to an incident and thus reduce the impact of that incident might lead to a
reduced Threat Ambition.  However, would this be a direct enhancement or just an
indirect impingement as the Resilience dimension had been enhanced?  In the end this is
a judgment call.  As the key test in this analysis is whether the dimensions form a
comprehensive set, this difficulty of assessment of the Threat Ambition dimension does
not have any implications on the assessment that there is no aspect of this suggestion that











Outreach and awareness activities should have the
following goals, among others: (i) to inform
businessmen on existing government controls in
the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and to stress the importance of
working with the Government at a national level;
(ii) to increase the quality of biosafety and
biosecurity controls; (iii) to identify and analyse
the potential occurrence of any commercial activity
that might be considered illegal and/or prohibited
under the international mechanisms that regulate
transfers (exports or imports) of sensitive products
or controlled technologies; (iv) to publish and
publicize the lists of sensitive goods; (v) to help
identify any implications of experts or imports in
areas of concern. [Brazil,
BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.28, 15 August 2008]
– X X –
In this suggestion, the Coherence/Engagement dimension would be enhanced through
improvements to government-industry interaction and the Availability/Opportunity
dimension would be enhanced through more effective transfer controls.  The Threat
Ambition dimension is only indirectly impinged upon owing to the enhancement of the
Availability/Opportunity dimension.  There is no aspect of this suggestion that falls









Criminal investigations: the response to CBRN
incidents, in particular terrorist acts, also includes
the necessity to conduct criminal investigations
with a view to bringing the perpetrators to justice.
The importance of judicial cooperation with regard
to terrorist activities involving CBRN materials
should be underlined. [Belgium/EU,
BWC/MSP/2010/MX/WP.3, 12 August 2010]
– X – X
In this suggestion, the Coherence/Engagement dimension is enhanced through the
identification of the need for cooperation.  The Resilience dimension would be enhanced
through better responses to incidents of misuse.  The Threat Ambition dimension is only
indirectly impinged upon owing to the enhancement of the Resilience dimension.  There











(Codes should be) Addressed to the individual
conscience of the scientist… (with) no judicial
implications; Focus on individual responsibility of
scientists and on the principle that ethical values
shall overcome hierarchy; Life scientist(s) is in a
position to follow the complete procedure related
to the potential misuse of the experiment; Not a
definition of permissible or forbidden experiments
but the concept of acceptable or unacceptable
intents of the research; (and) Not aimed at
establishing principles of self-censorship but
example of self-governance by the scientific
community [ICGEB, presentation, 13 June 2005]
X X X –
This suggestion provides a useful illustration in relation to issues that arise regarding the
dimensions and suggestions regarding codes of conduct.  In most cases, the
Availability/Opportunity dimension is enhanced through reducing the possibility that
scientists would contribute, willingly or inadvertently, to misuse activities.  This would
then indirectly impinge upon the Threat Ambition dimension.  However, there were some
codes suggestions, especially in 2005 that carried the implication of preventing scientists
themselves as instigators of misuse.  In such cases this would specifically indicate the
Threat Ambition dimension in this analysis.  The Coherence/Engagement dimension is
enhanced through bringing scientists together. There is no aspect of this suggestion that









A key area for action is the need to work for better
global health security, which includes reducing the
threat from infectious disease. In this context…
promoting wider adherence to the Convention and
agreeing practical measures to enhance its
effectiveness are key objectives, and this includes
capacity building in the fields of disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and
containment. [UK, BWC/MSP/2009/MX/WP.3,
27 July 2009]
– X – X
In this example suggestion, the Coherence/Engagement dimension is enhanced through
capacity building and the Resilience dimension is enhanced through aspects such as better
detection and diagnosis.  The Threat Ambition dimension is only indirectly impinged
upon owing to the enhancement of the Resilience dimension.  There is no aspect of this











It is necessary ... to have a national and
international network for the dissemination of
knowledge, technologies and protocols, aimed at
building the necessary national capacities whose
results (can be) accepted by all. [France,
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.55*, 28 July 2004]
– X – X
This suggestion was made in the context of laboratories that might be used to analyse
samples gathered in response to misuse incidents.  Enhancing laboratory capabilities
through networking activities has clear implications for the Resilience dimension and the
networking aspect clearly enhances the Coherence/Engagement dimension.  There is no









[There is a need for] individual countries to further
enhance ... capabilities in addressing challenges
such as emerging and re-emerging diseases which
affect human, animal, and plants. These efforts to
enhance capabilities must be adapted to local
needs. [Indonesia, statement, 19 August 2008]
– X – X
In this example suggestion, the Coherence/Engagement dimension is enhanced by
bringing together responses to naturally occurring infectious disease with those for
deliberate disease.  The Resilience dimension is enhanced as it has long been recognized
that effective responses to deliberate disease are enhanced through better responses to
naturally occurring infectious disease.  There is no aspect of this suggestion that falls









Intensify risk communication. [Netherlands,
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.74, 29 July 2004]
X X X X
This suggestion was made in the context of food safety and issues around possible
deliberate contamination.  Good risk communication brings departments and agencies
together and so impacts upon the Coherence/Engagement dimension.  The
Availability/Opportunity dimension would be enhanced as good risk communication
helps decision making on protection of foodstuffs.  The Resilience dimension would be
enhanced through good risk communication should an incident arise.  With all of the
above factors, it is a judgement whether any impact upon the Threat Ambition dimension
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might be entirely through the enhancement of the Availability/Opportunity and the
Resilience dimension or whether there was a separate influence on potential perpetrators
to reduce their Threat Ambition.  There is no clear answer to this, but it is the sense of this
author that it would.  As noted earlier, in some ways this sort of uncertainty with this
analysis is a moot point as the key test is for comprehensiveness of the set of dimensions
and there is nothing in this uncertainty that would indicate that there is any aspect of this









Facilitate the development of human resources in
developing States Parties in the implementation of
the Convention, taking into account the special
situation faced by them [Cuba/NAM, statement,
24 August 2009 and BWC/MSP/2009/MX/WP.24,
25 August 2009]
– X – X
This suggestion was made in the context of Article X (BWC/MSP/2009/MX/WP.24
contains the group’s call for a mechanism to implement this article).  The
Coherence/Engagement dimension would be enhanced through capacity building.  The
Resilience dimension would be enhanced as many outcomes of Article X developments
are improved responses to infectious disease.  There is no aspect of this suggestion that
falls outwith the proposed dimensions. 
Extraction of rhetorical/political, descriptive or process/procedural statements
In order to ensure that suggestions are not incorrectly labelled as rhetorical/political,
descriptive or process/procedural, and thus ensuring such statements are correctly
identified to avoid the case that proposals that don’t fall within the four dimensions aren’t
inadvertently labelled in one of these categories.
Below is a selection of the proposals highlighted with one of these labels and an
explanation of why the label was applied.  Quotations are as given in the proposals
compilation, but additional information, where available, on the the source of the proposal











Resorting to the UN Security Council under Article
VI, convening a formal consultative meeting under
procedures developed to implement Article V, and
conducting international investigations authorised
by the UN Secretary-General… all three of these
mechanisms remain viable and… revisions to their
scope or procedures are neither necessary nor
appropriate. [USA, Guy Roberts, plenary
statement, 26 July 2004]
R
The issue of how to investigate allegations of use was highly contested during the 2004
Meeting of Experts.  The US position as elaborated above was broadly held by the
Western Group states but was countered by many others that indicated that they believed
that use of mechanisms such as that of the UN Secretary-General were not ‘appropriate’16
and there was a need for a comprehensive verification arrangement.  Hence, this









It is obviously necessary to use the potential of the
UN Security Council for investigating alleged use
of biological weapons. [Russia,
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.44, 23 July 2004]
R
Possible roles of the Security Council in any investigation of alleged use are deeply
political.  While the high level of political significance embodied within the Security
Council is of importance, there could be difficulties if a member of the Council, especially
a Permanent Member, were to be one of the parties in the allegation.  Hence, this









The BTWC can never disregard one of the
characteristics of its membership: the difference
between its States Parties regarding the level of
development and their national capabilities and
resources. [Cuba/NAM, 2010]
R
While a recognition of differences between participants within the regime could help
inform activities that might enhance effectiveness of the regime, this statement was made













The only sustainable method to achieve this goal is
though multilateral negotiations aimed at
concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding
agreement, dealing with all the Articles of the
Convention in a balanced and comprehensive
manner that can not exclude the negotiation and
establishment of a verification mechanism.
[Cuba/NAM, plenary statement, 23 August 2010]
R
The goal in question is ‘the particular importance of strengthening the Convention’.  This
suggestion is a political description of a potential means of strengthening the Convention.
Even if this suggestion was not annotated as rhetorical/political, there is nothing within it









Any cooperation on primary notification… (or a)
call for international assistance and response must
be based on national mechanisms. [Norway, 2004]
P
This suggestion is annotated as procedural as it deals with the process of notification of
unusual pattens of disease rather than whether such notifications should be given at all.
However, the subject matter is highly political as a number of governments wish to retain
control over notifications of unusual patterns of disease.  This was particularly strongly
illustrated in the reactions in the first inter-sessional process from China to the early









Scientific research remains essential and requires
sustained efforts because: (of) threats from
unexpected or unexplored risks; the pace of
scientific progress in clandestine laboratories
cannot be objectively measured; the access of
terrorist groups to training, expertise, source
material and equipment is difficult to map; (and)
the validity of risk inventories, priority ranking
and risk assessment is time-limited. [Netherlands,
2004]
D
This statement is essentially an outlining of the problem rather than a suggestion for











Capacity must be developed within existing
national structures. [Norway, 2004]
D
As the topic under discussion was about enhancing capacities, this suggestion is
categorised as descriptive as it is a general statement of the issue.
Section conclusions
The analysis above indicates that there are no aspects of the suggestions made to the
Meetings of Experts that fall outside the proposed dimensions, although in some cases the
suggestions prompted clarifications in the descriptions of the dimensions as the research
work for this thesis progressed.
It is notable how few of the suggestions relate directly to the Threat Ambition
dimension — a key measure of regime effectiveness.  However, as noted in the section on
the Threat Ambition dimension, it is difficult for governments to be directly influenced in
this manner and such influence is primarily normative.
International diplomacy is a complicated process and it is relatively rare for a state to
directly prompt another to a particular action or to directly accuse another of improper
activities relating to the regime.  This can make suggestions directly related to the Threat
Ambition dimension difficult to bring forward other than in a general rhetorical manner.
Comparison with earlier writings on the regime
As noted earlier, the second sub-question of the first Research Question of this thesis is:
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria used within assessment of regime
effectiveness be related to principles, norms and rules (i.e., obligations) within the
regime?
An initial working premise underpinning this question is that the greater the number of the
principles, norms and rules encompassed within the dimensions, benchmarks and criteria
the more that might be learned from understanding effectiveness.
To tackle this question, the first task was the identification of the principles, norms
and rules within the regime to control biological weapons.  As the distinction between
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principles, norms and rules is not always easy to make (see page 144), there is some utility
in understanding these obligations together.
The identification of obligations within the regime was carried out in Chapter 3.
These identified obligations can be compared with the proposed dimensions.  
The Sims elaboration of obligations (see page 94) are presented in the table below,
together with identification of applicable dimensions.
Identified obligation Applicable dimensions
Article I — Never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or
otherwise acquire or retain, biological or toxin weapons (defined as:: (a)
microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method
of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;; and (b) weapons,
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict)
Threat ambition
Article II — To destroy them, or divert them to peaceful purposes, not later
than 9 months after the entry into force of the convention
Threat ambition
Article III — Not to transfer them to any recipient whatsoever, and not in any
way to assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire them
Availability/opportunity, threat
ambition
Article IV — To take any necessary measures to give domestic legal effect,
within each state party, to its international obligations under the convention
Coherence/engagement,
availability/opportunity
Article V — To consult and cooperate as necessary, bilaterally and
multilaterally, in solving any problems that may arise, including the use of
‘appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United
Nations and in accordance with its Charter’
Resilience, coherence/engagement
Article VI — To cooperate with the UN Security Council in any investigation
which it may ‘initiate’ (English text) or ‘entreprendre’ (French text), should it
receive a complaint that one state party finds another state party to be acting
in breach of its obligations
Resilience, coherence/engagement
Article VII — To assist victims, again in cooperation with the Security Council,
if biological or toxin weapons are used against a state party
Resilience, coherence/engagement
Article IX — To continue negotiations in good faith ‘with a view to reaching
early agreement’ on a chemical disarmament treaty
Article X — To pursue international cooperation in the peaceful uses of
micro-biology, through the ‘development and application of scientific
discoveries’ for the prevention of disease and for other peaceful purposes;;
and to implement the BTWC in such a way as ‘to avoid hampering the
economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention’ or
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of microbiology
Availability/opportunity
It can be seen from this table that only one of the obligations identified by Sims falls
outside of the proposed dimensions, that of negotiating a chemical weapons convention.
While it might be possible to argue that the Coherence/Engagement dimension would
cover this at a stretch, the point would be somewhat moot as the Chemical Weapons
Convention has been negotiated and is now in force (see page 13).  It could also be argued
that the regime to control chemical weapons, while it impinges on the regime to control
biological weapons, is a separate regime.
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The Kelle elaboration of obligations (see page 95) are presented in the table below,
together with identification of applicable dimensions.














It can be seen from this table that all of the obligations in the Kelle interpretation are
captured within the four dimensions proposed within this thesis.
Section conclusions
The four proposed dimensions match well with earlier writings on identified norms and
other obligations within the regime to control biological weapons.  It is clear that there is
much that has been learned, and much more to be learned, looking at the
uptake/implementation of individual regimes norms or obligations.  While there will be
utility in analysis of specific regime obligations highlighted in earlier analyses, it is also
clear that such analysis does not cover the breadth of regime obligations in the way that
the suggested dimensions do.
Chapter conclusions
Four dimensions have been successfully identified, defined in detail and tested.  Each of
the dimensions has embodied specific characteristics and there have been some identified
overlaps between them, but all dimensions are represented in the tables of suggestions
showing all have relevance to the regime.  The first of these tests was against the body of
suggestions made through the BWC inter-sessional processes.  No aspects of any of the
suggestions tabulated in Volume II has been found to fall outside the four dimensions and




While the use of the ‘coherence/engagement’ dimension contains within it the
traditional IR concept of regime effectiveness measured as a proxy of cooperation within
the regime, this dimension has been shown to be much broader than this.  The situation is
similar with the inclusion of the IR concept of regime robustness within the resilience
dimension.
There are two common meanings of the term ‘effectiveness’ that are relevant to the
thesis.  In the realm of traditional IR theory, if regime participants do not carry out any
activity that they would not have done in any case had the regime not existed then the
regime cannot be considered to be effective in IR terms.  Nonetheless, taking the other
common meaning of effectiveness, activities undertaken by regime participants that they
would have undertaken regardless of whether the regime the regime existed, may, on
aggregate, form an effective set of measures that have some effect in achieving the stated
aims of the regime; thus in this case the regime may be interpreted in this second meaning
as being effective even if it is not effective in an IR sense.  It is not always possible to
disentangle these two meanings of effectiveness as soon as some international cooperation
takes place within a regime.
A limitation of the research approach identified in Chapter 1, that suggestions mainly
followed the scope of the topics allocated to each of the meetings in the inter-sessional
processes, and so potentially did not cover all issues within the regime proved to be only
a partial limitation.  While these topics did not cover all aspects of the regime to control
biological weapons, a read through of other sources such as general debate statements at
the Review Conferences was also carried out in order to see if any aspects could be
identified that would fall outwith the proposed dimensions.  No such aspect could be
found, strengthening the confidence in the comprehensive nature of the dimensions.  This
could be regarded as the second test of these dimensions.
With the dimensions also being tested against external writings analyzing the regime
and being found to be able to accommodate all of the obligations as elaborated in selected
writings provides further confidence in the comprehensive nature of the proposed
dimensions.  This could be regarded as the third test of the dimensions.
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As the proposed dimensions have been tested in three ways, with results indicating
that there are no aspects of the regime that fall outwith them in each of the tests, it is
reasonable to state that this provides a strong indication that the proposed dimensions are
comprehensive in their coverage of regime activities.
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9. Analysing obstacles/hindrances to ‘effectiveness’ within policy processes and
regime contributions to diminishing or reinforcing them
Signposting
This Chapter brings some of the separate threads explored through the thesis together.  It
is therefore useful at this point to recap how the preceding chapters contribute to this.
The introductory material in Chapter 1 outlined some assumptions that underpin the
research undertaken and elaborated what this work seeks to achieve.  This included
identifying where this work is intended to add value to existing understandings.  At this
point, an outline of the research problem and related research questions was provided.
The regime to control biological weapons was examined in Chapter 3, including a review
of how this regime has been understood in earlier analysis.  The background to general
theory relevant to investigating the research problem was provided in Chapter 5 with
details of theories regarding international regimes explored in Chapter 6.  The concept of
regime effectiveness and the different theoretical understandings that have been
developed in this area were explored in that Chapter.  Earlier theoretical work regarding
national policy processes was explored in Chapter 7 and that provided an opening to
present a conjecture of a generic idealized policy decision.  As a regime can only be
considered to be effective in IR theory terms if it has some form of influence on the
behaviour of participants within it, such a generic decision becomes a useful tool for
analysis of regime effectiveness.  The material in Chapter 8 illustrated that effectiveness
has more than one dimension and identified four such dimensions along which aspects of
success or failure within the regime might contribute to or diminish regime effectiveness.
These dimensions were then examined in comparison with suggestions for strengthening
the regime made during meetings of the BWC inter-sessional processes, allowing for a
more informed understanding of how regimes may be considered to be effective.
The approaches pursued in this chapter
As noted earlier (see page 18), the second Research Question of this thesis is:
Can analysis of policy processes within governmental structures identify whether
activities within the regime to control biological weapons impinge upon such
policy processes?
This had one sub-question:
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Can the selected policy analysis methods indicate how obstacles to policy
development be overcome using the considerations, lessons, perspectives,
recommendations, conclusions and proposals put forward in presentations,
statements, working papers and interventions during meetings of the BWC
inter-sessional processes?
As the thesis reaches this point, there are four bodies of understanding that have been
developed:
• the proposed dimensions relating to effectiveness;
• the conjectured generic idealized policy decision
• the dataset of suggestions made within the BWC Meetings of Experts; and
• the dataset of statements, presentations and papers made or published within the
regime.
In Chapter 8 the proposed dimensions of effectiveness were compared with the dataset
of MX suggestions which might be regarded as examining the effectiveness of the regime
from the international perspective.  This Chapter provides a chance to carry out other
comparisons and contrasts between these bodies of understanding which might be
regarded as examining the effectiveness of the regime from the perspective of regime
participants.  This exercise provides useful triangulation to increase confidence in the
results from the top-down approach.
Following on from Chapter 8, a logical approach might be to examine the conjectured
generic idealized policy decision proposed in Chapter 7, against the dataset of statements
and proposals made within the regime to control biological weapons and through this
process establish whether the regime appears to have potential for influence on national
policy processes.
As the conjectured generic idealized policy decision has many aspects to it, a
tabulation analysis could become so detailed as to cause confusion.  A simplified analysis
looking only at the three policy influence groupings would produce tables in this form:
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The States Parties to the Convention with the assistance of relevant international institutions
should strengthen the existing global networks for disease surveillance and build up their
capabilities including national networks in order to respond to disease outbreaks in a timely
manner particularly in humanitarian assistance to the States Parties affected by disease
outbreaks. [Iran]
– – X
States Parties should be encouraged to improve disease surveillance and response capabilities.
[South Africa]
– X X
States should be encouraged to improve their disease surveillance capabilities. [South Africa] – X X
Strengthen the capacity to conduct effective surveillance activities. [Nigeria] – – X
Improved national and co-operative international disease surveillance is consistent with the
object and purpose of the Convention which is the elimination of biological weapons. [USA]
– – X
Participation in local, national or global disease surveillance systems represents one way of
making progress on biological weapons non-proliferation through cooperation and
transparency. [USA]
– – X
Strengthening surveillance should not be automatically associated with increasing the number
of health conditions included in the system. [USA]
– X X
Ensure national disease surveillance systems cover the whole of the country. [India] – – X
Animal disease surveillance should rely on existing standards and recommendations
wherever possible, rather than ‘reinventing the wheel’. [Australia]
– – X
(The) possibility of, and opportunity to, broaden (and improve) surveillance activities
(includes): increasing appreciation and understanding by both the public and politicians of the
effects of animal diseases on human health; increasing appreciation and understanding by
both the public and politicians of the economic and social impacts of animal diseases based
upon experiences derived from outbreaks of avian influenza, closer cooperation amongst
countries E.g. Australia and the Asian regional reference laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth
disease, or proficiency tests of Leptospirosis, Brucellosis and the USA and offers of training
and strengthening national programmes; (and) the provisional offer of assistance by
International Organizations, e.g. FAO and OIE. [Thailand]
– – X
The States Parties, acting nationally or collectively, should actively support the WHO, FAO
and OIE. [South Africa]
– – X
States Parties are urged to support the WHO’s efforts to strengthen the global system for
disease surveillance. [USA]
– – X
Effective global biosecurity can only be achieved if all OIE and FAO Member Countries
conscientiously comply with the standards and guidelines of the OIE, effectively train
stakeholders and ensure the availability of adequate human and material veterinary resources.
[FAO/OIE]
– – X
It is necessary to separate clearly the spheres of competence and responsibility of the WHO,
OIE and FAO and the Convention, as well as clearly define the field of activities where joint
efforts are possible according to the mandates of these organizations and the spheres covered
by the Convention. [Russia]
X X X
From these examples it can be seen that the information provided is not particularly
illuminating.
Any more detailed approach that examined the relevance of the conjectured generic
idealized policy decision would need to be done at least twice as it would be reasonable to
assume that the influences of the regime may be different whether the conjectured generic
idealized policy decision was either in support of or in opposition to the obligations of the
regime.  To do this would be an extensive body of work.  
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Therefore, a more condensed approach has been taken, using selected materials from
the BWC meetings and elsewhere to analyse obstacles to regime effectiveness and how
the regime might contribute to overcoming them.  A part of this examination is to
reference the dimensions for assessment of effectiveness conjectured in Chapter 8 in the
analysis the generic idealized policy decision proposed in Chapter 7 and through this
process connect aspects of the two elements of the proposed framework of assessment.
An additional source of data used within the second half of this Chapter is an
identification by SIPRI of seven categories of activities taken by states or other entities to
acquire biological weapons.  These seven categories are useful counterpoint to the
obstacles identified within the process of development of the conjectured generic
idealized policy decision.
Conjectured generic idealized policy decision assumptions and hindrances
compared with regime activities
The concept of a generic idealized policy decision was conjectured in Chapter 7 (see page
186 onwards) as a tool to help analyse policy processes within a state or any other entity
with a governance process.  A key assumption for the analysis was that in any
circumstances that a course of action to deal with an issue area was identified by an entity,
the entity will undertake the course of action unless one or more potential hindrances did
not inhibit the policy process or impact upon the character of a course of action  These
hindrances were summarized in table 7.2 (see page 187), reproduced below.
Chapter 9
238
Conjectured generic idealized policy decision potential hindrances
Element Potential hindrance
‘recognizes a challenge’ Policy area [and/or potential outcome] not seen as having sufficient priority.
No sense of expectation upon/within entity
Perceived as too large a challenge to deal with by any one entity [individual
contribution not seen as achieving anything]
If one entity puts in effort to tackle the challenge, other entities might benefit
from this effort without having incurred any costs [freeriding]
‘identifies a course of action’ Uncertainty whether any action could make a real impact on the challenge
Uncertainty of process to be undertaken
Uncertainty of what might be the optimum course of action
Uncertainty of what the next step might be
‘benefit of one form or another’ Benefit not perceived or understood
Skills or capacities may be missing and creating them would be beyond the
means available
Benefit outweighed by cost
‘cost — whether in resource terms,
opportunity costs or political costs’
Costs of a course of action may be perceived as not worth pursuing.
Costs outweigh the benefits
True costs misunderstood or perceived incorrectly
‘coincident with the influences that
those able to express power might
bring to bear’
Those in power lose power/status from the decision
Those in power don’t understand the purpose of the decision
‘coincident with interests of those
affected’
Costs and benefits do not fall in the same places.
Costs and benefits may be of different types.
‘support from the intellectual and
moral arguments’
Not perceived as the correct thing to do.
Intellectual arguments exist suggesting other courses of action.
Lack of knowledge or skills available.
In order to establish whether the regime to control biological weapons might influence
national policy processes, it is a useful exercise to identify regime activities that might
impact upon the hindrances outlined above.  In this way it is then possible to illustrate
whether the regime may influence the behaviour of participants within it.  As noted
earlier, if a regime does not influence in any way the behaviour of participants it cannot
be considered to be effective in strict Regime Theory terms.  Regime influences on
national policy processes could enhance the effectiveness of the regime in practical terms.
In order to carry out this exercise it is essential to indicate how the identified
hindrances might apply and how activities within the regime might have an influence.  For
the purposes of this analysis, regime activities include communications and meetings as
well as activities by participants within the umbrella of the regime.
As noted in Chapter 1 (see page 59) and Chapter 3 (see page 68), the regime to control
biological weapons is much broader than the Biological Weapons Convention that resides
at its core.  However, most on-the-record comments by government representatives
regarding the regime to control biological weapons have been made in statements to
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public sessions of meetings of the BWC or in written submissions, such as in the form of
working papers, to such meetings.
Norm compliant and non-norm compliant entities
It is immediately apparent that not all entities1 that might be examined within this analysis
would share common characteristics.  The most obvious distinction that might be made
between entities is that most should be making decisions in compliance with the norms of
the regime while others may be making deliberate decisions to operate against the norms
of the regime.  If the regime is exhibiting forms of effectiveness, the influences on the
hindrances to an idealized policy decision should be operating in different manners in
these two distinct cases — diminishing hindrances against norm compliant decisions and
reinforcing hindrances against norm non-compliant decisions.
If this analysis were to be carried out on case studies of states, as states are the primary
governance bodies within the regime to control biological weapons, there would be a need
to positively identify states that do not follow the norms of the regime.  However, it is not
always possible from outside of a state to identify with certainty which category — norm
compliant or norm non-compliant — a state is in.
There is potential additional complexity as the compliant/non-compliant distinction
has a number of possible layers of differentiation as highlighted in the discussion of the
Threat Ambition dimension identified as a form of success/failure hierarchy of the
demand side of the threat posed by biological weapons (see page 199 onwards).  This five
point plus null hierarchy would split states into six groups — users, integrators,
possessors, acquirers, aspirers, and regime compliant.  Any analysis would need to take
into account that these categories will include some states that are within the formal
elements of the regime to control biological weapons and some that are outside.  This
therefore would create twelve de facto categories for analysis.  For the analysis within this
Chapter, such a large number of categories would become too complex and would prove
highly repetitive without the benefit of necessarily providing any usable further
Chapter 9
240
1. The term ‘entities’ is used with some caution.  While the most obvious entities are governments as a
whole as well as ministries and agencies within governments there are also other entities involved
with governance in some form that is relevant to the regime in question; these would include
inter-governmental structures and professional bodies.
information.  If, at some future time, new information became available about entities
having been at particular stages of the Threat Ambition hierarchy at specific times, this
might form the basis of future research.
An alternative to creating such a large number of categories would be to reduce this to
three categories of states for the first stage of this examination — norm compliant states,
hedging states and norm non-compliant states.  Such categories might be defined in the
following terms:
• norm compliant — states which fully abide by the norms embodied in the
regime;
• hedging — aspirant states which consider or act upon policies to acquire
materials, technologies and knowledge that can have legitimate uses in order that
a latent weapons capacity might be established or maintained without the
necessity of a specific decision to acquire biological weapons being taken.2  This
may not be with the full knowledge or agreement of the entire structure of
government but might result from the activities of just a few individuals within
that structure;3 and
Another way to interpret hedging might be to consider it a distinguishing feature
between committed non-compliance and hesitant non-compliance with hedging
falling in the second category.
• norm non-compliant — states which have taken steps to act against the norms of
the regime.  Again, this may not be with the full knowledge or agreement of the
entire structure of government but might result from the activities of just a few
individuals within that structure.
While the categories of norm compliant and norm non-compliant would be unlikely to be
contested, the hedging category would be likely to be contested as not being clearly
defined; this would probably be a fair criticism.  On the other hand, as has been shown in
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2. This ambiguity of a possibly hedging state is clearly illustrate by events in the regime to control
nuclear weapons surrounding the activities of Iran.  Much of the difficulty in independently
determining the intentions of Iran with regard to its nuclear programme is that projects to acquire
relevant technical experience and expertise for a weapons programme can be carried out within a
peaceful energy-generation programme.
3. Examples of allegations of individuals in government labs carrying out activities prohibited by the
CBW regimes and seemingly without the knowledge of the relevant authorities include the case of
Wouter Basson in South Africa and Bruce Ivins in the USA.  In such cases, it can be difficult to
define in which category a government should be placed.
the discussion on Threat Ambition, there are gradations of norm non-compliance and so
there may be the possibility that unless analysis takes this into account such analysis may
be flawed.
After much consideration, only the two categories of compliant and non-compliant are
utilized in the analysis in the following paragraphs.  The influences of the regime are
likely to be different if any particular decision was in support of or in opposition to the
obligations of the regime.  The underlying assumption in any analysis would be that the
overarching policy decisions being taken in any given country are consistent with the
compliant/non-compliant perspectives of the state.  Within any hedging entities,
individual decisions would be either in support of or in opposition to the obligations of the
regime.
Hindrances for decisions in favour of regime compliance
Although this analysis primarily relates to decisions within governance systems
participating in the regime, many of the points also relate to non-members of the regime.
This will potentially be contested by those keen on a pure International Relations theory
view of regimes.  However, in the real world, members of a regime such as that to control
biological weapons hope through regime activities to influence the behaviour of those
outside of the regime — to comply with the norms of the regime and to join the regime.
Perhaps the classic example of this last point is the desires of those states that were within
the Chemical Weapons Convention to persuade Syria join that Convention after the use of
sarin nerve agent in Ghouta on 21 August 2013.4
In each of the hindrance/obstacle areas analysed below, any identification that the
regime contributes to overcoming obstacles should not be taken to imply that more could
not be done in that particular area.
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4. Syria wrote to the UN Secretary-General on 12 September 2013 indicating its intent to be bound by
the provisions of the CWC.  The letter is sent by the Syrian Ambassador to the UN in New York to
the Secretary-General which is said to transmit the information that a ‘legislative decree’ for joining
the Convention has been signed by President Assad.[United Nations Department of Public
Information, ‘Ban welcomes Syria’s letter on accession to treaty banning chemical weapons’, press
release, 12 September 2013.]  The formal instrument of accession is received by the UN treaties
office on 14 September, meaning that the entry into force of the Convention for Syria was to be 14
October 2013.[United Nations Secretary-General, Depositary Notification
C.N.592.2013.TREATIES-XXVI.3, 14 September 2013.]
‘recognizes a challenge’
In the case of the compliance with the regime to control biological weapons, the core of
the challenge to be recognised is the potential that biological materials could be used with
hostile intent to induce diseases and that action should be taken to reduce the potential
threat from such materials.
A typical example of a summary of perceived threats is this example from Malaysia:
Malaysia strongly believes that biological and toxin weapons continue to pose
threats to the international community.  We are concerned on the potential threat
for these biological agents and toxins being used as instruments of terror and
warfare.5
Policy area [and/or potential outcome] not seen as having sufficient priority.
All governments have a wide range of policy issues that they have to engage with and the
level of political attention any one of them receives at any particular time depends on
numerous factors.  With regard to biological weapons, governments which do not regard
themselves as being subject to a direct threat with biological weapons have tended to have
given the regime a lower priority.  This was highlighted by the European Union in its
activities to strengthen the regime:
Biological weapons risks were not seen as an acute problem for global security by
most of the countries involved, which consequently leads to low priority in
national political agendas compared with domestic political problem areas.
Nevertheless, strong commitment to regional and common security was
expressed, which may offer the opportunity to mobilize States to accede to the
BTWC and to establish and/or improve existing national legislation.6
Indeed, as Russia noted, for example, many governments had not taken the steps to even
join the BWC which lies at the heart of the overall regime.
A lot remains to be done to achieve complete universality of the Convention. The
States Parties should view this as a priority7
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5. Datuk Othman Hashim, Head of Delegation of Malaysia, plenary statement, BWC Seventh Review
Conference, 1 December 2008.
6. Portugal [on behalf of the European Union], ‘European Union Initiatives in Support of the BTWC’,
Working Paper, BWC/MSP/2007/MX/WP.1, 2 August 2007 , para 17.
7. Valery Loshchinin, Permanent Representative of Russia, plenary statement, BWC Meeting of States
Parties, 1 December 2008.
It is therefore clear that a potential obstacle to involvement within the regime to control
biological weapons is a lack of political priority.  With many multilateral obligations on
governments, an issue area such as the control of biological weapons may be seen as a low
priority, especially if the threat of use of biological weapons in the short-term is seen as
low.
However, some delegations at BWC meetings have been specific that the biological
weapons issues should be dealt with as a priority, for example:
Sweden attaches high priority to the reinforcement of the Biological and Toxic
Weapons Convention.8
This is not just a Western priority.  Delegations from other regions have also expressed
similar views, for example:
India attaches the highest priority towards the further strengthening of the BWC.9
No sense of expectation upon/within entity
Even when a government as a whole, or perhaps even when only those that hold power at
the centre, have identified a need to carry out activities in support of the regime, it is not
always clear who within the governance structures should actually be carrying out the
activities.  In the case of the regime to control biological weapons, a clear obstacle would
be that parts of governments might not perceive that there is an expectation upon them to
act in this issue area.
At the start of the twenty-first century, very few countries had implementation
arrangements that included representatives of a broad spread of government
departments.10  During the first decade of the century there was a significant increase in
states with a strong inter-departmental implementation, as will be illustrated below.
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8. Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations Office and
other International Organisations in Geneva, plenary statement, BWC Meeting of States Parties 10
November 2003.
9. Hamid Ali Rao, Ambassador & Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on
Disarmament, plenary statement, BWC Meeting of States Parties, 1 December 2008.
10. See, for example, Angela Woodward, Time to lay down the law, VERTIC, October 2003, 48pp.
The need for involvement of a number of ministries in implementation of regime
obligations was recognised in the efforts by the European Union to assist governments
with implementation matters.  For example, reporting on a Technical Assistance Visit to
Peru, the EU and Peru noted in a combined paper:
On the last day bilateral visits of the EU expert team, accompanied by the
Portuguese Ambassador as representative of the EU Presidency, confirmed the
results of the visit and the continued engagement and support on ministerial level.
On the part of Peru, the talks were held at the level of Minister (Justice), Vice
Minister (Industry), Director-General for Foreign Affairs (Defence) and Chief
Cabinet Advisor (Health). It was confirmed that all ministries are engaged with
the process and committed to achieving results.11
As an example of the new inter-departmentalism being implemented in this issue area,
Thailand informed the other BWC States Parties about the development of its own
inter-departmental arrangements:
A BWC Coordinating Committee headed by the Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Science and Technology was also appointed on 29 March 2006.  It is
composed of 19 members from 6 relevant ministries and has an initial mandate of
2 years.  Among its members are the representatives of agencies which serve as
national focal points for the Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Conventions.  We
hope that this will ensure a more comprehensive approach to the national
implementation of all these different but interrelated conventions.12
The difficulties of bringing together a diverse group of departments with a variety of
perspectives and functions, notwithstanding they all have roles and responsibilities in
relation to possible misuse of the life sciences were highlighted by Canada, on behalf of
the JACKSNNZ informal group:
Most countries face a dilemma: on the one hand, agriculture and health
departments traditionally have a health and safety mandate with an outlook of
protecting the population from infectious diseases, protecting national herd [sic]
and national produce, maintaining safety procedures within biological facilities,
and ensuring proper containment.  On the other hand, government departments
and agencies such as foreign ministries have a history and culture of focussing
[sic] on security. These traditional views and mandates are at the root of problems
we face as states parties to the BTWC.13
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11. Portugal [on behalf of the European Union] and Peru, ‘Assistance Activities for Implementing
BTWC Legislation in Peru’, Working Paper, BWC/MSP/2007/WP.6, 10 December 2007 , para 7.
12. Chaiyong Satjipanon, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand, plenary statement,
Sixth BWC Review Conference, 21 November 2006
13. Canada [for the ‘JACKSNNZ’ countries], ‘Biosafety and Biosecurity’, Working Paper,
Perceived as too large a challenge to deal with by any one entity [individual
contribution not seen as achieving anything]
This sub-section clearly has significant overlap with the previous one as it may apply to
separate elements within a governance structure that may perceive the challenge is too
great for them to deal with on an individual basis.  However, the focus in this sub-section
will be on governance structures as a whole.
The United States, for example, has recognized that the challenge of biological
weapons could not be handled in a purely unilateral manner:
President Obama has made it a top goal of his Administration to halt the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, because we view the risk of a bioweapons attack as
both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority.  In an age
when people and diseases cross borders with growing ease, bioweapons are a
transnational threat, and therefore we just protect against them with transnational
action.14
In addition to national and global activities, there are activities that can be carried out
at a regional level to enhance regime effectiveness.  This has been explicitly recognized
within the BWC inter-sessional processes; for example, one of the 2008 topics for
discussion was ‘National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and
biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins’.
If one entity puts in effort to tackle the challenge, other entities might benefit from this
effort without having incurred any costs [freeriding]
The potential for freeriding is high.  The government of a small or medium sized economy
benefits from a reduced global threat from biological weapons that derives from the




BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.17, 12 August 2008 , para 1.  JACKSNNZ is an informal grouping within
the BWC (pronounced ‘jacksons’ and sometimes referred to as the Jackson-7) that first appeared in
this form at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 comprising Japan, Australia, Canada, South
Korea, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand.
14. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, United States of America, plenary statement, Seventh
BWC Review Conference, 7 December 2011.  The ‘just protect’ may be a typo in the original
instead of ‘must protect’.
As there are additional costs in implementing verification arrangements, were they
ever to be agreed on an international basis, the negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the
BWC included proposals for clear benefits for being inside this element of the regime.15
Conclusions — ‘recognizes a challenge’
Statements of the threat posed by biological weapons reinforce the recognition of the
challenge and thus contribute to diminishing this particular potential obstacle.
By identifying the issues in more elaborate detail and thus identifying that diverse
arms of governance need to be involved in relevant issue, the regime can be seen to
contribute to diminishing the no expectation aspects of this potential obstacle.  As well as
the intellectual arguments, the need within many countries for representatives of relevant
ministries to meet in order that the country is capable of full participation in BWC
meetings provides a further contribution to diminishing this potential obstacle.
By bringing governments and other entities together, the regime contributes to
diminishing the ‘too large a challenge’ potential obstacle.  This is further reinforced by
promoting interaction on regional levels as well as national and global levels.
It would seem that there is little the regime can be seen to be contributing to
diminishing the free-riding aspects of this obstacle in a direct manner.  However, the more
that entities become active participants within the regime, the greater the diminution on
potential free-riding.
Overall, the regime can be seen to contribute to overcoming the ‘recognizes a
challenge’ potential obstacle by raising the profile of relevant issues.
‘identifies a course of action’
The potential obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Uncertainty whether any
action could make a real impact on the challenge’; ‘Uncertainty of process to be
undertaken’; ‘Uncertainty of what might be the optimum course of action’; and
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15. Such a trade-off was explicit withing the Chemical Weapons Convention.  Under the CWC there are
restrictions on trade between States Parties and non-States Parties.  This not only provides economic
encouragement for countries to join the CWC, it also assists in maximising the proportion of the
total global trade in certain chemicals that falls within the remit of the OPCW.
‘Uncertainty of what the next step might be’.  As there is a number of cross-cutting issues
within the potential obstacles these will be dealt with collectively.
There are multiple courses of action that any participant within the regime may take,
many of which do not exclude the possibility of any other course.  With so many choices,
any participant has to go through a process to identify any appropriate course(s) of action
for the context being considered.
There are many generic calls for action within the regime.  Two examples are used to
illustrate the point here:
Japan encourages all States Parties to take necessary national measures to
implement the Convention and also calls upon all States Not Party to the BWC to
join promptly.16
and:
The EU considers comprehensive implementation and universalisation of the
Convention to be areas of priority.17
There are many specific suggestions for courses of action that were put forward in
BWC Meeting of Experts and elsewhere within the regime.  Those compiled by the
secretariat during the inter-sessional process meetings are reproduced in Volume II and
some of these were elaborated in some detail in Chapter 8.
In a regime as complex as that to control biological weapons, there may easily be
doubt about whether any particular action might have a specific impact.  The interactive
nature of some of the regime activities provides an opportunity to learn lessons from other
participants in the regime.  This can happen through exchanges in the BWC meetings or
working papers submitted to those meetings.




16. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament,
plenary statement, BWC Meeting of Experts, 13 June 2005.
17. Ambassador Kari Kahiluoto, Permanent Representative of Finland to the Conference on
Disarmament, on behalf of the European Union, plenary statement, Sixth BWC Review Conference,
8 December 2006.
Interactive sessions are required to share knowledge, practices, procedures,
lessons learnt through personal as well as institutional experiences.18
From the earliest stages of the inter-sessional processes there was an identification that
there were issue areas where there would not be a ‘one size fits all’ solution.  For example,
South Africa noted in 2003:
We are confronted by the reality that the national measures to implement the
prohibitions of the Convention and the national mechanisms to establish and
maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins will
not be a case of ‘one size (or in this case ‘set of measures and mechanisms’) fits
all’.19
This recognition has been reiterated many times by other delegations on one or more
aspects of implementation issues within the regime to control biological weapons.
The exchange of information arrangements within the regime, primarily through the
BWC inter-sessional process, contributes to overcoming this part of this potential obstacle
as well for the first step aspects and so is discussed further in the sub-section below.
The interactive nature of some of the regime activities provides an opportunity to learn
lessons from other participants in the regime through information exchange both at the
formal BWC meetings but also in external regime-related activities such as regional
seminars.
Japan noted the following advantages of organizing regional seminars:
– Easy to participate because of geographic proximity
– Ideal opportunity to share each country’s experiences and expertise
– Possible to have concrete and frank discussions on the basis of common regional
interests20
South Africa noted:
The presentations that were made at the Meeting of Experts in August, and that
may be made at this Conference, are vehicles for us to inter alia demonstrate how
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18. Pakistan, presentation 22 August 2008, as summarised in Report of the Meeting of Experts,
BWC/MSP/2008/MX/3, dated 8 September 2008, page 34.
19. South Africa, plenary statement, BWC Meeting of States Parties 10 November 2003.
20. Satoshi TANIGUCHI, Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Japan, ‘Japan’s efforts toward regional cooperation on implementation of the
BWC’, presentation to the BWC Meeting of Experts, 22 August 2007
this work is done within our own countries; to provide the opportunity for us to
consider the measures and mechanisms being implemented elsewhere with a view
to seeing how our national systems may be enhanced or improved; and to form a
basis in terms of which assistance could be provided for the establishment,
enhancement or improvement of systems elsewhere.21
The concept of the exchange of information has been taken a step further with the
proposal by France of ‘peer review’ arrangements to enable further means by which
governments can learn from each other’s practical experience.22
It is a likely working assumption that greater opportunities for exchange of
experiences should lead to easier identification of possible courses of action.
Conclusions — ‘identifies a course of action’
The regime can be seen to contribute to diminishing this potential obstacle through the
identification of possible courses for action.  Moreover, by providing means by which
experiences of carrying out courses of action may be shared, the regime allows for greater
possibilities to identify appropriate courses of action, thus further contributing to
diminishing this potential hindrance.
Owing to the lack of ‘one size fits all’ solutions to some of the regime implementation
issues, the regime has some limitations in assisting participants to identify an optimum
course of action.
By providing means by which examples of courses of action taken by a number of
participants can be exchanged, the regime contributes to the diminishing of the optimum
course and first step potential hindrances.
‘benefit of one form or another’
The most obvious benefits of the regime to control biological weapons, assuming the
regime is effective, include a reduced threat from biological weapons and an enabling of
the peaceful trade in dual-use goods.  The bargain of the renunciation by States Parties of
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21. South Africa, plenary statement, BWC Meeting of States Parties 10 November 2003.
22. France, ‘Un mécanisme de revue par les pairs pour la CIAB: améliorer la confiance dans la mise en
oeuvre nationale et la coopération nationale’ [Peer-review mechanism for the BTWC: enhancing
confidence in national implementation and international [sic] cooperation], Working Paper,
BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011, 5pp.  The paper is based on the work of James Revill.
hostile uses of biological materials and technologies in return for freedom to gain the
benefits of the peaceful uses of them is embodied in Article X of the Convention.
Although most Western states have consistently put emphasis on the security aspects of
the bargain, states seeking greater economic development see access to peaceful uses as a
key justification for using precious governmental resources in their engagement with the
Convention.  The human cost of disease is widely recognised, but it is worth noting that
there are many parts of the world in which the economic costs of infectious disease have
a significant impact, not only through individuals being unable to be economically active
when they are unwell, but also through the efforts of others to take care of them.
Indonesia described the peaceful benefits of the regime in the following terms:
Indonesia is of the view that parties are not only obligated to implement all aspects
of the Convention, including its legal aspects, but also have the right to enjoy the
benefits derived from the provisions contained in the Convention. One of these
benefits is the possibility of procuring biological materials, equipment and
technology for peaceful purposes from other states parties. Therefore, Indonesia
also wishes to stress the significance of international cooperation as one of the
important pillars of the Convention.23
Many participants in BWC meetings have focused on identifying and highlighting
benefits of the regime, for example:
Generally speaking, there are two potential benefits from accession to the BWC
membership: security and economic.  The security benefits come from the
removal of all biological weapons from the globe, and this is the primary purpose
and benefit of the BWC.  The economic benefits emanate from increased
cooperation in the peaceful uses of biotechnology.24
There are very general benefits that the regime brings that have been identified from
time to time.  For example, Australia noted that disease surveillance activities are needed
for both naturally occurring as well as deliberately induced diseases to enable trade in the
food and agricultural sectors:
Timely and detailed regional surveillance for infectious disease outbreaks or
epidemics is essential to Australia’s security.  This is particularly so for diseases
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23. Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti, Indonesia, plenary statement, Meeting of States Parties, 10
November 2003.
24. Republic of Korea, ‘Universality of the BWC’, Working Paper, BWC/CONF.VI/WP.19, 17
November 2006, paragraph 4.
which may have major impact on health and international trade, and also for the
ability to detect and recognise the possible deliberate release of an infectious
agent.  Most crucial is the ability to detect novel or unusual diseases quickly and
specifically so that surveillance is a real-time process.25
Benefit not perceived or understood
Benefits of the regime are not always perceived clearly, especially in governance
structures of states and other entities which regard themselves as being neither subject to
a direct threat with biological weapons nor a source of threat (even inadvertently).  Even
when there are direct perceptions of biological threats, weaknesses of the regime may
make the perceived benefit less valuable:
However, it appears that joining the BWC has not invited a full sense of security
due to the shortcomings inherent in the Convention.  These include the difficulty
of ensuring full implementation and compliance by States Parties, which
undermines the effectiveness of the treaty in dealing with biological threats.  This
may have deterred many prospective Parties from joining the BWC.26
This governmental perspective has been echoed by non-governmental analysis:
The treaty regime of the BTWC is still developing and should continue to do so
for a very long time.  Its greatest limitation, however, is the absence of meaningful
verification and transparency-enhancing measures. This means that the security
benefits from the treaty are less than they could be.27
The benefits of regime participation are seen by some as going far beyond classic
security interests, for example:
I think in the areas of disease surveillance, biosecurity, national enforcement of
legislation and preventing the misuse of research, there is substantial work that
will make a measurable difference, we think, in all of those areas. Some of that
work will aid us in preventing biology being used as a weapon, but there are also
secondary benefits which in some cases may not frankly be secondary. They might
be co-equal.  When you look at, for example, the work in disease surveillance,
there is an obviously public health benefit there.  There’s an obvious benefit to
developing countries from improved capabilities to examine instances of disease
outbreaks and to determine whether they are naturally occurring or whether they
are suspicious in nature or perhaps have a biological weapons tie.28
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25. Australia, ‘Regional Networks: The Case for Integration and Coordination’, Working Paper,
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.27, 20 July 2004, para 1.
26. Republic of Korea, ‘Universality of the BWC’, Working Paper, BWC/CONF.VI/WP.19, 17
November 2006, paragraph 5.
27. Jean Pascal Zanders, Chemical and Biological Warfare Project Leader,  Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, NGO statement, Fifth BWC Review Conference, 21 November 2001.
Many suggestions were made within meetings of the Convention to initiate outreach
activities to promote the benefits of the Convention, and by extension, the regime:
using, as appropriate, bilateral contacts with States not parties, and regional and
multilateral fora, to promote the political, security and economic benefits of
ratification or accession to the Convention.29
The particular suggestion quoted above was made at the Sixth BWC Review
Conference and the Final Document from that Conference included :
Their reiteration that the effective contribution of the Convention to international
peace and security will be enhanced through universal adherence to the
Convention, and their call on signatories to ratify and other states not party to
accede to the Convention without delay.30
Skills or capacities may be missing and creating them would be beyond the means
available
The need for capacity building within some states, especially those with fewer economic
resources, is widely recognized within the regime.  This is implicit recognition of lack of
capacity as a hindrance to regime implementation and thus effectiveness.  The President
of the Sixth BWC Review Conference, Ambassador Masood Khan, who was also Chair
of the 2007 annual meetings, noted during the Meeting of Experts:
A further important point, which was alluded to in several presentations, is that
there is a need to help States Parties build capacity.  It is not enough to provide
guidance on enacting legislation and regulations: States Parties need practical
assistance to build their capacity to enforce and manage such measures.31
With much of the focus of the second inter-sessional process on disease surveillance,
some officials identified particular benefits from capacity building in this particular area
which would enhance the overall regime:
There has also been much valuable direct collaboration on health-security
capacity-building.  As an example, Australia has been working with partners in
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28. John C Rood, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, United
States of America, press conference at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, 20 November 2006
[transcript as circulated by the US mission to Geneva].
29. Australia, ‘An Action Plan for Realising the Universalisation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention’, Working Paper, BWC/CONF.VI/WP.15, 17 November 2006, paragraph 5.
30. Sixth Review Conference, Biological Weapons Convention, ‘Final Declaration’, BWC/CONF.VI/6,
dated December 2006, preambular paragraph ix.
31. Amb. Masood Khan (Pakistan), Chair, BWC Meeting of Experts, 24 August 2007, closing remarks.
our region to help build capacity in disease surveillance systems. In one such
program, Australia is working with partners in our region to build animal health
institutions to increase capacity to recognise new diseases emerging in animals
which may also infect humans. The health and security benefits of such
collaborations are clear.32
Benefit outweighed by cost
There is an inherent difficulty in making a quantitative assessment of benefits of active
participation in a regime like that to control biological weapons.  While most governance
structures use financial value as the basic measure to assess worthiness of activities, many
of the benefits of participation in the regime to control biological weapons are not truly
financially quantifiable, such as security and health.33
The need to overcome this obstacle has been specifically noted in BWC meetings, for
example:
it was suggested that it is important to ... Demonstrate that the costs of
development, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct do not outweigh the
benefits’34
A number of interventions (most of which have no lasting record) within the meeting
addressed this point.
It should be noted that this sub-section is a mirror of the section on costs outweighing
benefits below.
Conclusions — ‘benefit of one form or another’
The regime can be seen to contribute to overcoming this potential obstacle of
unregignised or costly benefits through economic as well as health and security benefits
for participants.




32. Peter Woolcott, Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament and Ambassador for
Disarmament, Australia, plenary statement, Seventh BWC Review Conference, 5 December 2011.
33. Indeed, this was key point in the development of the conjectured generic idealized policy decision,
that there are incommensurable aspects of policy.
34. Report of the Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2005/3, dated 14 December 2005, p 10.
‘cost — whether in resource terms, opportunity costs or political costs’
The potential obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Costs of a course of action
may be perceived as not worth pursuing’; ‘Costs outweigh the benefits’; and ‘True costs
misunderstood or perceived incorrectly’.
As with most areas of public expenditure, there is a consideration of costs of activities,
and a key set of decisions within the BWC are the costs of running the meetings.
However, while there are concepts regarding value for money that are used in relation to
a regime like that to control biological weapons, explicit references have not been
included within consensus documents from the BWC regarding the regime as a whole,
although there has been some attention paid to these issues at a lower level.35
There is greater freedom for researchers and commentators to comment on the record
on these issues:
The value of effective, sustained biological disarmament — undertaken in a
manner that encourages peaceful cooperation — is priceless. However, achieving
this will entail financial and political costs, and the choice of any one route towards
strengthening the convention over another may entail opportunity costs. None of
these costs can be realistically predicted in advance; but if there is appetite to do
something towards strengthening the convention in a time of austerity, then
financial costs cannot be ignored.36
There is an inherent difficulty in assessing overall costs of active regime participation,
as well as the benefits.  Many costs of participating in the regime are relatively diffuse
owing to the diffuse nature of the regime. While costs of personnel who are working
primarily on regime issues can be identified with some ease, the broad nature of regime
activities leads to a situation where there are many people with responsibilities that
impinge upon regime activities.  Identifying the true cost of such personnel in regime
activities would prove difficult.  This uncertainty may lead to a perception that costs are
greater than they really are.
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35. The author has some personal experience of this, having been appointed as one of three experts by
the European Commission to make a value for money assessment of the assistance given to the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons through EU Joint Actions.  The resulting
report from this study is not public and so aspects cannot be cited.  However, the experience of
preparation of the report has informed the work within this thesis.
36. James Revill and Caitriona McLeish, ‘Estimating the costs of compliance options for the BWC’,
Trust & Verify, no 151, October/December 2015 [published January 2016], pp 1-5 at p 5.
Conclusions — ‘cost — whether in resource terms, opportunity costs or political costs’
The regime can be seen to contribute to overcoming this group of potential obstacles by
identifying benefits to reduce relative costs to benefits obtained.  The regime also
contributes to reducing costs through the learning from the experience of others at
organizational levels and through the exchange of experiences between individuals who
are brought in contact with each other through the regime.  Costs for some regime
participants can also be reduced by introducing outside assistance to build capacity (see
section above on capacity issues).
‘coincident with the influences that those able to express power might bring to bear’
For the regime to be effective, implementation arrangements must be balanced between
those able to express power:
To be effective, then, as well as acceptable, or indeed legitimate, national
legislation implementing the international obligations of the BTWC requires the
commitment of regulators and research centres to a meaningful discourse,
opportunities for civil society to have appropriate access to the conversations, a
balanced distribution of power and authority between the different actors, and,
finally, trust and accountability between participants.37
Those in power lose power/status from the decision
While the regime to control biological weapons would be unlikely to reduce power or
status of those in power, there would be opportunity costs involved for any power
structure being involved with the regime.  Unlike early periods, NACD activities do not
carry the glamour that would attract the attention of those in power.
There is one aspect that does particularly affect governments with presidential
systems.  In such systems, it is easier to carry out foreign policy that has no direct
domestic impact as domestic impact means dealing with domestic ministries and other
domestic institutions over which there may be other arms of government also exercising
power.
If many ministries or departments are involved, this can become a dilution of power
in all forms of constitutional governments.  For example a foreign ministry will be used to
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37. Filippa Lentzos and Nicholas Sims, London School of Economics, informal plenary statement, Sixth
BWC Review Conference, 21 November 2006.
dealing with defence and trade ministries but might expend time and/or political capital in
creating links with health or education ministries.  Foreign ministries may be opposed to
greater involvement of domestic ministries in issues they regard as their ‘turf’.38
The regime contributes to the creation of an expectation of what good governance
includes.  Germany, on behalf of the EU, made a specific point on this:
Ideally legislation should name empowered authorities, which must be equipped
with sufficient capacities and resources.  Further, there must be a degree of
specialisation ensuring the proper application of the law.  This amounts to good
governance in the administration of any legislation that serves the handling,
including transfers, and control of agents and toxins of concern.39
Those in power don’t understand the purpose of the decision
It should be noted at the outset that the subject matter of this sub-section does not
necessarily equate with issues around economic and similar benefits of the regime, but is
about outcomes that are in the interests of those able to express power but that may not be
well understood.
Many of the positive outcomes of regime activities are not immediately apparent:
The mutual benefits arising through bilateral animal health projects in the region
are usually obvious. However Australia’s involvement in multilateral animal
health activities, both globally and regionally, generally has less obvious mutual
benefits related to systems and standards development.40
One of the EU’s collective activities within the regime has been funding workshops to
illustrate the benefits (in a broad sense) of joining the Convention that is the centrepiece
of the regime to control biological weapons.  As noted in the legal document that
established funding for a series of workshops in different regions of the world: 
The aim of the workshops will be to encourage greater membership and thereby
enhanced implementation of the BTWC in these regions and to explain the
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38. This has not been directly or overtly referred to in on-the-record interactions but has been implied
by the words and actions of particular individuals.  This issue would be worth further research that
goes beyond the current thesis.
39. Germany [on behalf of the European Union], ‘Assessment of National Implementation of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)’, Working Paper, BWC/CONF.VI.WP.3, 20
October 2006, para 21.
40. Australia, ‘Improving Regional Surveillance Efforts: Animal Health - Australia’s Contribution’,
Working Paper, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.29, 20 July 2004, para 36.
benefits and consequences of acceding to the BTWC and to understand the needs
of the States not Party to the BTWC in order to assist their accession and offer EU
technical and drafting assistance to States in need.41
The nature of language used within diplomacy means it would be unlikely for an official
representative of a government or inter-governmental body to suggest that there was a
lacuna in other governments in understanding something like the regime to control
biological weapons.  In essence, this statement from the EU can be read as a direct
acknowledgement of this obstacle.
Conclusions — ‘coincident with the influences that those able to express power might
bring to bear’
The regime can be seen to contribute to overcoming this potential obstacle by generating
awareness of its purpose and function.  In addition, by creating a norm of involvement
with the regime, those in power in the diverse entities that might be involved in the regime
encourages increased participation.
‘coincident with interests of those affected’
For developing countries, the importance of Article X is significant as the peaceful
interactions in the biological sciences underpin advances in human, animal and plant
health as well as being of economic significance.  Developed countries also benefit from
greater freedom of trade in peaceful uses of the life sciences.
Participants in the regime have indicated some changes occurring  in the economic
arena of the life sciences:
... in the biosciences, the distinction between developing and developed countries
is simply breaking down.  There’s a lot of what we used to call Third World
countries that are doing extremely sophisticated science. There’s lots of
South-South cooperation. It’s not just relationships being redefined between
donors and recipients, but also between partners and collaborators.42
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Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in the framework of the EU Strategy against the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, an act adopted under Title V of the Treaty on
European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 7 March 2006, L65/51-55, Annex,
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42. Ambassador Laura Kennedy, United States of America, as quoted in: Daniel Horner and Jonathan B.
Tucker, ‘Common Ground on the BWC: An Interview With U.S. Special Representative Laura
Kennedy’, Arms Control Today, June 2011.
Trade within the regime to control biological weapons relies in part on regime
activities being seen as being effective in reducing the potential for misuse of those items
being traded.  There are also the issues relating to food and agriculture trade highlighted
in the benefits section above (see page 252).  Potential economic losses could occur for
entities if they are not seen as in compliance with the regime.
Costs and benefits do not fall in the same places
While it could be argued that there is a universal benefit within any jurisdiction from a
reduced potential threat from biological weapons, costs are borne by some specific areas.
While the regime may assist economically beneficial trade (as noted in the section on
benefits) such as in the area of agriculture, the economic benefits do not fall to the same
firms that would bear additional costs through having to participate in transfer control
arrangements.  This is a general difficulty in multifaceted policy realms.  
Costs and benefits may be of different types
As with the sub-section above, this is a general difficulty in multifaceted policy realms.
The regime to control biological weapons has little specifically to offer in this regard other
than the creation of forums in which policy is discussed which allows for more informed
choices to be made on policy options.
Conclusions — ‘coincident with interests of those affected’
The regime can be seen to contribute to overcoming this potential obstacle enhancing
measures that bring economic and health benefits in addition to the classic security
benefits.
‘support from the intellectual and moral arguments’
The potential obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Not perceived as the correct
thing to do’; ‘Intellectual arguments exist suggesting other courses of action’; and ‘Lack
of knowledge or skills available’.
Despite many calls for evidence-based policy making within governance structures,
the intellectual and moral arguments are often not the main locus of decision making.
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Indeed, morality and intellect are seen as needing to be balanced with practical action, for
example:
we often get bogged down with moral principles and lofty ideals that are without
real value unless and until we put them into practice by way of
internationally-binding agreements as well as domestic policies and measures that
give substance to those principles and ideals.43
On the question of whether actions are not perceived as the correct thing to do, regime
interactions provide illustrations of preferable activities to carry out.  Some of these are
connected to concepts of what good governance should entail.  These expectations may be
elaborated through regime activities.
The issues surrounding the potential obstacle of lack of knowledge or skills available
has considerable overlap with the sub-section on capacity building, above.
Conclusions — ‘support from the intellectual and moral arguments’
The regime can be seen to contribute to overcoming this group of potential obstacles
through interactions that include moral and intellectual arguments and creation of
expectations of what good governance is this field should be.
Section conclusions
This first use of the conjectured generic idealized policy decision constitutes an
examination of both the regime and of the conjectured decision.
It has resulted in clear indications of the influence of regime activities on potential
obstacles to policy development in the arena of controls on biological weapons.
However, owing to the basic formulation of this examination, this provides strong
evidence of regime influence on behaviour (and in some particular facets, extremely
strong evidence), but it would be hard to extend this to claim proof of this influence
without further work on the conjectured generic idealized policy decision to enhance the
credibility of this tool.
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43. Enrique A. Manalo, Ambassador & Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United
Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, plenary statement, BWC Meeting of
States Parties, 10 November 2003.
Lessons learned at this stage of the development of the conjectured generic idealized
policy decision include that there is more work needed to fine tune overlaps between
cost/benefit sections and those on capacities/skills which may enable some reduction in
duplication of particular elements.  Implications of further work on the conjectured
generic idealized policy decision are included in the conclusions Chapter of this thesis.
SIPRI seven activities to acquire CBW weapons
Before analysis of the obstacles identified within the conjectured generic idealized policy
decision to a policy in favour of acquisition of biological weapons and how these interact
with the regime to control biological weapons, there is value in examining some earlier
analysis on the process of acquisition of chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
capabilities in order to improve the analytical context for the final section of this Chapter.
As part of the work into the six-volume series, SIPRI researchers identified a number
of steps that an entity acquiring CBW weapons would be likely to undertake.  These were
summarized in seven areas of activities: administrative, research, development, testing,
production, storage and doctrine.44
The identification of these activities follows an approach that is complementary to the
identification of the success/failure hierarchy that underpins the Threat Ambition
dimension (see page 199).
Administrative activities
Activities in the area of administrative and budgetary policy were summarized in these
terms:
1. Administrative and budgetary activity in the policy-making arena.  Politicians,
administrators, scientists and the military have to review alternatives, make
decisions whether to start or continue a chemical or biological weapons
programme, draw up plans and budgets and supervise their execution.  Activity
here is a prerequisite of activity down the line.
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44. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Prevention of CBW, The Problem of
Chemical and Biological Warfare, [volume V of the six volume series The Problem of Chemical
and Biological Warfare], (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1971)287 pp at pp 141-43.
These activities require an expression of desire to acquire the relevant weapons by some
element of the policy system that should normally be expressed before any real effort to
actually acquire components starts.  As noted earlier, only some elements within a
governance structure may be involved, or even aware, of decisions to acquire prohibited
weapons.
This applies best to democratic systems of governance, although all governments (and
non-state actors) would have to take decisions to allocate resources to a biological
weapons programme within overall government budgetary processes.
Research activities
Activities relating to research were summarized in the following terms:
2. Research, which entails the discovery and study of toxic or infective substances
and mechanisms for their dissemination. The discovery of a possible new BW or
CW agent or family of possible agents may be an accidental by-product of
academic, public health or industrial research or it may be the fruit of research
commissioned or conducted by the military.  An inspectorate probably could not,
with certainty, say from the apparent nature of the work (without knowledge of its
intent) whether it was part of a military programme. It might find it highly
suspicious and watch it closely.
It is worth noting that the term ‘research’ is not included in the key terms highlighting the
prohibitions within Article I of the BWC45 — the first of the two lacunae in the BWC
identified by Sims (see page 93).
Development activities
Activities relating to development were summarized in the following terms:
3. Development. When research yields promising new candidate CBW agents,
they will be sifted.  The more promising ones will then (a) be tested more intensely
as regards toxicity and other properties to assess their suitability as CW or BW
agents; (b) work will be done on the problems of producing them on the required
scale, including the building of a pilot plant or plants; and (c) during this phase,
work will be begun on the design or adaptation of dissemination mechanisms for
use in weapons (e.g., bombs, spray tanks, etc.).  During this phase the activity
becomes explicitly military and begins to go beyond the point considered
necessary for the design of defensive measures. We shall use the word
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45. The key terms are ‘develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain’.
“development” to describe work which is explicitly and visibly military and the
term “development of an offensive capability” to describe development work
which goes beyond the point necessary for the design of defensive measures.
Notwithstanding that research is not included as an Article I prohibition, the BWC obliges
States Parties not to ‘develop’ weapons, although there is no clear consensus
understanding of what constitutes development.  This makes the SIPRI description above
particularly helpful.
Testing activities
Activities relating to testing were summarized in the following terms:
4. Field testing will be undertaken as development proceeds, leading up to the
demonstration of the weapon to the military in an “evaluation” exercise so that
they can decide whether to adopt it.  This is plainly a military activity and one for
the most part needed only for offensive preparations; that holds for all activities
that follow.
There have been a number of developments in the CBW arena since the development of
these seven stages.  While CBW programmes in the 1930s and the 1960s, for example,
had large testing programmes, later programmes such as those in Iraq and Syria focused
far less on testing activities.  A working hypothesis would be that it was easier to carry out
a comprehensive testing programme at a time when development of such weapons wasn’t
considered such a taboo activity, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis, except to note
that the widespread norm against such weapons would raise the political costs of testing
activities.
Production activities
Activities relating to production were summarized in the following terms:
5. Production of the agent must be organized, entailing the building of a plant with
the required safety measures for the manufacture of the agents as well as providing
for a supply of raw materials (a bigger task for CW than BW agents). Production
or adaptation of weapons to carry and disseminate the agent must also be
organized, as well as the procurement of the inputs needed there.
Scientific and technological developments have meant that the scale of facilities to
produce biological agents has been reduced considerably in recent decades, particularly
through advances in genetic techniques, fermenter technologies and synthetic biology.
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Adaptation or production of munitions to disperse biological agents has also become
technologically easier as a result of engineering advances and finer tolerances of machine
tools, for example.
Storage activities
Activities relating to research were summarized in the following terms:
6. Once production is started, it is necessary to transport and store the CW or BW
agent either in bulk or in filled weapons.  For the sake of dispersal, all the stocks
are not likely to be at the place of production, though the difficulties of storage
may prevent great dispersal.  This applies particularly to biological weapons.
With hindsight, this is the area of activities that has the least closest fit to unfolding
realities.  While some of the historical CBW programmes followed this pattern, the
chemical weapons programmes by Iraq in the 1980s did not rely so heavily on storage but
on production of materials close to the moment of use.
Doctrinal activities
Activities relating to doctrines and training were summarized in the following terms:
7. It is necessary to develop military doctrine for the use of the weapons, to train
troops and conduct exercises, but this will also be done for defensive purposes,
and the two—defensive and offensive training—will be hard to distinguish.
As the use of CBW moved from being tactical military weapons to being strategic
political weapons the need for training in use became less prominent.  However, an entity
with ambitions to acquire a significant CBW weapons capacity would still need to test.
Section conclusions
The SIPRI seven areas of activities provide a useful insight into possible perspectives of
potential non-compliant states.
Each of these groups of activities involve efforts by entities that wish to be
non-compliant with the regime (whether in the regime or not) and thus also policy
decisions to initiate and then continue those efforts.  There are therefore a number of
aspects upon which the regime to control biological weapons may have influence.
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Hindrances for decisions against regime compliance
As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, the regime has to be examined against
possible decision processes that may lead to policy activities that run counter to the aims
of the regime.  While the key aspect in the earlier section examining policy processes that
were in support of the aims of the regime was whether the regime could reduce the
potential obstacles to policy developments, the key aspect in this section is whether the
regime could be seen to enhance or maginfy the potential obstacles/hindrances that would
impede policy developments toward non-compliance with the aims of the regime.
This analysis includes impacts on non-participants in the regime as well as
participants.  Unless specifically referred to otherwise, regime influences highlighted here
may apply to decision-making processes both inside and outside of the regime.
This section will be briefer than that looking at decisions in favour of regime
compliance, as most detailed regime  activities are, by their very nature, focused on
positive behaviour towards the regime within participant entities.  Indeed, it is extremely
rare for there to be positive statements in favour of biological weapons programmes.  The
statements the author has on the record in favour of acquisition of biological weapons all
predate the negotiation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
This section should be read in conjunction with the discussion on the identification of
the success/failure hierarchy that underpins the Threat Ambition dimension (see page 199
onwards).
‘recognizes a challenge’
The obstacles identified under this heading are: ‘Policy area [and/or potential outcome]
not seen as having sufficient priority’; ‘No sense of expectation upon/within entity’;
‘Perceived as too large a challenge to deal with by any one entity [individual contribution
not seen as achieving anything]’; and ‘If one entity puts in effort to tackle the challenge,
other entities might benefit from this effort without having incurred any costs
[freeriding]’.
In the case of policies towards non-compliance with the regime to control biological
weapons, the core of the challenge to be recognised is the potential for deliberate disease
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so that biological materials could be used with hostile intent to induce diseases and that
action should be taken to exploit the potential threat from such materials.
Biological weapons are political weapons more than military weapons and this
therefore leads to a different set of policy actors from normal military programmes.
The regime can be seen to contribute to reinforcing this group of potential obstacles in
a number of ways.  The potential for freeriding was much higher when there were
biological weapons programmes from which experience could be acquired, such as the
utilisation by the United States after the Second World War of information from the
Japanese biological warfare programme of the 1930s and 1940s.  Fewer biological
weapons programmes equates with fewer opportunities to gain experience from others.
More fundamentally, if the norms of the regime are strongly communicated and
globally promoted there should be no expectation on any entity to acquire biological
weapons.
The drivers for satisfying security and prestige concerns are currently better satisfied
through other means as biological weapons are no longer considered a currency of power.
Thus the regime can be seen to reinforce this group of potential obstacles.
‘identifies a course of action’
The obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Uncertainty whether any action could
make a real impact on the challenge’; ‘Uncertainty of process to be undertaken’;
‘Uncertainty of what might be the optimum course of action’; and ‘Uncertainty of what
the next step might be’.
There are multiple courses of action that any norm non-compliant entity may take,
many of which do not exclude the possibility of any other course.  With so many choices,
any participant has to go through a process to identify any appropriate course(s) of action
for the context being considered.
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The reduction in state-run biological weapons programmes over the past half-century
or so reduces the possibilities of learning from the experience of others.  Regime activities
promote awareness of being careful with relevant weapons design information.
The imposition of transfer controls leads to uncertainty about reliability of supplies
which complicates potential courses of action.  A sub-optimal biological weapons
development programme could result in no operational weapons, yet result in similar
international opprobrium as a programme that had produced operational weapons.  In
such a case the sub-optimal effort may be worse than no effort at all.
Therefore the regime can be seen to contribute to reinforcing this group of potential
obstacles.
‘benefit of one form or another’
The obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Benefit not perceived or understood’;
‘Skills or capacities may be missing and creating them would be beyond the means
available’; and ‘Benefit outweighed by cost’.
Benefits of a biological weapons programme have historically been seen as focused on
security issues.  In more recent times there have been fears of how deliberate disease
could be used to spread terror.  There may also be technological spin offs and an increase
in an entity’s collective absorptive capacity. All have to be balanced against costs.  Any
benefits of a biological weapons programme diminish as resilience of those that might be
targetted increases.  It is to the advantage of the regime if any benefits that might accrue
from a biological weapons programme are not always perceived.
Any political and security benefits of acquiring biological weapons would come with
significant political and security costs (see the following section).  As with examination of
obstacles relating to compliant states, this sub-section has an element of mirroring the
sub-section on costs.
The regime can be seen to contribute to reinforcing this group of potential obstacles
by reducing perceived benefits of non-compliance.
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‘cost — whether in resource terms, opportunity costs or political costs’
The potential obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Costs of a course of action
may be perceived as not worth pursuing’; ‘Costs outweigh the benefits’; and ‘True costs
misunderstood or perceived incorrectly’.
The area of costs gets into difficult concepts of value for money; in other words, how
much security or other perceived advantage is purchased at a particular price.  In terms of
regime activities, a potential perpetrator would also have to consider how much insecurity
is also purchased in the same transactions. The regime as a whole has influence in this
regard.  Cost calculations would also have to include opportunity costs such as increased
diversion of talented personnel from other purposes.
There are a number of historical lessons of the maintenance (or the suspicion of
maintenance) of covert programmes of weapons covered by international regimes.
Examples of cases include Iraq, Libya, Syria and South Africa.  Each has a number of
distinct lessons that may influence a potential perpetrator of a programme for weapons
covered by an international regime and implications for the costs involved.
The regime can be seen to contribute to reinforcing this group of potential obstacles
by increasing perceived costs of non-compliance.
‘coincident with the influences that those able to express power might bring to bear’
The obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Those in power lose power/status from
the decision’; and ‘Those in power don’t understand the purpose of the decision’.
Weapons programmes, historically, were seen as prestige programmes, especially for
any kinds of weapon that had any kind of high political profile.  A sense of the prestige,
or lack of, that biological weapons brings can be understood following the observation
that there is no government in the world with an overt biological weapons programme.
While this reduction in states with overt biological weapons programmes correlates with
the development of the regime against such weapons it is difficult to prove causation, the
regime may be presumed to reinforce this potential obstacle.
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‘coincident with interests of those affected’
The obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Costs and benefits do not fall in the
same places’; and ‘Costs and benefits may be of different types’.
In terms of policy processes leading to non-compliance with the regime to control
biological weapons, this is the group of potential obstacles that the regime probably has
the least influence on.
‘support from the intellectual and moral arguments’
The potential obstacles identified under this heading were: ‘Not perceived as the correct
thing to do’; ‘Intellectual arguments exist suggesting other courses of action’; and ‘Lack
of knowledge or skills available’.
A clear hindrance to a potential biological weapons programme, if the regime was
acting in a practically effective manner, would be a sense that pursuit of prohibited
weapons was not the right thing to do.  Therefore, the regime should hopefully reinforce
this group of obstacles.
As noted within the analysis of policy processes towards compliance with the regime,
this group of issues is not often main locus of decision making, but in this case they
broadly work against the development of a biological weapons capability.
Conclusions
The conjectured generic idealized policy decision is an analytical tool derived from
practical experience of real-world policy making. It is not yet fully formed and should be
regarded as a first attempt to create a theoretical abstraction of that experience and the
experience of others.  However, this Chapter shows the conjectured generic idealized
policy decision has potential to highlight particular aspects in a decision area such as the
control of biological weapons.
This Chapter, using the conjectured generic idealized policy decision, shows that the
regime to control biological weapons can both reinforce the principles, rules and
obligations of the regime while at the same time can reinforce obstacles to decisions to
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carry out activities prohibited by the regime.  However there are some weaknesses in this
process which will be discussed below.
A conclusion can be drawn that the identified conjectured generic idealized policy
decision obstacles appear to coincide with real-world situations.  The conjectured generic
idealized policy decision therefore passes a basic test of rationality, such that it has a
match with real-world experience of government representatives and others dealing with
biological weapons control issues.
The key weakness is that the method used here is a novel method and while some
testing was carried out in the development of the conjectured generic idealized policy
decision, this is the first full scale test of the new method.  It would therefore be
productive to attempt to use the novel tool in other issue areas in order to make a fuller
assessment of its utility.  There would also be some benefit in further work on the
definitions of particular aspects of the conjectured generic idealized policy decision in
order to reduce the overlaps in the cost and benefit sections and those in the capacities and
skills sections.
As to the analysis within this Chapter, the first part examining policy processes
towards compliance with the regime has distinct credibility.  It is possible to match the
provisions within the conjectured generic idealized policy decision with a range of on the
record sources.  The latter part examining policy processes towards non-compliance with
the regime is much weaker.  A contribution to this weakness may simply be the lack of
public statements in favour of acquisition of biological weapons since the regime to
control biological weapons became underpinned by the Biological Weapons Convention.
Another contribution may be that there is no extensive literature on why it is that entities
develop biological weapons and the influences on their decisions (although this might be
a problem deriving from the overall success of the regime — fewer programmes equates
to fewer case studies to examine).  This has left this latter section having to be illustrated
with very general statements about possible regime influences on the identified potential
hindrances/obstacles.
Nevertheless, the examinations carried out within this Chapter do enhance





This Chapter contains the overall conclusions of the thesis.  It starts with some general
findings that put the work of the thesis in context.  The basic assumptions described in the
Chapter 1 are explored.  There then follows an elaboration of the activities carried out to
fulfil the objectives of this thesis which leads into a revisiting of the Research Questions
to explore how well they had been answered.  Limitations relating to the research are then
explored, followed by some thoughts of what further research could be pursued in future,
based on the knowledge generated during the work for this thesis.  The Chapter concludes
with some observations on the real world problems explored in this thesis.
General findings
Before moving on to specifics, there are some general findings that have emerged from
the work carried out for this thesis that are worth highlighting.  Some of these are
observations rather than results of deliberative research activities however they put other
elements of the work contained within this thesis into context.
The first is that it is absolutely clear that there is no common perception within the
regime to control biological weapons on either the scope of all issues to be dealt with nor
on how they should be dealt with.  Analysis of any problem is inherently easier when
common perceptions exist.
A second is that there are language issues that are relevant to the research.  Most of the
work within the inter-sessional process (and other international meetings) is carried out in
English.  However, the language of diplomacy means that terms can carry loaded
meanings beyond what might be understood in everyday use or, indeed, in academic
usage.  There is also a standardization of language used that can be helpful in some cases
but cause confusion in others.
A third is that the shrill tone of much that is written about the possibility of terrorist
use of biological weapons has had a dominant influence on much public debate and
discourse.  While this has not drowned out the more analytical commentators on the
subject matter, it has meant that analysts reaching measured conclusions have had some
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difficulties having their voice heard.  The ‘incestuous inter-quote’ problem that was
highlighted in Chapter 3 has made the difficulties of delineating between allegations and
confirmed cases much more pronounced.
A fourth is that human factors are important.  Individuals within the regime operate in
more than one environment — a government official may participate in a regime meeting
both as a representative of that government but may at the same time have influence
within the policy- and decision-making processes of that government and within regime
structures.  Therefore, people step across the boundaries that often exist between realms
and units of analysis used by various analytical tools.  Further human factors arise as
major differences can occur in the type and level of engagement of delegation depending
on who is on it or who is writing instructions from the capital — there are regular changes
owing to routine staff rotations.  Officials may have significantly varying influences, or
even motivations, relating to policy development depending on individual preferences or
where they reside within policy structures.
A final general finding is the observation made in Chapter 7 that there are some
commonalities in how policy development structures, such as committees, work whether
they are local committees within an academic institution or the UN Security Council.
Policy making has a fractal-like characteristic to it; as the level of magnification increases
to increase the level of detail in how policy is derived, the nature of the underlying
influences remains the same – the interaction of people following influences in the three
areas identified in the thesis — power/status, finance/resources and intellect/knowledge.
The basic assumptions reexamined
In Chapter 1, six basic assumptions underpinning the work within this thesis were made
explicit.  Before examining in detail the results deriving from the specific Research
Questions posed in this thesis, it is worth reexamining these basic assumptions to see if
they were valid.




the potential use of biological weapons is something to be avoided if possible and
the potential for use can be reduced by making acquisition of such weapons more
difficult.
While, as noted in Chapter 1, it can clearly be argued that anyone trying to acquire
biological weapons does not hold this view, it is clear from the contributions within the
regime meetings that this assumption embodies a widely-held perspective.
The second assumption was elaborated in the following terms:
in the first decade of the twenty-first century many governments aimed to
strengthen the regime to control biological weapons despite US efforts to
downplay the treaty-based elements of the regime.
The scale of activities and contributions to the BWC meetings and, indeed, the continued
level of US engagement with the inter-sessional processes, indicates that this assumption
was valid. While the US remained committed to the BWC during the period under
examination, it also remained staunchly opposed to proposals for additional
legally-binding measures that might be appended to the Convention.
The third assumption related to the nature of biological weapons themselves:
biological weapons have distinct characteristics in relation to their potentials for
use, their acquisition and their political context; meaning that the policy responses
to the threat of biological weapons should have distinct characteristics.
Biological weapons and activities to counter them have clear dissimilarities from many
other areas of international policy.  Potential threats posed by biological weapons are
aggregated by many into a collection of potential threats identified as so-called ‘weapons
of mass destruction’, for which there are a number of policy responses (see Chapter 2).
However, biological weapons have distinct characteristics in relation to their potentials
for use, their acquisition and their political context.  Indeed, if there was a perception that
there were sufficient similarities with other types of prohibited weapons (and chemical
weapons would be the most obvious candidate for this) there would have been calls to
conflate such regimes. The paucity of such calls is a further illustration that biological
weapons are a distinct subject area.
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Once the conclusion is reached that biological weapons have distinct characteristics in
relation to their potentials for use, their acquisition and their political context it follows
that the policy responses to the threat of biological weapons should also have distinct
characteristics (see Chapter 3).  Moreover, as biological weapons are essentially tools for
deliberate disease, the counters to them require the involvement of activities not usually
involved in international policy organs.  It therefore follows that understanding the
problems presented by the issue of biological weapons and the possible solutions there
may be has to be a truly multidisciplinary effort that spans the natural and social sciences.
This thesis therefore has had to go beyond standard political sciences and international
relations areas of study.
Furthermore, the limits of the application of Regime Theory to an issue area such as
the regime to control biological weapons, as identified in Chapter 6, illustrate the clear
dissimilarities of this policy area from many other areas of international policy.
The fourth assumption was elaborated in the following terms:
governments may not act as unified actors in this policy area.
As the list of suggestions made to the Meetings of Experts illustrated, there have been a
wide variety of actors involved within the processes that form the regime to control
biological weapons.  As noted in Chapter 8, the influences on and perspectives of officials
from different ministries and agencies vary across governance structures.  This reinforces
the general finding on human factors, above.
The fifth assumption goes to the core of the work of this thesis:
An assessment of effectiveness of the regime to control biological weapons can
be made in one form or another
At the outset of the work for this thesis, the advice offered to the current author was that
Regime Theory would provide suitable tools for such an assessment of effectiveness.  As
work progressed, and the suitability of Regime Theory for this purpose was being
challenged, this assumption became the assumption most closely tested.
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Chapter 3 concluded that the key challenge that arose within this thesis is the lack of
a previously tested method for understanding effectiveness of a regime such as that to
control biological weapons, noting that while the identified existing writings on the
regime that have been used to understand effectiveness provide lessons and some tools for
application in the chosen area, none were suitable in their entirety for the task required
here.  It was apparent from the variety of problem-oriented approaches identified in
Chapter 3 that each of these might be used as background for an evaluation of success,
failure and other measures of effectiveness of the regime to control biological weapons,
but it became clear that no single measure would encompass all of these approaches.
Hence, in the work of this thesis, more than one aspect of effectiveness would have to be
explored.
While the existing methods that were identified in Chapter 6 that have been used
previously to understand effectiveness within other regimes provide lessons and some
tools for application in relation to a regime such as that to control biological weapons,
none are suitable in their entirety for the task required here.  In addition, the existing
literature on understanding success or failure in a regime like that to control biological
weapons was found to be weak.  Much focused on how ‘robust’ a regime is, rather than its
effectiveness with much of the assessment of effectiveness within Regime Theory relating
to whether a regime enhances cooperation between states, rather than whether the regime
is effective at achieving its objectives.
Much literature and analysis has been reliant on highly contested techniques such as
the use of counterfactual scenarios and limitations of quantitative approaches such as
Oslo-Potsdam were identified (see Chapter 7) as they might be applied in the subject
matter under discussion in this thesis.  Taken with the new frame of reference resulting
from the dual-use nature of the biological weapons problem identified in Chapter 2, it was
clear that new measures for success/failure would need to be developed.
As is shown in Chapter 8, it was indeed possible to define a limited number of
dimensions to help evaluate effectiveness. The consequences of this will be explored in
the section on the Research Questions, below.
There was a final assumption relating to the passage of time:
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The events of 2001 were a watershed for the efforts to control biological weapons.
The rejection by the US of the draft protocol to strengthen the BWC followed by
the use of the US postal service as a delivery system for powdered Bacillus
anthracis forced governments around the world to consider how materials and
technologies that could be used to make biological weapons should be controlled.
As was illustrated in Chapter 4, it was clear that 2001 did indeed mark a clear change in
the types of statements being made regarding effectiveness.  While the protocol
negotiations were on-going, the focus of the potential effectiveness of the regime to
control biological weapons was on what might result from the negotiations.  With the
negotiations halted, how should effectiveness of the regime be understood?  The regimes
to control chemical and nuclear weapons each had global inter-governmental
organizations connected with them and the post-2001 efforts of many governments in
these fields went primarily into strengthening these existing bodies, their interaction with
states and implementation of the relevant treaties within states.  As there was no
inter-governmental organization for the BWC, a number of issues had to be reconsidered
from first principles by some governments.  As Chapter 4 illustrated, the events of 2001
were indeed a watershed for the efforts to control biological weapons.  It is the inputs into
this post-2002 process, and their focus on ‘common understanding and effective action’
that form the basis of this thesis.
Activities involved in preparation of this thesis
A number of activities were carried out in the preparation of this thesis.  Each of them is
described here to illustrate the work involved and the context they were used in.  Each also
has novel elements or other originality.  Also covered in this section is an overview of the
limited ethical issues confronted in carrying out the work of this thesis.
Compilation of the dataset of suggestions — The creation of the dataset of suggestions
made at the inter-sessional Meetings of Experts is the first time that this author is aware of
all of these being put together in a searchable form and being analysed on an individual
basis for characteristics that they may have.
Compilation of the dataset of BWC and other regime-relevant documents — While
there are a number of other gatherings together of BWC-relevant documentation in
electronic form such as the website of the BWC’s Implementation Support Unit, the
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OPBW website run by the University of Bradford and the UN documents server, none is
as comprehensive as the compilation by the present author.  None is as searchable as the
author’s dataset.  Nonetheless, there are gaps, especially in relation to documentation
deriving from the period before desktop publishing was used to generate BWC documents
— a period that predates the focus of the work of this thesis.
Bringing forth practical experience to identify limits to existing academic analysis —
A PhD thesis is by its very definition an academic work.  The role of a practitioner
carrying out such a piece of academic research embodies a two-way exchange — the
examination of existing academic literature together with the testing of practical
experience against that literature.  The examination of academic literature and comparison
with personal experience was time consuming, but provided valuable lessons, especially
where there are gaps between academic writings and real world practice.
Creation of a framework of assessment using dimensions to overcome limitations of
conceptualizing effectiveness — The creation of definitions for four dimensions to sit
within a new framework of assessment for evaluating effectiveness within the regime to
control biological weapons is discussed in detail in the discussion of the first Research
Question, below.
Developing the conjectured generic idealized policy decision to overcome limitations
of analytical techniques that focus on influences towards policy outcomes — The
development of the conjectured generic idealized policy decision, a novel tool for policy
analysis, is discussed in detail in the discussion of the second Research Question, below.
All of these were carried out in the context of interaction with practitioners and
researchers to bring these strands into a cohesive whole.
Ethical issues
For a thesis dealing with an area considered by many as a moral issues, the work in this
thesis has raised very few ethical issues.
Most of the work has been on published writings, in other words open sources
available to all if interested.  The interactions with practitioners has been mostly at
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Ambassadorial level (or their deputies) for a variety of reasons, not least (in the context of
this thesis) that at this level they usually have a good sense of the reasons why their
government has brought forth a suggestion.  It was also useful on an ethical basis to
operate mostly at this level as ambassadors, by the very nature of their role, have been
trained and approved by their governments as their representatives.  While a very junior
member of a delegation could inadvertently be put into a position of jeopardy if they
expressed something in what was perceived by their authorities as an inappropriate
manner, an ambassador should be sufficiently experienced to handle interactions with
researchers.  On occasion, interactions provided some ‘off-the-record’ background
information.  This form of information has been used to inform the work of this thesis, but
has not been cited.
Other issues have a different form of sensitivity.  Indeed, in understanding the utility
of certain technologies for the potential contributions they might make within a
programme to develop biological weapons, a by-product of such research can be the
accumulation of information that itself becomes proliferation sensitive.  Fortunately, it
has been possible to draw up this thesis without reference to proliferation-sensitive
information or breaching confidentiality of otherwise privileged information.
The Research Questions revisited
To recap, the Research Problem that this thesis seeks to resolve can be defined in the
following terms:
How should success or failure, and therefore ‘effectiveness’, in a regime such as
that to control biological weapons be categorised and assessed?
The work examining this Research Problem showed existing tools were not fully capable
of generating useful understandings.  As noted in the discussion relating to the fifth basic
assumption, above, the research within this thesis illustrated the difficulties with a number
of aspects of existing analytical techniques.
The First Research Question




How can the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in relation to the regime to control
biological weapons be broken down into separate dimensions in order to create a
more rigorous framework of assessment?
The work to answer this Research Question resulted in the development of four proposed
dimensions — Threat Ambition, Coherence/Engagement, Availability/Opportunity, and
Resilience and the development of their definitions is outlined in the first section of
Chapter 8.  The term Threat Ambition is novel and was generated during the preparation
of this thesis.
These four proposed dimensions have some overlaps and each have some influence on
each other.  For example, improved Resilience to deliberate release in most jurisdictions
leads to reduced effect of any such release; such a reduced effect leads to a reduced
advantage of use which should lead to a reduced Threat Ambition.
It is possible to argue that three of the dimensions — Coherence/Engagement,
Availability/Opportunity and Resilience — are directly related to implementation of the
regime within any entity’s jurisdiction while the fourth — Threat Ambition — is rooted in
the policy outcomes of other entities that may be inside or outside of the regime.
Sub-questions
The first Research Question had two sub-questions, the first of which was:
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria suggested for use within this assessment
of regime effectiveness be related to the considerations, lessons, perspectives,
recommendations, conclusions and proposals put forward in presentations,
statements, working papers and interventions during meetings of the BWC
inter-sessional processes?
The main test carried out to answer this sub-question was to tabulate the dimensions
against the suggestions made at the BWC inter-sessional Meetings of Experts.  This
tabulation appears as Volume II of this thesis.
The tabulation, and the analysis in Chapter 8, was primarily used to see if the proposed
dimensions would be capable, as a set, to comprehensively cover all of the suggestions
that had been recorded.  The analysis indicated that there were no aspects of the
suggestions made to the Meetings of Experts that fall outside the proposed dimensions,
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although in some cases the suggestions prompted clarifications in the descriptions of the
dimensions as the research work for this thesis progressed.
A number of suggestions were identified as not being practical measures to enhance
the implementation of the Convention and the broader regime it sits at the centre of (in
other words, not a suggestion to enhance the effectiveness of the regime in one form or
another) but were either rhetorical/political, descriptive, or process/procedural.  Examples
of entries in the dataset that were labelled in either of these three categories were discussed
in Chapter 8 in order to illustrate that these weren’t instead suggestions that fell outwith
the dimensions.
All dimensions were represented in the tabulation of suggestions showing all have
relevance to the regime.  No aspects of any of the suggestions, as tabulated in Volume II,
was found to fall outside the four dimensions.  This constituted the first test of the
proposed dimensions.
A limitation of the research approach identified in Chapter 1, that suggestions mainly
followed the scope of the topics allocated to each of the meetings in the inter-sessional
processes, and so potentially did not cover all issues within the regime proved to be only
a partial limitation.  While these topics did not cover all aspects of the regime to control
biological weapons, a read through of other sources such as general debate statements at
the Meetings of States Parties and at the Review Conferences was also carried out in order
to see if any aspects could be identified that would fall outwith the proposed dimensions.
No such aspect could be found, strengthening the confidence in the comprehensive nature
of the dimensions.  This could be regarded as the second test of the proposed dimensions.
It follows, therefore, that the results of the work to answer the first sub-question
provides high confidence that the proposed dimensions represent a comprehensive
coverage of the conceptualization of regime effectiveness amongst participants in the
Meetings of Experts, Meetings of States Parties and Review Conferences.
The second sub-question of the first Research Question was:
Can the possible benchmarks or criteria suggested for use within this assessment




In Chapter 8, the four proposed dimensions were tested against two selected sets of earlier
writings on principles, norms and rules (collectively referred to as obligations within this
thesis) within the regime to control biological weapons.  The writings, examined in
Chapter 3, were chosen to represent the most developed identification of obligations.
The proposed dimensions matched the obligations in earlier writings with the possible
exception of one obligation in the BWC, that of negotiating a chemical weapons
convention.  While it might be possible to argue that the Coherence/Engagement
dimension would cover this at a stretch, the point would be somewhat moot as the
Chemical Weapons Convention has been negotiated and is now in force.  It could also be
argued that the regime to control chemical weapons, while it impinges on the regime to
control biological weapons, is a separate regime.
First Research Question conclusions
Four dimensions have been successfully identified, defined in detail and tested.  In effect,
these proposed dimensions have been tested three times: against the tabulated MX
suggestions; against other papers and statements within BWC meetings; and against
external writings analyzing the regime.  The proposed dimensions have been found to
encompass all of the material they were tested against.  It is therefore reasonable to state
that this provides a strong indication that the proposed dimensions are comprehensive in
their coverage of regime activities.
The research carried out to answer this Research Question has shown how the concept
of ‘effectiveness’ in relation to the regime to control biological weapons can be broken
down into separate dimensions.  This should lead to the creation of a more rigorous
framework of assessment (see below).
The second Research Question
The second Research Question was formulated in the following terms.
Can analysis of policy processes within governmental structures identify whether




Chapter 7 identified four challenges that existing methods for policy analysis do not
overcome in many cases (see page 182 onwards) — the implicit assumption that desirable
policy is a static target (as opposed to movable objectives); that many policy areas are not
subject to overarching decisions which are suitable for analysis as a make or break
moment; that policy processes can be viewed as ongoing flows of activity of various sorts,
all interacting and interweaving; and that most policy analysis is focused on influences
towards particular outcomes.  The analysis suggested that the first three of these did not
necessarily need new tools but potentially could be overcome through researchers seeking
a broader conceptualization of the issues they are investigating.  The fourth challenge is
the most interesting in the context of this thesis.  Policy analysis focused on influences
towards particular outcomes brings with it a severe analytical limitation as correlation
does not equate with causation.  However, an analysis of hindrances/obstacles to
particular outcomes brings with it a means of analysis that allows for a separation of
influences and identification in which circumstances certain influences may have been
critical to a particular outcome.  This is what was the inspiration for the conjectured
generic idealised policy decision.
The conjectured generic idealized policy decision, elaborated in Chapter 7, is a second
new analysis tool, following the new framework of analysis to analyse effectiveness of
regimes.  As the major part of this thesis is about the creation of a new framework of
analysis for evaluating effectiveness within the regime to control biological weapons,
there was some hesitation in using a further new method as a means of triangulation.
Sub-question
The second Research Question had one sub-question:
Can the selected policy analysis methods indicate how obstacles to policy
development be overcome using the considerations, lessons, perspectives,
recommendations, conclusions and proposals put forward in presentations,
statements, working papers and interventions during meetings of the BWC
inter-sessional processes?
Attempts to tabulate the elements of the conjectured generic idealized policy decision
proved cumbersome and uninformative.  The author tharefore took the decision to use
instead the identified hindrances/obstacles in the conjectured generic idealised policy
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decision and attampt to match them against on the record interventions within the BWC
regime.
It would have been possible to have changed the sub-question to formulate it in such
a way as to accommodate what could be achieved through the conjectured generic
idealized policy decision.  However, there is something much more interesting about
setting a target and being able to show the difficulties of reaching that target rather than
resetting the target.  This sense was reinforced by the author’s experience of reformulating
the original research questions before the abandonment of Regime Theory as the
dominant framework of the work of this thesis.
Second Research Question conclusions
The conjectured generic idealized policy decision is an analytical tool derived from
practical experience of real-world policy making. It is not yet fully formed and should be
regarded as a first attempt to create a theoretical abstraction of that experience and the
experience of others.  However, this thesis shows the conjectured generic idealized policy
decision has potential to highlight particular aspects in a decision area such as the control
of biological weapons.
The analysis of policy processes within governmental structures can indeed identify
that activities within the regime to control biological weapons impinge upon them.
Research Problem conclusions
The Research Problem asked how success or failure, and therefore ‘effectiveness’, in a
regime such as that to control biological weapons should be categorised and assessed.
The proposed set of dimensions can be shown with high confidence to encompass all
aspects of the regime to control biological weapons.  This provides some useful
categorisation, but can the dimensions be used as a practical tool for assessment?
This goes beyond what was asked in the first Research Question which guided the
practical work of the thesis, but does fall within the overarching Research Problem.
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A basic conclusion on any framework of assessment built on the dimensions is that it
is possible to show movement in individual dimensions but not in a directly quantitative
manner.
However, the reverse of the four questions creates a tool to help guide policy making.
It is possible to use these dimensions as a tool in development of new policy by using the
dimensions to evaluate and further develop suggestions before they are made on the
international stage through basic questions: ‘will this policy proposal reduce Threat
Ambition or Availability/Opportunity’ or ‘will it enhance Coherence/Engagement or
Resilience’?
A further difficulty in transforming the proposed dimensions instantly into a new
practical assessment tool is coming to a conclusion about how much is enough in each of
the dimensions.  Or to use more traditional academic language, what would be the
idealised end point of each dimension?
On one level, the idealised end point for the Threat Ambition and the
Availability/Opportunity dimension would be zero.  However, each has some
complications.  For the first of these, a Threat Ambition of zero would always be
impossible to confirm with any certainty owing to the nature of political processes in
contexts where it is most likely that any ambition to acquire biological weapons would be
acted upon in a covert manner.  For the Availability/Opportunity dimension, a potential of
zero availability would be superfically attractive; however, the dual-use nature of relevant
materials and technologies means that any control system that might provide an absolute
guarantee of no misuse of transferred materials, for example, would also be likely to
hinder legitimate peaceful uses.  It is therefore unclear what an idealised end point for this
dimension would be.
The idealised end points for the Coherence/Engagement and the Resilience dimension
are also indeterminate as they both have unclear answers to the basic question of ‘how
much is enough?’
Towards the end of the preparation of this thesis, a new simplified way of
summarizing the dimensions came to mind.  The dimensions could also be described in
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the following terms: the Threat Ambition dimension equates with acting to reduce
motivation to do bad things [the demand side]; the Availability/Opportunity dimension
equates with acting to reduce opportunities to do bad things [the supply side]; the
Coherence/Engagement dimension equates with making it work together; and the
Resilience dimension equates with reducing the impact if it all goes wrong.
Although this simplification loses some of the details of the dimensions, the
reformulation may potentially make the dimensions easier to understand and so could
facilitate use in other areas.
Limitations relating to the research
Aside from the usual limits of time and space in the preparation of a thesis, a number of
areas of limitations of the research carried out were identified.  This section starts with
some general observations then looks at some specific areas relating to the definitions of
the dimensions, theory issues and theory/policy gap issues.
Limitations arose from the original design of the thesis as it started as an examination
of how the European Union’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy had evolved and
how the EU was learning to face new challenges in this sphere.  To fulfil this original
purpose, a case study of the regime to control biological weapons in the period starting
2001 was selected.  This case study would be evaluated against the body of literature
known as ‘Regime Theory’.  However, it became apparent as the work progressed that
there were few existing practical tools to evaluate effectiveness in such a regime, all of
which had significant limitations or flaws in their application (see Chapter 6).  The lack of
a means to evaluate effectiveness created significant methodological limitations as to how
the activities of the EU, its institutions and its member states could be analysed.  As time
progressed, the work for the thesis ended up being dominated by the process of creating a
framework of assessment to evaluate effectiveness to the extent that it became logical to
make this methodology the primary focus of the thesis.
A key limitation of how the thesis turned out is the pre-eminent danger in using two
new methods in the triangulation as there may be errors that may not be detected if there
were to be related flaws in the two frameworks (and as the two were generated in the same
brain, they could both be impacted upon by a common error or an unrecognized implicit
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assumption).  While it might appear to be better to attempt triangulation of a new
framework against an existing established framework, the limitations of the existing
frameworks for the area under examination outweigh the benefit of trying new techniques.
Dimension definition issues
One limitation in the research within this thesis arises from the definitions of the
dimensions.  The dimensions have what might be described as opposite directions of
travel which seemed to cause some confusion with some people the author interacted with
while developing the dimension definitions.
The situation is that any enhancement of the Coherence/Engagement or the Resilience
dimension relates to an enhancement of the aspects embodied within those dimensions.
The reverse happens with the other two dimensions; any enhancement of the Threat
Ambition or the Availability/Opportunity dimension relates to a diminution of the aspects
embodied within those dimensions.  In other words, an enhancement of the Threat
Ambition dimension should lead to reductions in desires to carry out activities prohibited
within the regime and an enhancement of the Availability/Opportunity dimension should
lead to reductions in opportunities to carry out activities prohibited within the regime.
Attempts were made during the dimension development phase to find language that
would ease this confusion.  One example was an attempt to see if the dimensions could be
considered to have opposite polarities.  Alas, this seemed to simply add to the confusion.
If this limitation were to be overcome through new definitions being developed this
might help make these dimensions a more user-friendly tool.
General theory issues
As highlighted in the discussion of the third basic assumption, above, understanding the
problems presented by the issue of biological weapons and the possible solutions there
may be has to be a truly multidisciplinary effort that spans the natural and social sciences.
This thesis therefore has to go beyond standard political sciences and international
relations literature.  The examples provided within Chapter 5 illustrated that a thesis such
as this must be informed from a variety of theoretical inputs.
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This need for a broad theoretical base highlights the point that any theoretical
construct under consideration should contribute an element of explaining why something
happens or why something has significance in order to be of any use.
This need to be informed from a variety of theoretical inputs had some implications
for the structure of this thesis, making it somewhat front-end heavy in the resulting thesis.
The need to deal with either informative or potentially confounding areas of theory, such
as those dealing with innovation, human constructs and the concept of the adjacent
possible was compelling, even though there may be little overt reference to these bodies
of literature in the chapters of substantive work of the thesis, they have proved very
valuable in framing the work herein.
A second area of theory issues is that conceptual analysis is not the same as textual
analysis and the latter seems to get much more attention in academic research, not least as
it is simpler to take a body of text and analyse it for various terms than it is to create
abstractions of the concepts underlying the issues.  As noted elsewhere in this thesis, there
are language issues relevant to the research as the language of diplomacy means that terms
can carry loaded meanings beyond what might be understood in everyday use.  This was
evident within the research for this thesis when trying to conceptualize effectiveness.  The
phrase ‘assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention
... are being realized’ is an example of the embodiment of the concept of effectiveness by
another name. This had potential to be a confounding factor in the research here.  While
efforts were made to identify such alternative formulations, it would be impossible to give
a guarantee that all had been found.  The thus undeterminable question of how many more
alternative phrases there might be is a limitation on the conceptual analysis in this thesis.
Theory/policy gap issues
The theory/policy gap was analysed in general terms in Chapter 5.
The key theory/policy gap conclusion is one highlighted at the end of Chapter 6
regarding examination of regime success/failure as a measure of effectiveness and
identification of it being outside the scope of academic study and in particular Regime
Theory.  It is worth remembering the perspective that: ‘The most fundamental and most
widely discussed of these purposes [of regimes] is the enhancement of the ability of states
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to cooperate in the issue area’ (as quoted on page 154).  As it was noted in the conclusions
of Chapter 6:
For a regime such as one relating to trade, this would be a useful measure of
success if 99 per cent of regime members were cooperating with enhanced ability
or capacity — any other member would essentially be irrelevant.  But on the other
hand, according to this measure a weapons-control regime in which over 99 per
cent of the participants had been cooperating extremely well would also be seen
as effective by this ‘most fundamental’ measure, even if another participant had
caused millions of fatalities with the weapons that were supposed to be under
control.  As this proposition is clearly absurd, new suggestions for evaluating
success/failure are required.
It is hoped that the work within this thesis reduces the gap in this specific area.  However,
it is clear that this does not provide a sufficient solution to close this gap.
The second area of theory/policy gaps issues revolves around intelligibility issues.
Academics do not seem to find time to interact with practitioners and practitioners rarely
have time to consider academic literature nor adopt academic concepts.  This means that
common lexicons do not exist — the same concept in academic language can end up
expressed very differently in the language of diplomacy.  A simple example of the
divergence of the use of the term ‘consensus’ was identified within the thesis.
It would be fundamentally dishonest as a researcher with practical experience to
ignore the gap between practice in the real world and the academic literature.  This has
resulted in a thesis that is less heavy in some ways on existing academic literature, but also
heavy on gaps identified through practical experience.  It is valuable to consider existing
literature but there are times it is more valuable to establish what knowledge from
practitioners can be codified into information.
Further research
There are a number of areas of future research that have been highlighted through the
research for this thesis.
Further research relating to the dimensions
Some potentials for confusion in the definitions of the dimensions were identified in the
limitations of research section above.  These would be worthy of further research.
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Having established the comprehensiveness of these four dimensions, it may be worth
examining whether the same methodology could be used to evaluate measures within
other regimes that control things.  While the regimes to control chemical weapons,
nuclear weapons, land mines and small arms, just to take a few examples, all have some
similarities and some differences with the regime to control biological weapons, it would
be of interest to examine activities within those regimes against the proposed dimensions.
Regimes used to question existing methods for regime analysis were those to eradicate
polio or smallpox (see page 155).  Clear dissimilarities between these regimes and the
regime to control biological weapons mean that the proposed dimensions would be likely
to be inappropriate tools for analysis in these cases, not least as the concept of Threat
Ambition would be fairly meaningless in such a context.
Chapter 9 highlighted a specific area in which further research could be productive,
but only if certain new information became available about entities having been at
particular stages of the Threat Ambition hierarchy at specific times.  The five point plus
null success/failure  hierarchy identified in the discussion on the Threat Ambition
dimension (see Chapter 8, page 199 onwards) would split entities into six groups — users,
integrators, possessors, acquirers, aspirers, and regime compliant.  Any analysis would
need to take into account that these categories will include entities that are within the
formal elements of the regime to control biological weapons and some that are outside.
This therefore would create twelve de facto categories for analysis.  However, such
research could only be carried out with new information identified above.
Further research relating to the conjectured generic idealized policy decision
The conjectured generic idealized policy decision has shown to have potential as a
practical tool but the roughness around the edges makes it a fruitful area for further
research.  There is a need to deal with the overlaps within the hindrances/obstacles
definitions, as identified in the conclusions to Chapter 9, particularly in the cost and
benefit sections and those in the capacities and skills sections.  It would also be productive




As noted in Chapter 7, the development of the conjectured generic idealized policy
decision arose from the author’s practical experience during which three groups of factors
relating to decision making had been identified (these were outlined initially in Chapter 5,
see page 136 onwards) – power/status, finance/resources and intellect/knowledge.  One
potential area of further research would be to see how well policy analysis tools match
these three groups.  As noted earlier, it can be seen from the most cursory of examinations
that the power/status group is the focus of most realist analysis, finance/resources the
focus of neoliberal political economy approaches and intellect/knowledge the focus of
normative thinking or constructivist approaches.  However, would a more detailed
analysis support such a cursory examination?  In such a case, a routine analytical process
that looked at each of these groups of factors relating to decision making with regard to
any policy decision would then assist in identifying appropriate tools for analysing that
decision such that, for example, if the predominant influences on a particular policy,
realist analytical tools are most likely to produce useful analysis.  As noted earlier, most
of the parsimonious theories apply only to decisions in which the most relevant group of
these factors predominates.
It was suggested in the sub-section on further research relating to the proposed
dimensions that it may be worth examining whether the same methodology could be used
to evaluate measures within other regimes.  The same logic would apply to further
research relating to the conjectured generic idealized policy decision.  Moreover, in this
case, this tool could be relevant to regimes such as those to eradicate polio or smallpox.
Indeed, within the efforts to eradicate polio one of the clearest obstacles has been that in
some areas locals who are able to express power (often through violence) have prevented
vaccination teams being able to work.  This has sometimes been so extreme as to result in
fatalities amongst these teams.  A clear case of ‘those in power lose power/status from the
decision’ or ‘those in power don’t understand the purpose of the decision’.
This thesis and the real world
The final conclusions of this thesis relate to research in a real world context.
The focus of the work contained within this text is biological warfare — a particularly
unpleasant method for humans to wreak devastation and destruction on themselves and on
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the planet.  It can be difficult to analyse such a dreadful aspect of humanity without being
changed by it.  Indeed, many people do not engage with the subject matter because of its
distasteful nature and this is of concern as the only way to manage the threat from the
hostile uses of the life sciences is to engage with the problem.  JBS Haldane expressed
similar feelings in his classic work on air raid precautions prior to the Second World War:
I hate having to write this book.  Air raids are not only wrong.  They are loathsome
and disgusting.  If you had ever seen a child smashed by a bomb into something
like a mixture of dirty rags and cat’s meat you would realize this fact as intensely
as I do.  And I sympathize with the attitude of those who feel that the whole
business is so horrible that they will have nothing to do with it.1
Policy choices made in this area have direct impacts.  Biological and chemical
weapons have been used in Zhejiang, Sardasht and Halabja, amongst others.  During the
preparation of this thesis there was the horrific use of sarin in the East Ghouta area of
Damascus.  It would be the highest form of disrespect to the dead, and those whose
suffering still lingers, to treat their passing as simply the basis of a discussion of theory,
unless that discussion of theory can be shown to enhance understanding of the chain of
circumstances that led to their deaths and so to enhance understanding of which policy
options might make future deaths less likely.
Empiricism has fallen from fashion in the academic world.  While it obviously has its
limitations, there cannot be any doubt that some areas of study, and this includes the
regime to control biological weapons, are dealing with real world issues that have
short-term and long-term practical consequences.  The fashionable view that there are no
such things as ‘facts’, and that all things are open to interpretation has superficial
attraction; an attraction that is somewhat diminished when establishing the cause of death
of hundreds, if not thousands, of people in an alleged attack with prohibited weapons.
The motivation for the preparation of this thesis has been the understanding that
particular policies, activities and events have potential to either bring about death and
destruction on a large scale or to enhance public health and promote public safety.  With
this in mind, deliberate efforts have been made to make this thesis both readable and
intelligible to those who may have a chance to influence policy in the future.
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Note on referencing systems
 Oxford style has been chosen for referencing as there are significant limitations to the
Harvard system of referencing for a thesis such as this.  For some chapters, there is a
heavy reliance on papers by governments presented to intergovernmental meetings.
Under the Harvard system for referencing, the author of the paper given would be the
conference, so for the 2009 Meeting of Experts under the Biological Weapons Convention
the reference to a Working Paper would be of the form (BWC, 2009v) as there were 28
Working Papers submitted.  As the analysis within this thesis derives from the positions
of the States Parties to that Convention (and it is States Parties, either individually or in
groups, which submitted the Working Papers) it is of considerable assistance to the reader
to utilise Oxford style instead.  Moreover, there are instances where statements are made
at ameeting that are driven by the views of the Ambassador who may have different
emphases from those of the predecessor or successor in that post.  For a thesis of this
nature, it is therefore useful to be able to provide that data where available.
A second issue with Harvard referencing is the aim of reducing information to a bare
minimum with no additional data added.  This can cause further misleading situations.
Take the book by Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State
Power from Messina to Maastricht, that was published in the UK by Routledge in 1999.
This book was initially published by Cornell University Press in the USA in 1998 and it
would appear that the pagination was different for that edition.  Under Harvard
referencing it would be considered inappropriate to add ‘[Note: this book was initially
published by Cornell University Press in 1998.]’ into the bibliographic reference.1
Selection of a referencing system raises issues of exclusivity, most notably on the
basis of gender.  There had been a presumption that the academic world was so small that
only a surname and initial(s) would be needed to identify individuals.  As the Oxford
Manual of Style, now subsumed into the Oxford Style Manual, notes:
A couple of generations ago, British academic authors were known by their
initials, and female authors were so rare relatively that the convention of spelling
Bibliography and Index
307
1. A similar situation occurs with Tom Mangold’s work, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological
Warfare, published by Macmillan in the UK in September 1999 at 416 pages (ISBN 0333716140)
also published as Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare published by St
Martin’s Press in the USA in February 2000 at 336 pages (ISBN 0312203535).
out their names was considered not only gallant but useful, so as to avoid the faux
pas of unwittingly referring to a female author as he.2
In pursuing the removal of gender distinctions, some referencing systems chose to cite
everyone in the previously male style.  Others decided that the retention of whole names
for both sexes was beneficial:
citing forenames by initials only is not a service to the reader.3
 Indeed, it could be argued that removal of useful data — the forenames — goes against
academic principles.
In the electronic era, the use of full names is of considerable benefit.  It is much more
difficult to carry out a search in digital texts for ‘Smith, J’ and find what you are looking
for than it is to search for ‘John Smith’. 
For all of these reasons, Oxford referencing is used within this thesis.
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2. R.M. Ritter (ed.), Oxford Style Manual, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1033 pp at p 506.
3. Ibid.
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